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Decisions 1975-1976
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1. MARYLAND COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS - INVES-
TIGATORY AND ENFORCEMENT POWERS - Banach v. State Commis-
sion on Human Relations,' State Commission on Human Relations v.
Amecom. 2 - Article 49B of the Maryland Annotated Code prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
marital status, or physical or mental handicap, and establishes the
Commission on Human Relations, an administrative agency, to enforce the
statutory anti-discrimination provisions.3 The Commission has jurisdiction
over alleged discriminatory practices involving public accommodations,
4
employment,5 housing,6 and financing.
7
When an individual believes that he is a victim of discrimination, he
may file a complaint with the Commission.8 Moreover, the Commission.
itself is authorized to file a complaint in its own name upon receipt of
reliable information of a discriminatory practice, provided a preliminary
investigation discloses that the filing of a complaint is warranted. 9 Once a
complaint is filed, either by an individual or by the Commission, it is
referred to the Commission's staff for a "prompt investigation."' 0 The
Commission has the power to subpoena witnesses, books, papers, records,
and documents relevant for proceedings designed to administer and enforce
the anti-discrimination provisions of the statute." If the investigation
reveals probable cause for believing that a discriminatory act has been
committed, the Commission's staff must attempt to resolve it through
"conference, conciliation and persuasion."' 2 In the event that no conciliation
agreement can be reached, the respondent is served with notice to appear at
a hearing to answer the charges in the complaint.' 3 If the Commission finds
at the hearing that the respondent has engaged in a discriminatory act,' 4
the Commission shall issue an order requiring the respondent to cease and
1. 277 Md. 502, 356 A.2d 242 (1976).
2. 278 Md. 120, 360 A.2d 1 (1976).
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B (1972, Cum. Supp. 1976).
4. See id. § 11 (1972).
5. See id. §§ 17, 18, 19, 20 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
6. See id. § 21 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
7. See id. § 23 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
8. Id. § 12(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
9. Id. § 12(b) (1972).
10. Id. § 13(a) (1972).
11. Id. § 14(d) (1972).
12. Id. § 13(b) (1972).
13. Id. § 14(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
14. Id. § 14(e) (1972).
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desist from the discriminatory act and "to take such affirmative action as
will effectuate the purposes of the particular subtitle [prohibiting that
discrimination].' 5
Recent decisions of the Court of Appeals and legislative amendments to
article 49B have resulted in a significant expansion of the powers of the
Commission on Human Relations. In Banach v. State Commission on
Human Relations16 the Court of Appeals considered whether the Commis-
sion's subpoena powers extended to preliminary investigations. The
Commission had attempted to obtain information regarding employment
practices from the A.S. Abell Company, publisher of the Baltimore Sun
newspapers, pursuant to section 12(b), which requires a preliminary
investigation before the Commission may issue a colnplaint in its own
name.17 After Banach, the personnel manager, refused to provide the
Commission with the requested information, the Commission issued a
subpoena duces tecum directing him to appear with the desired records. 18
When Banach failed to produce the records, the Commission obtained
enforcement of the subpoena in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.19 The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to consideration of Banach's
appeal by the Court of Special Appeals. 2°
Banach contended that section 14(d) did not give the Commission the
power to issue subpoenas in connection with a section 12(b) preliminary
investigation, arguing, instead, that subpoena power attends only to the
prompt investigation mandated by section 13 and to the section 14
hearing.21 In analyzing the language of the statute authorizing the
Commission to issue subpoenas, the Court of Appeals found the use of the
word "proceedings" in section 14(d) to be significant,22 noting that this term
is one of broad scope which encompasses the investigatory as well as the
adjudicatory process. 23 Reasoning also that the General Assembly would not
15. Id. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the respondent has not
committed the alleged discriminatory act, the Commission shall issue an order
dismissing the complaint. Id. § 14(f) (1972). The statute makes the filing of an
unfounded and malicious complaint a misdemeanor. Id. § 15(b) (1972).
16. 277 Md. 502, 356 A.2d 242 (1976).
17. Section 12(b) provides:
Whenever the Commission has received reliable information from any
individual or individuals that any person has been engaged or is engaged in
any discriminatory practice within the scope of this article, and after a
preliminary investigation by the Commission's staff authorized by the
chairman or vice-chairman it is satisfied that said information warrants the
filing of a complaint, the Commission, on its own motion, and by action of not
less than four commissioners, may issue a complaint in its name in the same
manner as if the complaint has been filed by an individual.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 12(b) (1972).
18. 277 Md. at 505, 356 A.2d at 245.
19. Id. at 504, 356 A.2d at 244.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 506, 356 A.2d at 245-46.
22. Id. at 509, 356 A.2d at 247.
23. Id. at 509-10, 356 A.2d at 247; see 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 3.01, at 159-60 (1958).
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require the Commission to conduct a preliminary investigation yet deny it
the necessary tools with which to investigate,24 the court concluded, over the
dissent of Chief Judge Murphy,25 that the Commission has the power to
issue subpoenas in connection with a section 12(b) preliminary investiga-
tion.2
6
A more significant problem is that of fashioning an appropriate remedy
for the victim of discrimination. The Court of Appeals first considered the
remedies provided by article 49B in the 1974 case of Gutwein v. Easton
Publishing Co.27 Following discharge by Easton Publishing Co. from his
employment as a newspaper reporter, Paul Gutwein, a white male, filed a
complaint with the Human Relations Commission, alleging that his
employment had been terminated because Easton had discovered that his
fiancee was black. 28 After investigation and a hearing, the Commission
concluded that Gutwein's allegation was true and determined that the
discharge constituted a violation of article 49B, section 19(a), which makes
discharge of an individual because of his race an unlawful employment
practice. 29 On the basis of this determination, the Commission ordered
Easton to pay the complainant compensatory damages for lost pay and
24. 277 Md. at 512, 356 A.2d at 249.
25. Chief Judge Murphy focused mainly on the structure of article 49B. Id. at
517-20, 356 A.2d at 251-54. Because § 13 requires the Commission to refer any
complaint to the staff for an investigation, a complaint filed by the Commission itself
after a § 12(b) investigation would undergo a second investigation, with each
investigation being subject to subpoena powers. Chief Judge Murphy asserted that
the majority's interpretation therefore results in a duplication of procedures,
rendering the § 13 investigation "nugatory and duplicitous." Id. at 519, 356 A.2d at
253. But even with accompanying subpoena powers, there is no reason to expect that
a § 12(b) preliminary investigation will be as extensive as a § 13 investigation. The
second investigatory procedure would be duplicitous only to the extent that the
Commission sought the same information.
26. 277 Md. at 512-13, 356 A.2d at 249. In Solely v. State Comm'n on Human
Relations, 277 Md. 521, 356 A.2d 254 (1976), a companion case to Banach, the Court of
Appeals held that the Commission clearly has the authority to issue subpoenas
pursuant to a § 13 investigation. Id. at 525, 356 A.2d at 257.
More recently, the Court of Appeals held that the Commission has authority
to investigate discriminatory employment practices allegedly committed by public
agencies of the state's political subdivisions. State Comm'n on Human Relations v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 280 Md. 35, 371 A.2d 645 (1977). Additionally, the General
Assembly has brought state agencies within the ambit of article 49B. See ch. 706,1977
Md. Laws.
27. 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975).
28. Id. at 565, 325 A.2d at 741.
29. Section 19(a) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, marital status, or physical or
mental handicap unrelated in nature so as to reasonably preclude the
performance of the employment ....
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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moving expenses. 30 In ordering this remedy, the Commission relied on the
authority conferred by section 14(e), 31 which empowers the Commission to
order a violator "to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the
purpose of the particular subtitle [violated]. '32 On appeal, the Circuit Court
for Talbot County reversed the Commission's order, holding that section
19(a) did not prohibit discharge for interracial association. 3 Because the
circuit court found no violation of section 19(a), it declined to decide whether
the Commission had the power to award compensatory damages.
After reversing the lower court's ruling that Easton, did not violate
section 19(a),34 the court considered the question whether the "affirmative
action" provision of section 14(e) granted the Commission the power to
award compensatory damages. The court observed that the stated purpose of
the subtitle on discrimination in employment is to prohibit discrimination in
employment. 35 Placing emphasis on the word "prohibit" in section 17, the
court concluded that the General Assembly empowered the Commission only
to prevent discriminatory acts.3 The absence of language in section 14(e)
specifically authorizing the Commission to award compensatory damages
was construed as an indication that the legislature did not intend to provide
such a remedy.37 The court concluded, then, that although a violation of the
30. 272 Md. at 566, 325 A.2d at 742.
31. Id. at 565, 325 A.2d at 741.
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 14(e) (1972).
33. 272 Md. at 564, 567, 325 A.2d at 741, 742.
34. The court stated: "The race of Gutwein's fiancee was manifestly not the only
reason for his dismissal; rather Gutwein's employment was terminated because he
was white and was intimately associated with a black woman, a relationship so
offensive to Easton as to cause it to discharge Gutwein from his position." Id. at
567-68, 325 A.2d at 742-43 (footnote omitted).
35. Section 17, a statement of legislative purpose, provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Maryland, in the exercise
of its police power for the protection of the public safety, public health and
general welfare, for the maintenance of business and good government and
for the promotion of the State's trade, commerce and manufacturers to assure
all persons equal opportunity in receiving employment and in all labor
management-union relations regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry or
national origin, sex, age, marital status, or physical or mental handicap
unrelated in nature and extent so as to reasonably preclude the performance
of the employment, and to that end to prohibit discrimination in employment
by any person, group, labor organization, organization or any employer or his
agents.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 17 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
36. 272 Md. at 569, 325 A.2d at 743.
37. Id. at 574-75, 325 A.2d at 746. The court noted similar results in other
jurisdictions. See Mendota Apartments v. D.C. Commission on Human Rights, 315
A.2d 832 (D.C. 1974); Murphy v. Industrial Commission, 37 Wis. 2d 704, 157 N.W.2d
568 (1968).
The court also relied on the legislative history of the acts establishing the
Commission. 272 Md. at 575-76, 325 A.2d at 746-47. The Human Relations
Commission had its genesis in the Interracial Commission of 1927, which was
authorized to consider questions concerning the welfare of Maryland's black
residents. In addition, the Commission had the authority to promulgate regulations
[VOL. 37
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law had occurred, neither remedy for the victim nor sanction against the
wrongdoer was available.3 8
In 1975 the General Assembly made a cautious response to the Gutwein
decision. Section 4 of article 49B was enacted authorizing the Commission,
after a complaint has been filed, to seek a temporary injunction in order to
preserve the status of the parties and prevent irreparable harm pending
administrative disposition of the complaint. 39 On its face section 4 did not
seem to be an adequate solution to the problem posed by Gutwein, for if the
individual had already been discharged, he would still be left without a
remedy under the statute. Alternatively, section 4 might be used to protect
persons such as Gutwein if it were construed as authorizing temporary
reinstatement of a discharged employee. Once the Commission found the
complaint to be meritorious, it could prevent the discharge of the previously
reinstated employee by ordering the respondent to cease and desist from
discriminating against the complainant. The validity of this broader
reading of section 4 came before the Court of Appeals in State Commission
on Human Relations v. Amecom.40 Amecom involved an action by the
Commission seeking temporary reinstatement of a discharged employee
pending resolution of her complaint alleging that her dismissal had been
and had plenary investigatory powers. Ch. 559, 1927 Md. Laws. The Commission was
reduced to a study group in 1943 when it was divested of its regulatory and
investigatory functions. Its new name, the Commission to Study Problems Affecting
the Colored Population, reflected this change. Ch. 431, 1943 Md. Laws. Since then,
however, the trend has been toward a gradual but consistent expansion of the
Commission's jurisdiction and enforcement powers. In 1963 the Commission acquired
enforcement powers. Ch. 227-28, 1963 Md. Laws. Later the Commission's jurisdiction
was expanded to include discrimination in employment, ch. 717, 1965 Md. Laws, and
discrimination in housing, Ch. 324, 1971 Md. Laws. In 1969 the Commission was
given the authority to seek enforcement of its orders in court. Ch. 153, 1969 Md. Laws.
With the addition of § 4, the Commission gained the power to seek temporary
injunctions. Ch. 419, 1975 Md. Laws. The court apparently viewed the Commission's
history of fluctuating powers as an indication that the legislature intended to
maintain strict control over its functions.
38. Whether the "affirmative action" provision of § 14(e) permitted reinstatement
was not at issue in Gutwein. However, the availability of such a remedy would seem
doubtful in view of the court's emphasis that neither § 14(e) nor § 17 concerns
remedying the effects of employment discrimination, preventing economic loss, or
redressing individual rights. See 272 Md. at 569, 325 A.2d at 743.
The Gutwein holding was followed in State Comm'n on Human Relations v.
Malakoff, 273 Md. 214, 329 A.2d 8 (1974). In Malakoff the Commission had determined
that the respondents were guilty of racial discrimination in refusing to rent a home to
the black complainant. It then awarded the complainant $1,500 in damages for
humiliation. The Court of Appeals, relying on Gutwein as controlling authority,
invalidated the award. Id. at 217 n.3, 329 A.2d at 11 n.3.
39. At any time after a complaint has been filed, if the Commission believes that
appropriate civil action is necessary to preserve the status of the parties or to
prevent irreparable harm from the time the complaint is filed until the time of
its final disposition, the Commission may bring action to obtain a temporary
injunction.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 4 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
40. 278 Md. 120, 360 A.2d 1 (1976).
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discriminatory. 41 The Circuit Court for Prince George's County dismissed
the Commission's bill of complaint for an injunction, ruling that reinstate-
ment was not available relief under section 4.42 The Court of Appeals did not
reach the question of whether section 4 authorizes the Commission to seek
temporary reinstatement of an employee subsequent to discharge,43
however, for it held that the General Assembly had not intended section 4 to
be applied retroactively.44 Thus, the availability of remedies for a discharged
employee remained in doubt.
The General Assembly further amended article 49B during the 1977
session. The remedies contained in section 14(e) were expanded to grant the
Commission the authority to order "reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay. . ., or any other equitable relief that is deemed
appropriate.' 4 Although the expansion of the Commission's authority
eliminates the paradox of Gutwein and dispels the uncertainty over section 4
left after Amecom, 46 difficulties remain. Hiring or reinstatement may not be
41. The complaint, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation for previous sworn
testimony, was originally filed with the United States Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commission. It was referred to the Maryland Commission on Human Relations
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1974). 278 Md. at 121-22, 360 A.2d at 2-3. For a
discussion of the practice of deferral, see Shawe, Employment Discrimination - The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Deferral Quagmire, 5 U. BALT.
L. REV. 221 (1976).
42. 278 Md. at 122-23, 360 A.2d at 3.
43. Id. at 123, 360 A.2d at 3.
44. The allegedly discriminatory discharge had occurred prior to the effective date
of §4. The Court of Appeals held that the General Assembly, by providing an
interlocutory remedy prior to a determination of the merits of the complaint, had
created a new substantive right. In the absence of an expression of legislative intent
to the contrary, the court followed the general presumption that statutes affecting
substantive rights be given only prospective application. Id. at 123-27, 360 A.2d at
3-6.
45. The amendment to section 14(e) provides:
If the respondent is found to have engaged in or to be engaging in an
unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the remedy may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment
practice), or any other equitable relief that is deemed appropriate. The award
of monetary relief shall be limited to a two-year period, except that such two-
year period shall not apply to losses incurred between the time of the
Commission's final determination and the final determination by the circuit
court or higher appellate court, as the case may be. Interim earning or
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons
discriminated against shall operate to reduce the monetary relief otherwise
allowable. In cases of discrimination other than those involving employment,
non-monetary relief may be granted to the complainant.
Ch. 937, 1977 Md. Laws.
46. It is unlikely that the question of whether § 4 authorizes temporary
reinstatement will be litigated again. Now that the Commission can provide a remedy
subsequent to discharge, a complainant need not secure reinstatement prior to
resolution of the case.
(VOL. 37
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possible. Furthermore, as a practical matter, it is questionable whether the
remedy of reinstatement is always desirable. Once the acrimony of litigation
has invaded the relationship between the employer and the employee, it may
be difficult for them to resume working productively with each other.
4 7
Therefore, the question naturally arises whether the amendment authorizes
the Commission to make a damage award independent of reinstatement in
employment discrimination cases. The statute does not clearly permit a
damage remedy, as did the original proposed amendment to section 14(e).48
Therefore, it could be argued that the General Assembly did not intend to
give the Commission that power.49 On the other hand, one may argue that
47. It is for this reason that courts do not award specific performance to an
employee for an employer's breach of an employment contract; monetary damages are
considered a more appropriate remedy. See Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 177 Md. 248,
254-55, 9 A.2d 639, 641 (1939). Moreover, Maryland courts have refused to award
specific performance for an employer's breach of an employment contract even when
damages are not ascertainable. Id. at 255-56, 9 A.2d at 642.
But see J. WITHERSPOON, ADMINISTRATIvE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
194 (1968).
48. "The Commission may require payment of monetary damages in cases
involving discrimination in employment. In addition the Commission may provide
other nonmonetary relief to victims of discrimination. The monetary award shall be
limited to direct financial loss resulting from employment." H. B. 458, Md. Gen.
Assembly, 1977 Sess., § 14(e).
49. The question of whether an administrative agency has the constitutional
power to award compensatory damages was litigated in County Council v. Investors
Funding, 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973). The Montgomery County Council enacted
the Fair Landlord Tenant Relations Act and created an agency, the Office of
Landlord-Tenant Affairs, to administer it. MONTGOMERY CoUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 93A
(1972). The agency was given broad remedial powers, including the power to award
compensatory damages, id. § 9(c)(iii), which were challenged on the ground that the
grant of power violated article 4, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution:
The Judicial power of this State shall be vested in a Court of Appeals, and
such intermediate courts of appeal, as shall be provided by law by the General
Assembly, Circuit Courts, Orphans' Courts, such Courts for the City of
Baltimore, as are hereinafter provided for, and a District Court. All said
courts shall be Courts of Record ....
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
The Court of Appeals held that "the grant of remedial powers to the
Commission to award money damages. . . does not constitute an invalid delegation
of judicial power to an administrative agency in violation of the Maryland
Constitution." 270 Md. at 440-41, 312 A.2d at 245. The court's holding rested largely
on the reservation of ultimate authority in the courts. Id. at 432, 312 A.2d at 241. The
court reasoned that the determinations of the administrative agency would always be
reviewable in the courts, and that the agency must seek enforcement of its orders in
the courts. Id. at 436-37, 312 A.2d at 243. The Court of Appeals also found the powers
of the agency to be constitutional because they were delegated on the basis of the
declared public interest and were quasi-judicial, rather than judicial, in nature. Id. at
438, 312 A.2d at 243-44. Although the agency was permitted by its statute to
adjudicate matters formerly decided by the courts, this factor was not considered
determinative. Id. at 437, 312 A.2d at 244.
For an analysis of Investors Funding, see Tomlinson, Constitutional Limits
on the Decisional Powers of Courts and Administrative Agencies in Maryland, 35 MD.
L. REV. 414, 449-56 (1976).
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the section clearly does not establish exclusive categories of remedies.50 The
enforcement provision of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Act,
containing language strikingly similar to that of section 14(e), 51 has been
construed to authorize damage awards.5 2 A similar interpretation of section
In light of Investors Funding, the grant of authority to the Commission on
Human Relations to award compensatory damages would appear clearly constitu-
tional. Such a power would be delegated to preserve the declared public interest of
assuring equal opportunity in employment. Certainly the Commission's power to
award compensatory damages could be characterized as quasi-judicial in nature as
was the authority in Investors Funding. More importantly, a respondent desiring to
challenge an order to pay compensatory damages could seek review in the courts.
Alternatively, the respondent could simply disobey the order, thus making it
necessary for the Commission to seek enforcement of its order in the courts.
50. The amendment states clearly that relief "is not limited to" reinstatement
with back pay. See note 45 supra.
51. If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment
agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the
unlawful employment practice) or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (1974).
52. Most courts that have considered the issue have held that the Act does not
authorize the award of so-called compensatory or punitive damages- See EEOC v.
Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308-10 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 45 U.S.L.W. 3786
(U.S. June 6, 1977); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F.
Supp. 1363, 1368-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1341-42 (D.
Hawaii 1974); Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854, 855-56 (N.D. Ga.
1974); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 835-38 (N.D. Cal. 1973). But
see Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (affirming award of
damages for "harassment"); Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F.
Supp. 832, 834-35 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (awarding damages for mental suffering), rev'd on
other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974); Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14, 18
(D. Neb. 1972) (allowing possible recovery of punitive damages).
Nevertheless, the Act has been interpreted broadly to permit compensation for
economic injury suffered; such monetary damages have been held recoverable
independent of the hiring or reinstatement remedy. See Rosen v. Pub. Serv. Elec. &
Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1973) (pension benefits); Chastang v. Flynn &
Emrich Co., 381 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Md. 1974) (retirement benefits plus interest), aff'd in
pertinent part, 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F.
Supp. 684, 690-91 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (compensation for lost wages granted
independent of hiring), rev'd on other grounds, 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975); Tidwell v.
Am. Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 436-37 (D. Utah 1971) (recovery of back pay with
interest, employer contributions to life insurance, savings, and retirement plans
granted without reinstatement). It has been suggested that these cases demonstrate
that "[c]ompensation for virtually any economic harm caused by unlawful employ-
ment practices may be awarded under the rubric of 'back pay.'" Whitney v. Greater
N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. at 1370.
See generally Developments in the Law - Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1259-69 (1971);
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14(e) as amended would appear desirable to effect the broad purpose of
preventing discrimination in employment53
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1. CHANGE OF VENUE - Davidson v. Miller,' Perkins v. Eskridge.2
- The ability to grant a change of venue upon proof of local prejudice has
historically been among the common law discretionary powers of a trial
court.3 In Maryland, however, a constitutional right of removal was secured
by an 1805 amendment to the state constitution. 4 During the succeeding
seventy years, a series of constitutional revisions modified the removal
right, making it in turn absolute or contingent upon proof of prejudice, and
imposing various limitations upon the locality to which a case could be
transferred. 5 The present removal provision, article IV, section 8, of the
Maryland Constitution, grants civil litigants a right of virtually automatic
removal: a case shall be removed from the court in which suit was brought
to "some other court having jurisdiction" merely upon "suggestion in
writing under oath" that a fair and impartial trial could not be had.6
Comment, Implying Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.REv. 325 (1974); Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimina-
tion under Title VII, 54 VA. L. REV. 491 (1968).
53. The amendment to § 14(e) specifically precludes the grant of monetary relief in
cases of discrimination in areas other than employment. See note 45 supra.
1. 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422 (1975).
2. 278 Md. 619, 366 A.2d 21 (1976).
3. See Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N.E. 369 (1911);
Rex v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834, 859-60, 97 Eng. Rep. 587, 602 (K.B. 1759); A. NILES,
MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 242 (1915).
4. 1804 Md. Laws, ch. 55, § 2, ratified, 1805 Md. Laws, ch. 16.
5. For a discussion of the constitutional history of the removal clause, see
Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 646-49, 366 A.2d 21, 37-38 (1976); A. NILES,
MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 242-43 (1915); Note, Change of Venue Between
Courts in Baltimore City: Is the Constitutional Right Protected?, 33 MD. L. REV. 116,
117-19 (1973).
6. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8 provides:
The parties to any cause may submit the same to the Court for determination
without the aid of a jury, and in all suits or actions at law, issues from the
Orphans Court, or from any court sitting in equity and in all cases of
Presentments or indictments for offences, which are or may be punishable by
death, pending in any of the courts of law in this State having jurisdiction
thereof upon suggestion in writing under oath of either of the parties to said
proceedings that such party cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the court
in which the same may be pending, the said court shall order and direct the
record of proceedings in such suit or action, issue, presentment, or indictment,
to be transmitted to some other court having jurisdiction in such case for trial,
but in all other cases of presentment or indictment, pending in any of the
Courts of law in this State having jurisdiction thereof, in addition to the
suggestion in writing of either of the parties to such presentment or
1977]
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The question of the proper application of the constitutional removal
provision to Baltimore City litigants arose soon after its adoption. In
Weiskittle v. State,7 the Court of Appeals held that a transfer from the Court
of Common Pleas to the Superior Court of Baltimore City satisfied the
requirements of article IV, section 8. The Court of Appeals merely observed
that because the Superior Court had jurisdiction in the case, and because the
Court of Common Pleas and the Superior Court were distinct courts, the
transfer satisfied the literal command of the constitution that removal be to
"some other court having jurisdiction."'8 The Wieskittle rule was reaffirmed
by the Court of Appeals in the 1971 case of Middleton v. Morgan.9 The
defendants, who challenged removal of the case from the Superior Court of
Baltimore City to the Court of Common Pleas, 10 argued that removal within
the City, while complying with the literal language of article IV, section 8,
failed to satisfy the provision's purpose of permitting escape from possible
local prejudice. 1 The Court of Appeals stated that it was "not persuaded" by
the arguments and found Weiskittle "controlling." 12
Davidson v. Miller 3 presented for the first time a constitutional
challenge to article IV, section 8, as applied to Baltimore City litigants. The
Davidson litigation arose from a suit filed on behalf of the infant plaintiff
Alenetta Miller and her mother in the Superior Court of Baltimore City for
damages arising from an automobile accident.1 4 In response to the
indictment that such party cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the court
in which the same may be pending, it shall be necessary for the party making
such suggestion to make it satisfactorily appear to the Court that such
suggestion is true, or that there is reasonable ground for the same, And
thereupon the said court shall order and direct the record of proceedings in
such presentment or indictment to be transmitted to some other Court having
jurisdiction in such cases for trial and such right of removal shall exist upon
suggestion in cases where all the Judges of said Court may be disqualified
under the provisions of this Constitution to sit in any such case and said
Court to which the record of proceedings in such suit, or action, issue,
presentment or indictment may be so transmitted shall hear and determine
the same in like manner as if such suit or action, issue, presentment or
indictment had been originally instituted therein, and the General Assembly
shall make such modification of existing law as may be necessary to regulate
and give force to this provision.
7. 58 Md. 155 (1882).
8. Id. at 158-59. The Court of Appeals also noted that separate jury panels were
selected for each court. Id. at 158.
9. 263 Md. 154, 282 A.2d 94 (1971), noted in Note, Change of Venue Between
Courts in Baltimore City: Is the Constitutional Right Protected?, 33 MD. L. REV. 116
(1973). Weiskittle was also followed, with little discussion, in De Murguiondo v.
Frazier, 63 Md. 94 (1885).
10. 263 Md. at 155, 282 A.2d at 95.
11. Id. at 156, 282 A.2d at 95-96.
12. Id. at 156, 158, 282 A.2d at 96, 97. The court rejected the defendants' attempt to
distinguish Weiskittle on the ground that in 1882 each trial court drew its own panel
of jurors but in 1971 jurors were treated as a pool. Id. at 158, 282 A.2d at 96.
13. 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422 (1975).
14. The defendants were the driver of an automobile and a company for whose
benefit the automobile was being driven at the time of the accident. The automobile
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defendants' suggestion for removal, the case was transferred to the
Baltimore City Court, where a jury awarded the plaintiffs a substantial
verdict. 15 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari before the defendants'
appeal was heard by the Court of Special Appeals. 16
Besides raising certain issues concerning the measure of damages in the
case,' 7 the defendants asserted that the removal procedure of article IV,
section 8, violated the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.' They argued that the unique structure of the Baltimore City
court system made the right of removal often meaningless for litigants
whose civil suits were filed in City courts. Whereas Baltimore City has three
circuit-level courts having jurisdiction over civil cases, each of Maryland's
twenty-three counties has only one civil circuit court.' 9 Removal from a
county circuit court necessarily placed the case in the circuit court of another
county or Baltimore City, thus guaranteeing a jury selected from an entirely
different locality. Removal from a Baltimore City court, however, could be
accomplished by a transfer to another court in the City. 20 Thus, while parties
to suits filed in any of the counties were assured of removal to a different
locality, Baltimore City cases could well be, and frequently were, removed
merely from one City court to another.2' The defendants argued that this
variation in the assignment of removed cases violated the fourteenth
amendment.
In considering this constitutional challenge, the Court of Appeals
observed that because the decision of the trial judge to remove a case to a
particular court is reviewable for abuse of discretion, 22 the alleged unequal
passed through a red light and collided with a truck, causing it to enter a sidewalk
and strike the plaintiff child, a pedestrian. The child suffered serious injuries,
particularly to the pelvic region. Id. at 56-57, 344 A.2d at 425.
15. The jury awarded the infant plaintiff $650,000, which was reduced to $200,000
through the acceptance by the plaintiff of a remittitur. Id. at 56, 344 A.2d at 424.
16. Id.
17. The defendants' major contention was that expert medical testimony
concerning the infant plaintiffs potential difficulties of future normal child birth was
inadmissible because speculative. The Court of Appeals agreed that the testimony did
not demonstrate an adequate probability of future difficulties and ordered a new trial
on the issue of damages. Id. at 58-62, 344 A.2d at 425-28.
18. The defendants' claim that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to
transfer the case outside Baltimore City was rejected by the Court of Appeals, the
defendants having asserted no more than a "naked allegation" of prejudice. Id. at
83-84, 344 A.2d at 439-40.
19. The first seven judicial circuits in Maryland are comprised of from two to five
counties; within each county is a separate circuit court. MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 19, 20.
Baltimore City constitutes the Eighth Circuit, but has three circuit-level courts: the
Superior Court of Baltimore City, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Baltimore City
Court. MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 19, 27 & 28.
20. See Middleton v. Morgan, 263 Md. 154, 282 A.2d 94 (1971); Weiskittle v. State,
58 Md. 155 (1882), (discussed in text accompanying notes 7 to 13 supra).
21. The Davidson court noted that in 19I4, 26 of 31 Baltimore City litigants
requesting removal were granted transfers to another court in the City. 276 Md. at 67
n.7, 344 A.2d at 430 n.7.
22. See, e.g., Middleton v. Morgan, 263 Md. 154, 158-59, 282 A.2d 94, 97 (1971).
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treatment of litigants "can only exist in those civil law cases in Baltimore
City where the litigant requesting removal either is not in any way deprived
of a fair trial or asserts some proof of deprivation but not enough to make it
an abuse of discretion if the trial judge fails to send the case outside of the
City ... *"23 Thus, the court found that the removal provision operated to
distinguish between two classes: (1) all county litigants, and (2) those
Baltimore City litigants unable to demonstrate sufficient local prejudice to
require that their cases be transferred outside the city.24
Reaffirming its previously expressed view that the equal protection
clause applies to territorial classifications,2 5 the Davidson court engaged in
a typically structured equal protection analysis. The court easily concluded
that no suspect class was deprived of any right by the automatic removal
provision.26 Moreover, the court found that the inequality created by the
provision did not restrict the fundamental right 27 to a fair and impartial jury
23. 276 Md. at 67, 344 A.2d at 431.
24. One might quarrel with the court's view of the classes created by the
automatic removal provision. Although the court found no discriminatory effect on
Baltimore City litigants who were able, through a showing of local prejudice, to have
their cases transferred outside the city, it could be argued that the mere added burden
of presenting such proof operated to distinguish between county litigants and all city
litigants.
25. The court expanded on the view most recently expressed in In re Trader, 272
Md. 364, 389-90, 325 A.2d 398, 411-12 (1974), that territorial distinctions must have a
rational justification to be constitutional. See generally Franklin v. State, 264 Md. 62,
285 A.2d 616 (1972); Md. Coal & Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md. 627, 642-43,
69 A.2d 471, 477 (1949); State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771 (1899). The Supreme
Court has upheld territorial classifications in a number of cases - see, e.g., McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954); Chappell
Chem. & Fertilizer Co. v. Sulphur Mines Co., 172 U.S. 474 (1899); Hayes v. Missouri,
120 U.S. 68 (1887); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880) - from which some courts
have inferred that the equal protection clause does not apply when territorial
classifications are challenged. See Mathis v. Noith Carolina, 266 F. Supp. 841, 846-47
(M.D.N.C. 1967); Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d 207, 216-17, 247 N.E.2d 260, 264-65,
299 N.Y.S.2d 424, 430-31 (1969), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). However, the Davidson court interpreted the Supreme Court
cases as resting' on adequate proof of existing rational bases for the territorial
classifications at issue, agreeing with the analysis in Horowitz & Neitring, Equal
Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance
Programs From Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 787, 788-804
(1968). See Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 70-77, 344 A.2d 422, 432-36 (1975). See
generally Note, Strengthening Equal Protection Analysis in Maryland: Territorial
Classification and In Re Trader, 35 MD. L. REV. 312, 318-21 (1975).
26. The court observed that the class allegedly discriminated against could not be
characterized as one deemed suspect by the Supreme Court, 276 Md. at 68, 344 A.2d at
431 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948)
(nationality)).
27. The Supreme Court has recognized a number of fundamental rights that will
trigger strict judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)
(interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)
(voting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (procreation). See generally
Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40
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trial;28 by defining narrowly the class affected by the inequality through the
exclusion of those litigants who were able to obtain removal outside
Baltimore City by proving local prejudice, the court was able to conclude
that the right to a fair trial was not threatened. 29 Thus, there was no need to
view the case with strict judicial scrutiny,30 and the court turned to, the
question of whether a rational basis existed for the territorial classification.
The Davidson court noted that customarily a rational basis for a
legislative classification is presumed; the party challenging the classifica-
tion has the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable justification exists.31 The Davidson defendants had presented no
evidence challenging the basis of the classification. 32 However, the court
undertook a novel mode of analysis.33 Stating that the issue of removal "so
peculiarly involves the judicial process, about which . . . it is [the court's]
responsibility to have a particular familiarity," the Court of Appeals took
judicial notice of facts which, it found, denied the existence of a rational
basis for the automatic removal scheme.34 The court considered three
possible bases for the classification. It first questioned whether the greater
population density of Baltimore City could justify the removal system: when
the removal provision was adopted in 1875, it might have been thought that
local prejudice would be greater in the rather sparsely populated counties
than in the more heavily populated City, where anonymity would more
likely be provided. 35 But even if this were true in 1875, the court took judicial
notice that the population differential has decreased significantly in the
intervening 100 years,36 so that it was "no longer dramatic enough" to
U. Cm. L. REV. 807 (1973). A fundamental right is defined as one "explicitly or
implicitly protected by the Constitution." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
28. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1935).
29. 276 Md. at 69, 344 A.2d at 432.
30. Strict judicial scrutiny requires that the proponent of the classification
demonstrate that such classification is necessary to promote a compelling state
interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
31. 276 Md. at 79, 344 A.2d at 437 (citing In re Trader, 272 Md. 364, 400, 325 A.2d
398, 417 (1974)). Ordinarily, in the absence of contrary proof, a legislative enactment
will not be set aside as a denial of equal protection if "any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived" that would justify its classification. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner, 219 Md. 607, 623, 150 A.2d 421, 431 (1959).
32. 276 Md. at 79, 344 A.2d at 437. Indeed, the constitutional challenge occupied a
subsidiary position in the defendants' brief; the equal protection discussion was
rather cursory. See Brief for Appellants at 16-18, Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 344
A.2d 422 (1975).
33. The court offered no direct authority to support the use of such an analysis.
See 276 Md. at 79, 344 A.2d at 437.
34. 276 Md. at 79, 344 A.2d at 437. Chief Judge Murphy, dissenting from this
portion of the court's opinion, pointed out the unusual nature of this analysis and
criticized the majority for "sua sponte taking judicial notice of matters of doubtful
conclusive import." Id. at 87, 344 A.2d at 441.
35. The population of Baltimore City accounted for more than one-third the total
state population in 1875. 276 Md. at 79, 344 A.2d at 437.
36. See id. at 80 & n.10, 344 A.2d at 437 & n.10.
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justify treating civil litigants in Baltimore City differently from those in the
counties. 37 A second arguable basis for the inequality was a difference in
caseloads and capabilities between the county and City courts. But although
there may have been a "substantial" fear in 1875 that cases removed from
the City might overburden the county courts,38 the Court of Appeals took
notice that today the county courts would be fully able to handle an increase
in cases removed from the City.39 Finally, the court found no evidence that
Baltimore City litigants abused the right of automatic removal more than
did other litigants in the state.40 Thus, the court concluded that any rational
basis that may have once existed had "evaporated."'"
Not only did the Court of Appeals assume an unusual role in itself
presenting the arguments against the existence of a rational basis for the
removal scheme, it also appeared to apply a stricter standard than the
Court's traditional rational basis test.42 Traditionally, a rational basis
inquiry will uphold a legislative classification as long as that classification
has any conceivable reasonable basis;43 to be held unconstitutional, the
classification must be "purely arbitrary."' 44 But the Davidson court appeared
to go farther; it questioned whether the justifications were "dramatic
37. Id. at 80, 344 A.2d at 437.
38. Id. at 80, 344 A.2d at 438.
39. Id. at 81, 344 A.2d at 438.
40. The court remarked that "the use of the provision 'for delaying purposes and
other obscure ends' . . . has been prevalent throughout the State." Id. (quoting Note,
Change of Venue Between Courts in Baltimore City: Is the Constitutional Right
Protected? 33 MD. L. REV. 116, 119 n.22 (1973)).
41. 276 Md. at 82, 344 A.2d at 439.
42. It has been suggested that the Court of Appeals has demonstrated some
willingness to apply a stricter standard of review than the traditional rational basis
test when important rights or interests are implicated. See Note, Strengthening Equal
Protection Analysis in Maryland: Territorial Classification and In Re Trader, 35 MD.
L. REV. 312, 325-36 (1975), (discussing In re Trader, 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974);
Bruce v. Director, 261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971)). The Davidson court stated that it
would consider the existence of a rational basis "in the light of the vital objective of
the right of removal as it relates to fair and impartial jury trials ... " 276 Md. at 79,
344 A.2d at 437.
For discussions of the "new" equal protection, see Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Note, Legislative
Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). See also
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976), the Supreme Court for the first
time recognized explicitly a standard of review intermediate between minimal
rationality and strict scrutiny: "[cilassifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Id. at 457.
43. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 219 Md. 607, 623, 150 A.2d 421,
431 (1959); Wampler v. LeCompte, 159 Md. 222, 228, 150 A. 455, 458 (1930). See
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
44. In re Trader, 272 Md. 364, 391, 325 A.2d 398, 413 (1974). See also Montgomery
County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 524-26, 336 A.2d 97, 111-12 (1975); Administrator v.
Vogt, 267 Md. 660, 299 A.2d 1 (1973).
[VOL. 37
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
enough. '45 Clearly, the rationales considered by the court would have
satisfied a true minimal scrutiny rational basis test. Although the difference
in population between Baltimore City and the counties is less significant
than it once was,46 it could be argued that the legislature could still
reasonably conclude that the City's greater population density creates less
danger of bias than is present in the counties.47 Similarly, because Baltimore
City courts continue to hear a greater number of civil law cases than any of
the county courts,48 the second rationale rejected by the Davidson court
would also seem to satisfy a true minimal scrutiny test.49
Finding article IV, section 8 to be in violation of the equal protection
clause, the Court of Appeals held the automatic removal provision
"unenforceable so long as the present multiple civil common law court
45. 276 Md. at 80, 344 A.2d at 437. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
46. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
47. The Supreme Court has upheld several territorial classifications based on
population differences. In Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887), the Court upheld a
Missouri statute allowing the state more peremptory challenges to jurors in capital
cases tried in cities having a population greater than 100,000 than in cases tried in
other localities, stating:
Allowing the state fifteen peremptory challenges in capital cases, tried in
cities containing a population of over 100,000 inhabitants, is simply providing
against the difficulty of securing, in such cases, an impartial jury in cities of
that size, which does not exist in other portions of the state. So far from
defeating, it may furnish the necessary means of giving that equal protection
of its laws to all persons, which that amendment declares shall not be denied
to any one within its jurisdiction.
Id. at 72.
In Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880), the Court rejected an equal protection
challenge to a Missouri appellate procedure whereby litigants in heavily populated
areas were required to appeal to an intermediate court, with limited further appeal to
the state supreme court, while litigants elsewhere could appeal directly to the supreme
court: "Where part of a State is thickly settled, and another part has but few
inhabitants, it may be desirable to have different systems of judicature for the two
portions .... Large cities may require a multiplication of courts and a peculiar
arrangement of jurisdictions." Id. at 32. The Davidson court cited both Hayes, see 276
Md. at 75-76, 344 A.2d at 435, and Lewis, see id. at 71-72, 344 A.2d at 433, and
asserted that each decision was grounded on the existence of a rational basis. Id. at
76, 344 A.2d at 435. But the court made no attempt to explain why the justification for
the automatic removal procedure was any less reasonable than the rationales
considered in Hayes and Lewis.
48. See 276 Md. at 81 n.11, 344 A.2d at 438 n.11.
49. In Chappell Chem. & Fertilizer Co. v. Sulphur Mines Co., 172 U.S. 474 (1899),
the Supreme Court summarily dismissed an equal protection challenge to a rule of the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City requiring that Baltimore City litigants request a
jury trial within a time period different from that required in the remainder of the
state. The Davidson court, discussing Chappell, stated: "We can only surmise that the
Supreme Court found no difficulty recognizing that this court rule might have had
any number of rational bases, not the least of which could have been the volume of
litigation in Baltimore City as compared with that in the counties." 276 Md. at 76, 344
A.2d at 435. The Davidson court failed to reconcile this rationale with the similar
argument it rejected as a basis for the automatic removal procedure.
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system exists in Baltimore City."0 Therefore, after the Davidson decision,
removal could be obtained only through the exercise of a trial court's
common law discretion to transfer a case upon a showing of potential local
prejudice, passion, or interest.51 The decision thereby produced an extremely
curious result; the challenged inequality was remedied not by conferring a
right of removal on Baltimore City litigants, but by eliminating the benefit
of absolute removal enjoyed by county litigants.
The result appears particularly odd in view of the manner in which the
Court of Appeals reached out to decide the constitutional issue. The court
decided a question that was not briefed extensively by the parties and that
was seemingly considered a secondary issue in the case.52 Once the court
addressed the issue, it substituted judicial notice for the usual burden of
proof placed on a party raising an equal protection challenge. Although the
court justified this analysis on the ground that the issue in the case was one
of particular judicial expertise, the action is a striking departure from past
practice; the court made no sound attempt to distinguish prior cases in
which it had required the party asserting a denial of equal protection to
produce facts controverting the reasonableness of the legislative classifica-
tion.53 Moreover, the court apparently subjected the classification at issue to
a more intense level of judicial scrutiny than is customarily applied in a
rational basis analysis.54 Finally, the court eschewed any attempt to
reassess the interpretation given the language of the removal provision by
earlier cases.55
50. 276 Md. at 82, 344 A.2d at 439.
51. See id. at 83, 344 A.2d at 439.
52. See Brief for Appellants at 16-18, Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422
(1975); Brief for Appellees at 28-35, Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422
(1975).
53. For example, in In re Trader, 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974), a unanimous
Court of Appeals dismissed equal protection challenges to several juvenile law
jurisdictional statutes because sufficient evidence to controvert the existence of
rational bases for the statutes was not produced. The Davidson court failed to explain
why the issue of automatic removal any more "involves the judicial process" or was
more familiar to the court than the issue of juvenile court jurisdiction. See 276 Md. at
79, 344 A.2d at 437.
54. See text accompanying notes 42 to 49 supra.
55. The Court of Appeals, consistent with its holdings in Weiskittle v. State, 58
Md. 155 (1882), and Middleton v. Morgan, 263 Md. 154, 282 A.2d 94 (1971), discussed in
text accompanying notes 17 to 23 supra, found it "not possible" to read article IV,
section 8, to require that cases brought in Baltimore City be removed to a court outside
the City. The constitutional provision was said to be "clear" in leaving the situs of
removal to the discretion of the trial court. 276 Md. at 82, 344 A.2d at 439.
The court thus continued to view the language of article IV, § 8, as incapable
of an interpretation that would effect the purpose of the provision - to eliminate the
possibility of local prejudice affecting the fairness of a trial. See Mayor of Baltimore v.
Libowitz, 159 Md. 28, 31, 149 A. 449, 450-51 (1930); Cooke v. Cooke, 41 Md. 362, 372
(1875). The Davidson court acknowledged that removal in Baltimore City amounted to
a "futile exercise." 276 Md. at 67, 344 A.2d at 430. Yet the court made no reference to
the settled maxims that the key to constitutional interpretation is the ascertainment
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Following the Davidson decision in September, 1975, the Maryland
General Assembly enacted a statute during its 1976 session granting all
litigants in specified actions a right of automatic removal to the.court of
another county.56 Chapter 454 clearly remedied the equal protection defect of
article IV, section 8, but it sparked great controversy as numerous
defendants exercised the newly created statutory right to remove cases
outside Baltimore City.57
In Perkins v. Eskridge5s a medical malpractice action originating in
Baltimore City was removed pursuant to the statute to the Circuit Court for
Garrett County. After the order was issued, plaintiffs' petition for certiorari
was granted by the Court of Appeals prior to consideration of their appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals.59 Acting expeditiously, the Court of Appeals
issued a per curiam order declaring chapter 454 to be in violation of article
IV, section 8, of the Maryland Constitution. 60 The court's opinion was filed
some two months later.6 1
of the purpose of the framers and that a constitution is to be interpreted in the context
of contemporary social conditions:
[W]hile the principles of the Constitution are unchangeable, in interpreting
the language by which they are expressed it will be given a meaning which
will permit the application of those principles to changes in the economic,
social, and political life of the people, which the framers did not and could not
foresee.. . . In determining the true meaning of the language used, the courts
may consider the mischief at which the provision was aimed, the remedy, the
temper and spirit of the people at the time it was framed, the common usage
well known to the people, and the history of the growth or evolution of the
particular provision under consideration.
Norris v. Mayor of Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, 675-76, 192 A. 531, 535 (1937), quoted in
Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 639, 366 A.2d 21, 33-34 (1976).
56. 1976 Md. Laws, ch. 454, amended MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-204
(1974) to provide in pertinent part:
(A) In actions at law, including issues from the Orphans' Court and appeals
from the Workmen's Compensation Commission, pending in any of the courts
of law of this State, upon suggestion in writing under oath of either of the
parties to the action and not of counsel, that such party cannot have a fair
and impartial trial in that county or judicial circuit in which the same may be
pending, the court shall order and direct the record of proceedings in the
action to be transmitted to a court of some other county within the circuit or to
some other judicial circuit having jurisdiction in the action, for trial.
(B) The right of removal is waived by a party unless the written suggestion
is filed within 60 days after the action is at issue or after an issue from an
orphans' court or appeal from a Workmen's Compensation Commission is
filed, or within .60 days of the docketing of any action removed from another
county or transferred from the District Court. Thereafter an action may be
removed only by order of court for good cause shown.
57. See, e.g., The Sun (Baltimore), Sept. 1, 1976, § C, at 1; id., Aug. 23, 1976, § A, at
1.
58. 278 Md. 619, 366 A.2d 21 (1976).
59. Id. at 623, 366 A.2d at 25.
60. The order was issued on September 24, 1976, less than one month after the
petition for certiorari was filed. See id. at 620-21, 366 A.2d at 23-24.
61. The opinion was filed December 1, 1976. Id. at 619, 366 A.2d at 21.
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The plaintiffs' primary contention in challenging the grant of removal
was that the General Assembly had no power to enact chapter 454; article
IV, section 8, although declared unconstitutional in Davidson, was said to
remain operative to the extent of limiting legislative authority in the field. 62
The defendants, on the other hand, argued that the effect of the Davidson
holding was to eliminate completely the civil removal provisions from article
IV, section 8, i.e., to render them void ab initio, and thus to remove all
constraints on legislative action.63 Although the Court of Appeals acknowl-
edged that the void ab initio theory relied upon by the defendants
represented the traditional view of the effect of an unconstitutional statute,64
the court detected a clear trend among many courts away from rigid
application of this doctrine in all circumstances. 65 Noting that this trend
appeared in the Maryland cases as well, 66 the court announced that it would
not apply the void ab initio rule in all situations.67 The court then adopted a
balancing test to be applied when a provision of the Maryland Constitution
has been held to conflict with the United States Constitution. 68 In
62. 278 Md. at 624, 366 A.2d at 25.
63. Id.
64. As the Perkins court noted, the "classic formulation" of the void ab initio
theory is contained in Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886): "An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords
no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed." See 278 Md. at 629, 366 A.2d at 28.
65. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1973); Chicot County
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940). See also 1 J.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2.07, at 23 (4th ed. C.
Sands 1972).
66. See, e.g., Home Utils. Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209 Md. 610, 618-19,
122 A.2d 109, 113 (1956); Kimble v. Bender, 173 Md. 608, 622-27, 196 A. 409, 415-17
(1938). See also Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 538 n.2, 341 A.2d 789, 792 n.2 (1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976).
67. 278 Md. at 637, 366 A.2d at 32. The court noted that the void ab initio
approach may remain appropriate in some cases. Id. at 637 n.7, 366 A.2d at 32 n.7,
(citing Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 38, 353 A.2d 222,
235 (1976); State v. Ingel, 18 Md. App. 514, 522-23, 308 A.2d 223, 229 (1973)). However,
the court made no attempt to define those cases in which it would still apply the
doctrine.
68. The court discussed two principal theories that have been followed in place of
the void ab initio theory. See 278 Md. at 631-35, 366 A.2d at 29-31. The "presumption
of validity" doctrine arose chiefly to avoid harsh results that might accrue from
holding an individual liable for acts undertaken in reasonable, good faith reliance
upon a statute subsequently held unconstitutional. Under this theory, an unconstitu-
tional statute, although invalid for future purposes, is deemed to have been effective
in the past, thus ensuring that conduct taken in good faith reliance on that statute
will not be a basis of personal liability. See, e.g., Yekhtikian v. Blessing, 90 R.I. 287,
157 A.2d 669 (1960). A second theory, the "case-to-case" theory, is even more flexible.
Declaring a statute unconstitutional does not render it wholly invalid; its continued
validity is determined in the circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Shepherd v.
Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S.E. 635 (1887). See generally 0. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 2-12 (1935).
[VOL. 37
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ascertaining the residual effect of the state constitutional provision, two
basic inquiries must be made:
first, is any intent manifested in the provision or elsewhere which is
contrary to the rule that as much of the Constitution as is reasonably
possible should be preserved, and second, are the conditions at the time
of our decision such that the narrowest ruling, although desirable, is not
practically possible.6 9
Applying these principles to the removal provision, the court first
gleaned from the constitutional history of the removal procedure a desire to
maintain the right of removal "directly under the control of the people." 70
This objective had been linked with a "manifest intent" to circumscribe
legislative power concerning this right.71 Secondly, the court found no
"broad considerations of expediency" that would free the General Assembly
from the limitations imposed by article IV, section 8:72 no emergency
existed,73 the common law right of removal remained intact, and automatic
removal could be reinstituted at any time by unifying the Baltimore City
multiple court system. Therefore, the court held that "although the effect of
Davidson was to relegate article IV, section 8 to a status whereby it is
unenforceable by litigants in civil law actions, it did not have the effect of
freeing the General Assembly from whatever limitations are imposed by
that provision. '74
The court then turned to the question of whether chapter 454
contravened article IV, section 8. The court summarily concluded that it did,
finding an "express conflict between the two:"'75 while article IV, section 8,
as construed by the court, permits transfers "to some other court,"
regardless of the location, 76 chapter 454 required that removal be granted
either to another county within the circuit or outside the circuit. 77 Thus, the
69. 278 Md. at 646, 366 A.2d at 37.
70. Id. at 649, 366 A.2d at 39.
71. Id. at 649, 366 A.2d at 39. The right of automatic removal has been secured by
a constitutional provision since 1806. See notes 6 to 15 and accompanying text supra.
72. Id. at 650, 366 A.2d at 39 (quoting Reed v. McKeldin, 207 Md. 553, 561, 115
A.2d 281, 285 (1955)).
73. Such an emergency situation was addressed in Md. Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 437-40, 180 A.2d 656, 670-71 (1962), where the
Court of Appeals ruled that the General Assembly had the power to reapportion
election districts itself, rather than proceed by constitutional amendment. The Tawes
decision arose in the aftermath of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme
Court's landmark reapportionment decision.
74. 278 Md. at 651, 366 A.2d at 40.
75. Id. at 652, 366 A.2d at 41. The court found Heslop v. State, 202 Md. 123, 95
A.2d 880 (1953), to be "dispositive". The Heslop court struck down an act of the
General Assembly granting an absolute right of removal to all criminal defendants.
The statute conflicted with the express requirement of article IV, section 8,
conditioning removal in noncapital cases upon proof that a fair trial could not be
conducted. See 13 MD. L. REV. 344 (1953).
76. See notes 7 to 13 and accompanying text supra.
77. See note 56 supra.
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Court of Appeals held that the equal protection defect in article IV, section 8,
uncovered in Davidson, could not be remedied by legislative action.
It is difficult to quarrel with the court's general view of the residual
effect of a statute or state constitutional provision held to be unconstitu-
tional. The formulation of clear principles defining which theory of
interpretation will be applied in. a given case is a problem that defies easy
resolution. 78 More troubling is the court's perception of a clear conflict
between the constitutional and statutory removal procedures. Since chapter
454 certainly provided for removal to "some other court," it would seem to be
consistent with the literal language of article IV, section 8. However, given
the court's resolve to construe article IV, section 8 as vesting discretion in
the trial court to order removal to any other court, the Perkins holding
followed ineluctably.
79
After Davidson and Perkins, change of venue exists solely as a common
law right, available upon demonstration of potential local prejudice. Given
modern conditions, perhaps the elimination of automatic removal is not an
unfortunate development.8° But should the right of automatic removal be
thought still desirable, Davidson and Perkins make clear that it can be
reinstituted only by a constitutional amendmentsl or through reorganization
of the Baltimore City court system.
2
78. See, e.g., Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940), where it was stated that:
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of sta tus, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and
federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Id. at 374 (footnote omitted).
79. The court's insistence upon reading arguably ambiguous constitutional
language so as to strike down legislation finds a striking parallel in Murphy v. Yates,
276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975), noted in Survey of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
1975-1976, 37 MD. L. REV. -, - (1977).
80. Conditioning change of venue on a showing of local prejudice or inconven-
ience does not seem unfair. Few jurisdictions provide an absolute right of removal. See
Note, Change of Venue and Change of Judge in a Civil Action in Indiana: Proposed
Reforms, 38 IND. L.J. 289, 298 & n.45, 299 (1963). It has been observed that the right of
automatic removal often serves more as a dilatory and harassing tactic than as a
technique to avoid real or potential unfaimes" See, e.g., Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md.
54, 81, 344 A.2d 422, 438 (1975); Smith v. Fredericktown Bank & Trust Co., 258 Md.
141, 144, 265 A.2d 236, 238 (1970) ("[Ilts use as an eleventh hour maneuver to avoid
trial both harasses the opposition and disrupts the constitutional right of others to
have their day in court."). See also 3 J. POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 104 (6th ed. H.
Sachs 1975). Some have even suggested that an absolute right of removal in civil
cases may be unconstitutional. See Note, The Constitutionality of Indiana's Civil
Change of Venue Law: Change for the Sake of Change, 48 IND. L.J. 105 (1972).
81. See 278 Md. at 653, 366 A.2d at 41.
82. The Davidson and Perkins opinions both intimated that the Court of Appeals
would welcome unification of the Baltimore City court system. See 276 Md. at 82, 344
A.2d at 439; 278 Md. at 651, 366 A.2d at 40. Attempts to unify the court system have
been unsuccessful to date. See The Sun (Baltimore), March 11, 1977, § D, at 1.
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2. STATEWIDE PROSECUTOR ACT HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
- Murphy v. Yates.' - In Murphy v. Yates, the Court of Appeals considered
a challenge based on the Maryland Constitution to the State Prosecutor
Act,2 an act of the Maryland General Assembly which authorized the
establishment of an independent prosecutor with statewide powers. The
court held the Act an unconstitutional limitation upon the discretionary
power of the State's Attorneys to prosecute and upon. the absolute right of
the Attorney General to represent the state in appellate proceedings.
The Act, enacted in 1975, created the office of State Prosecutor as an
independent unit within the office of the Attorney General, and granted it
investigatory and prosecutory authority over statewide criminal activity.
The Prosecutor could investigate, on his own initiative, possible violations of
state criminal laws regulating elections, conflicts of interest, bribery, and
malfeasance in office.3 He could also investigate, upon request by the
Governor, Attorney General, General Assembly, or a State's Attorney,
criminal activity occurring partly in Maryland and partly in another state,
or committed in more than one political subdivision of Maryland. 4 Once the
Prosecutor discovered criminal activity, the State's Attorney having
jurisdiction over the alleged offense would be given forty-five days to
commence prosecution; if the State's Attorney failed to act, prosecution
could be initiated by the State Prosecutor.5 In such a prosecution the
Prosecutor would have all the powers of a State's Attorney.6 He would also
represent the state in all appeals and post-conviction proceedings arising
from prosecutions he had begun.7
In August 1975, Donna Yates, a citizen and taxpayer, filed a class action
suit in the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County challenging the validity of
the Act; the defendants were the officials entitled to serve on the State
Prosecutor Selection and Disabilities Commission and the officials who were
1. 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975).
2. An Act concerning State Prosecutorial System, ch. 255, 1975 Md. Laws 1259
(voided 1975; reenacted version appears at MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, §§ 33A-33F (Supp.
1976)).
Originally introduced in Senate Bill 453, the State Prosecutor Act was
designed to reorganize the entire prosecutorial system in Maryland. See id. at 1262
(bill as introduced; before amendment). The state prosecution system was to have
been changed from one in which twenty-four local State's Attorneys are elected,
financed, regulated, and organized independently to one in which a central state
prosecutor would control an organization of local prosecutorial offices. The proposed
bill would have eliminated the independence of the local offices by establishing a
Chief State Prosecutor who would control the budgets and assignments of local units.
However, the bill was amended to create a new state prosecutor without giving him
control over the local units. Thus, rather than creating a unified system, the Act
added a separate, independent officer.
3. Ch. 255, § 33B(B), 1975 Md. Laws 1259.
4. Id. § 33B(C).
5. Id. § 33B(E).
6. Id. § 33B(G). Under the statute the Prosecutor can proceed to trial only upon a
grand jury indictment.
7. Id. § 33B(L).
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to authorize or fund the Commission.8 The petition sought a declaration that
the Act was unconstitutional and requested injunctions forbidding the
establishment of the Commission for the purpose of putting the Act into
effect.9 The trial court held unconstitutional that portion of the Act
designating the Chief Judges of the Court of Appeals, Court of Special
Appeals, and District Court as members of the Selection Commission.10
However, the provisions of the Act were held separable, and the remainder
of the Act was permitted to stand." The defendants appealed, and the
plaintiff filed a cross-appeal, contending, as she did below, that the entire
Act was unconstitutional. Certiorari was granted by the Court of'Appeals
prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals.
1 2
The Court of Appeals held the State Prosecutor Act unconstitutional in
its entirety. Finding that under the constitution only the offices of Attorney
General and State's Attorney were entitled to prosecute cases on behalf of
the state, Judge Singley, for the court, ruled that the statutory creation of a
third prosecutor infringed upon the powers and duties of the constitutional
offices.' 3 That the Attorney General has the sole authority to represent the
state on the appellate level was easily demonstrated: the constitution grants
him power "in all Cases."'14 The Act, by conveying to the State Prosecutor
the authority to represent the state in certain appellate cases, 15 clearly
8. 276 Md. at 477- 78, 348 A.2d at 838- 39. The named defendants were: the Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals, the Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals, the
Chief Judge of the District Court, the Attorney General, the Montgomery County
State's Attorney, the Governor, the State Treasurer, and the State Comptroller. See ch.
255, § 33D, 1975 Md. Laws 1259.
9. 276 Md. at 478, 348 A.2d at 839.
10. Id. The trial court based its decision on the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
which provides for separation of the three branches of government, MD.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 8, and prohibits judges from holding other office, MD.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 33.
11. 276 Md. at 478, 348 A.2d at 839.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 495, 348 A.2d at 848.
14. MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, § 3 (amended 1976, subsequent to the Yates
decision), provided:
It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute and defend on the
part of the State all cases, which at the time of his appointment and
qualification and which thereafter may be pending in the Court of Appeals
and the intermediate courts of appeal, or in the Supreme Court of the United
States, by or against the State, or wherein the State may be interested; and he
shall give his opinion in writing whenever required by the General Assembly
or either branch thereof, the Governor, the Comptroller, the Treasurer or any
State's Attorney, on any legal matter or subject pending before them, or either
of them; and when required by the Governor or General Assembly, he shall
aid any State's Attorney in prosecuting any suit or action brought by the
State in any Court of this State, and he shall commence and prosecute or
defend any suit or action in any of said Courts, on the part of the State, which
the General Assembly, or the-Governor, acting according to law shall direct to
be commenced, prosecuted or defended.
15. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
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conflicted with the explicit command of the constitution. However, the Yates
court experienced more difficulty in explaining how the Act unconstitution-
ally interfered with the trial level duties of State's Attorneys, for the
constitution, rather than expressly defining the responsibilities of State's
Attorneys, provided merely that their duties "shall be prescribed by law.' 16
Curiously, the court's analysis began not with an examination of this
language, but with a review of Maryland constitutional history. The court
concluded from this historical review that the office of State's Attorney had
inherited the common law prosecutorial duties of the Attorney General,
including the broad discretion formerly accorded that official.17 The court's
inquiry then focused on the meaning of the constitutional phrase "shall be
prescribed by law." Three interpretations were possible. First, the language
might be read as solely a grant of the common law powers of the Attorney
General. Alternatively, the language might be read as granting the General
Assembly complete authority to prescribe the duties of State's Attorneys. A
third possibility would combine these two views; State's Attorneys would
initially exercise the common law functions of the Attorney General, but
these powers would be subject to subsequent alteration by the General
Assembly. Judge Singley adopted the first interpretation. In his view the
constitution vested the State's Attorneys with specific common law powers
which the General Assembly could not subsequently constrict by statute.'8
Judge Levine, joined by Judge Eldridge in dissent, differed with both the
majority's historical analysis and its interpretation of the constitutional
language. Judge Levine contended that because the office of State's
Attorney was unknown at common law, it was without common law
powers.' 9 Furthermore, he urged that the phrase "shall be prescribed by
law" be construed as a grant of authority to the General Assembly to
prescribe by statute the duties of State's Attorneys. 20 According to this view,
the State Prosecutor Act was a valid exercise of this authority.
Article V of the Maryland Constitution and statutes enacted pursuant to
article V divide the power to act on behalf of the state in criminal and civil
actions between the State's Attorneys in each political subdivision in the
state and the Attorney General. The Attorney General represents the state
in all appellate cases; he may also commence and defend civil actions, give a
written opinion on any legal matter when requested by various governmen-
tal units, and, when requested, aid a State's Attorney in any criminal
prosecution. 21 The State's Attorneys prosecute criminal cases in their
political subdivisions. This authority is not expressly granted by the
16. "The State's Attorney shall perform such duties and receive such salary as
shall be prescribed by law ..... MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, § 9 (prior to 1976
amendment).
17. 276 Md. at 480-88, 348 A.2d at 840-45.
18. Id. at 493-95, 348 A.2d at 846-47.
19. Id. at 505-06, 348 A.2d at 853.
20. Id. at 506-09, 348 A.2d at 854-55.
21. MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, § 3 (prior to 1976 amendment). The text of § 3
is found in note 14 supra.
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constitution, which provides only that "[t]he State's Attorney shall perform
such duties and receive such salary as shall be prescribed by law,"2 2 but
instead is found in a statute enacted pursuant to the constitution.
2 3
Nevertheless, the State's Attorneys' power to prosecute can be inferred from
the constitutional order to the Attorney General to "aid any State's Attorney
in prosecuting any suit or action brought by the State.
'24
The origins of the modern prosecutor can be traced to English common
law. The office of attorney general was vested with prosecutory power,25 but
the exercise of such power was limited; for in England the attorney general
prosecuted only those cases "in which the Crown was interested," not
ordinary criminal cases. 26 The American colonial legal systems generally
adopted the offices of the English system, including the office of attorney
general with English common law powers. In adapting the office of attorney
general to colonial needs, however, the public prosecutor function was
added. 27 By the time the colonies declared independence and enacted state
constitutions, the prosecutorial power of the attorney general, although not
specifically defined by statute, was an established common law function of
the office. 28
22. MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, §9 (prior to 19176 amendment). The text of §9
is found in note 16 supra.
23. MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 34(1976) provides: "The State's Attorney for each
county and the city of Baltimore shall, in such county or city, prosecute and defend,
on the part of the State, all cases in which the State may be interested."
24. MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, §3 (prior to 1976 amendment).
25. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 126, 160 (1907); Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 480,
348 A.2d 837, 840 (1975); People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396, 398-99 (N.Y. 1868); State ex rel.
Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 130-34, 53 N.W. 35, 51-52 (1892); Cooley,
Predecessors of the Attorney General, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 304, 309 (1958).
26. 276 Md. at 480, 348 A.2d at 840; Cooley, supra note 25, at 309.
The chief law officers of England prosecuted only extraordinary cases -
those which involved the king or other political authorities. In cases of ordinary
felonies, lawyers appeared on behalf of neither prosecution nor defense. Such trials
were rather simple, with no complex rules of evidence or procedure that might require
the skills of attorneys. Assistance in examining witnesses and suspects was provided
by justices of the peace as part of their primary roles of maintaining the peace and
presiding at trial. If no witness were available, the justices of the peace, as trial
magistrates, conducted the entire investigation and prosecution. Thus, a separate
prosecutorial office was not employed. For further discussion of the prosecutorial
function under English common law, see J. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE
RENAISSANCE 1-125 (1974).
27. Early statutes indicate that prior to 1700 the Maryland Attorney General
exercised prosecutorial powers. See ch. 7, 1698 Md. Laws (1 Kilty, 1799); cf. Key, The
Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 VA. L. REv. 165, 169-170 n.11 (1958)
(discussing the predecessor of the United States Attorney General).
28. Legal historians have offered various explanations for the emergence of the
prosecutor in the American legal system. Hurst traces the creation of a public
prosecutor to Connecticut in 1704, describing its function as a combination of the
powers and duties of the English attorney general and the French procureur du roi. J.
HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 174 (1950). It has also been suggested that
the office evolved through the Dutch settlement of New York; the Dutch settlers
perhaps carried their concept of a prosecutor to New Holland, and, when the English
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The first Maryland constitution, that of 1776, provided for an Attorney
General to be appointed by the Governor but did not attempt to enumerate
the powers of the office. 29 The Attorney General simply continued to perform
the functions of the office as they previously existed.30 He managed the
state's legal affairs and had the power to prosecute all criminal and civil
suits; his power to prosecute was, as under common law, discretionary.
31
However, this prosecutorial power did not remain with the Attorney General
for long. In a series of constitutional and statutory enactments, the
prosecutorial power and other traditional duties of the Attorney General
were transferred back and forth between the Attorney General and a new set
of statutory officers - State's Attorneys.
During the years 1816 and 1817, the constitution was amended so that
the prior constitutional provisions concerning the Attorney General were
"abrogated, annulled, and made void," 32 and the General Assembly was
authorized to thereafter direct who would perform the Attorney General's
duties and services. 33 After confirmation of the amendment,34 the 1817
legislature divided the Attorney General's existing powers between the
Attorney General and District Attorneys established throughout the state.
The Attorney General was to represent the state in appellate actions and to
render opinions when requested; the District Attorney., were to conduct all
trial litigation in their districts on behalf of the state.35 For four years the
powers of the statutory District Attorney exceeded even those of the modern
State's Attorney;36 in 1821, however, the Attorney General's former powers
were restored by statute.
37
took control of the colony, the established custom was continued. Comment, The
District Attorney - A Historical Puzzle, 52 Wis. L. REV. 125, 128-31 (1952).
Cummings and McFarland, on the other hand, argue that the English attorney
general always had the power to prosecute all cases as being in the King's interest
but, in practice, chose not to do so. Attorney generals prosecuting in the colonies were,
under this theory, merely exercising existing common law rights. H. CUMMINGS & C.
MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 11 (1937).
29. MD. CONST. OF 1776 48, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STUDY
DOCUMENTS at 383 (1968).
30. The Declaration of Rights, adopted in Maryland in conjunction with the first
constitution, provides that Maryland inhabitants are entitled to the benefit of English
common law and English statutes which had been applied in the colonial system
prior to the adoption of the first state constitution. MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art.
5. Thus, when the 1776 constitution provided for an Attorney General without
specifying his powers, the common law authority was presumed to continue.
31. See ch. 48, 1715 Md. Laws (Dorsey 1840).
32. MD. CONST. OF 1776 59 (amended 1817), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION STUDY DOCUMENTS at 396 (1968).
33. Id.
34. In the early part of the nineteenth century, the constitution could be amended
simply by one session of the General Assembly submitting an amendment and the
succeeding session confirming it. MD. CONST. OF 1776 59, reprinted in
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STUDY DOCUMENTS at 384 (1968).
35. Ch. 146, 1817 Md. Laws, quoted in 276 Md. at 481-82, 348 A.2d at 840-41.
36. The 1817 District Attorney represented the state in civil suits as well as
criminal cases. Id.
37. Ch. 126, 1821 Md. Laws, quoted in 276 Md. at 483, 348 A.2d at 841.
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With the adoption of a new constitution in 1851, the office of Attorney
General was again completely abolished,38 and newly created State's
Attorney for each county and Baltimore City assumed the prior functions
of the Attorney General.39 The State's Attorneys were to "perform such
duties . . . as are now prescribed by law for the attorney-general."40
Thus, the powers enumerated in the 1821 statute were transferred to the
State's Attorneys. The constitution of 1864, however, once more divided the
power to represent the state in legal proceedings between the State's
Attorneys and the Attorney General, with the State's Attorneys performing
such duties "as are now or may be hereafter prescribed by law." 41 The
constitution of 1867 repeated the language of the 1864 constitution regarding
the delegation of powers, 42 and this version remained essentially unchanged
until 1976. 4
3
On the basis of this constitutional history, the Yates court concluded
that the prosecutorial powers and duties of the Attorney General at common
law passed to the State's Attorneys as the existing trial level prosecutors.
Thus the State's Attorneys were held to be, in effect, common law and
constitutional officers.44 In reaching this decision, the court re-evaluated two
earlier decisions, Kilgour v. Evening Star Co. 45 and Hawkins v. State,
46
which had found that because State's Attorneys as such did not exist at
common law, they possessed only those powers delegated directly by the
38. "No law shall be passed creating the office of attorney general." MD. CONST.
OF 1851 art. III, § 32, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STUDY DOCUMENTS at
426 (1968).
39. Id.
40. MD. CONST. OF 1851, art. V, § 3.
41. MD. CONST. OF 1864, art. V, § 9, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STUDY
DOCUMENTS at 472 (1968). There was some uncertainty after the 1864 constitution as
to which officer had the right to represent the state at the appellate level. Compare
MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, § 3, with MD. CONST. OF 1864, art. V, § 9 and ch. 126, 1821
Md. Laws, as amended by ch. 177, 1862 Md. Laws.
42. MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, §§ 3, 9 (prior to 1976 amendment).
43. Section 9 of article V has been amended several times, but the majority and
the dissent agreed that the changes related only to the salary of the State's Attorneys.
The last of such changes removed a maximum limit placed upon that salary.
Language stating that "the State's Attorney shall perform such duties and receive
such fees and commissions or salary, not exceeding three thousand dollars, as are
now or may hereafter be prescribed by law ... ," MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, §9
(amended 1924), was changed to read: "the State's Attorney shall perform such duties
and receive such salary as shall be prescribed by law .... " MD. CONST. OF 1867, art.
V, § 9 (amended 1943; prior to 1976 amendment). The court rejected the appellants'
argument that the amendment affected the duties of the State's Attorney, noting that
the statute proposing the amendment and the published ballot referred solely to
salary. 276 Md. at 486-87, 348 A.2d at 843. The dissent agreed that the 1943
amendment had no effect on the issue of the State's Attorneys' duties. Id. at 510, 348
A.2d at 855.
44. 276 Md. at 488, 348 A.2d at 844; see State v. Hunter, 10 Md. App. 300, 305-06
n.5, 270 A.2d 343, 345-46 n.5 (1970) (Murphy, C.J.).
45. 96 Md. 16, 53 A. 716 (1902).
46. 81 Md. 306, 32 A. 278 (1895).
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constitution and by statutes.47 Furthermore, the court apparently considered
this grant of common law power to be absolute: the General Assembly was
not empowered to trench upon these powers in any way.48 The dissent, on
the other hand, found the rationale of Kilgour and Hawkins still persuasive:
although State's Attorneys do perform duties formerly associated with the
Attorney General, the office of State's Attorney itself was not known at
common law, and, therefore, could not be presumed to have common law
powers. 49 Judge Levine found it doubtful that the framers of the constitution
intended to vest common law powers in an office designated by a title
"without common law significance."0
Although the majority interpretation of the complicated constitutional
development of the office of State's Attorney is plausible, there are
legitimate grounds for disagreement. The majority appears to be correct in
its view that the office of State's Attorney was not created to serve an
entirely new statutory or constitutional function but, instead, was granted
powers which traditionally had been vested in the common law office of
attorney general. In the early constitutions and statutes these powers were
specifically assigned to the State's Attorneys;51 thus, by the time the 1867
constitution was drafted, the powers and functions of the State's Attorneys
were clearly defined. Inherent in the office of prosecutor, whether the title of
the prosecuting officer was known at common law or not, are the ordinary
powers of the prosecutor at common law.5 2 Nevertheless, the constitutional
history developed by the majority does not explain its conclusion that the
1867 constitution inalterably vested the State's Attorneys with the
discretionary power of a common law attorney general. The 1851 constitu-
tion, which created the office of State's Attorney, did not enumerate the
powers and duties of the office but, instead, referred to the 1821 statute that
47. Kilgour v. Evening Star Co., 96 Md. 16, 29, 53 A. 716, 719 (1902); Hawkins v.
State, 81 Md. 306, 312-13, 32 A. 278, 279-80 (1895).
48. 276 Md. at 488, 348 A.2d at 844. This position sharply conflicted with the
views of Alfred Niles, the eminent scholar of Maryland constitutional law. Professor
Niles wrote:
The office of state's attorney is unknown to the common law. In Maryland the
state's attorney is an officer created by our Constitution, and his powers and
duties, whatever they may be, must be derived from either the Constitution
itself or laws passed in pursuance thereof.... The state's attorneys, now
have no other power or duty except as the legislature may prescribe.
A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 295 (1915).
49. 276 Md. at 505-06, 348 A.2d at 853.
50. Id. at 505, 348 A.2d at 853. -Judge Levine also contended that, even if the
powers of the office could be inherited, the abolition of the Attorney General's office in
1817 broke the chain leading from the common law Attorney General to the State's
Attorneys. Id. at 509-10, 348 A.2d at 855.
51. See, e.g., MD. CONST. OF 1851, art. V, § 3; ch. 126, 1821 Md. Laws; ch. 146, 1817
Md. Laws.
52. The clause in MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, § 3, permitting the Attorney General
to assist a State's Attorney in prosecuting, see note 24 and accompanying text supra,
supports the conclusion that the framers of the constitution intended the State's
Attorneys to be prosecutors.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
listed the powers of the Attorney General. Furthermore, an 1860 codification
of Maryland law provided that the "State's Attorney shall . . . prosecute
and defend on the part of the State all cases in which the State may be
interested." 53 According to the Yates majority, the language, "now ...
prescribed by law," found in the 1864 constitution referred to this 1860
codification. Thus, there appears to have been a prevailing understanding
that the powers and duties of the State's Attorneys were to be specified by
statute. This practice undercuts the majority's theory that the framers of the
1851 constitution intended to grant the State's Attorneys absolute common
law powers.
Even assuming that certain of the Attorney General's common law
duties and powers constitutionally vested in the State's Attorneys, the
critical question is the interpretation of the constitutional provision
authorizing the State's Attorneys to "perform such duties . . . as shall be
prescribed by law. ' '54 Courts in other states have adopted various
interpretations of the phrase "prescribed by law" as it describes the 'powers
of the constitutionally created office of attorney general. 5  Both the majority
and dissenting opinions in Yates recognized two distinct rules: a majority of
states permit legislatures to alter the prosecutorial powers, 56 while a
minority hold that powers existing at the time of a constitutional enactment
may not be limited by subsequent legislation.57 The Yates court chose to
follow the minority rule.58
53. Md. Code (1860) art. 11, § 18.
54. MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, § 9 (prior to 1976 amendment).
55. It appears that only one state court has construed a similar phrase describing
the powers of a trial level prosecutor. In Ex parte Corliss, 16 N.D. 470, 114 N.W. 962
(1907), the North Dakota legislature had created the office of enforcement commis-
sioner to enforce the state's laws against the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquor. The commissioner was given the power to appoint a deputy and special
enforcement sheriffs throughout the state, as well as to utilize "all the common law
and statutory powers of state's attorneys" in the enforcement of the law. Id. at 471,
114 N.W. at 963. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found the statute unconstitu-
tional because it transferred powers of the State's Attorneys and the sheriffs, both
elected officers, to the appointed commissioner. The court held that any transfer of
power from an elected officer named in the constitution, including one whose powers
are "prescribed by law," to an appointed, statutory officer was invalid. The decision
rested not so much on the ground that the change invaded the rights of the officer, but
on the theory that it violated the rights of the state's citizens to elections and home
rule. Id. at 475, 114 N.W. at 965. The Yates majority briefly noted that the creation of a
State Prosecutor would mean the transfer of power from elected officials to an
appointed official but failed to develop the point. 276 Md. at 495, 348 A.2d at 848.
56. See Railroad Tax Cases, 136 F. 233 (1905); Shute v. Frohmiller, 53 Ariz. 483, 90
P.2d 998 (1939); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. People, 5 Colo. 60 (1879); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 820 (1942); People v. Santa Clara Lumber
Co., 55 Misc. 507, 106 N.Y.S. 624 (1907); State v. Huston, 21 Okl. 782, 97 P. 982 (1908);
State v. Industrial Commission, 172 Wis. 415, 179 N.W. 579 (1920).
57. See Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915); Ex parte Corliss, 16
N.D. 470, 114 N.W. 962 (1907).
58. 276 Md. at 493, 507, 348 A.2d at 847, 854.
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The minority rule is exemplified by Fergus v. Russel, 9 an Illinois case in
which the Attorney General challenged a statute that permitted the State
Insurance Commissioner to hire his own departmental counsel to enforce
state insurance laws. Prior to the statutory authorization, the Attorney
General had represented the Commission as part of his general duties of
representing the state. 6° The Illinois constitution delegated no express duties
to the Attorney General; rather, it provided that he should perform such
duties as "shall be prescribed by law. '61 Finding that the attorney general
had well-defined powers at common law, including the power to represent all
state officials, and that these powers had been incorporated into the
constitution,62 the Fergus court held that although the legislature could add
to these duties, it could abrogate only those powers which it had conveyed to
the office.
63
The Arizona case of Shute v. Frohmiller4 represents the majority view.
The Shute court permitted an attorney hired by the Colorado River
Commission, an independent state agency, to recover on a claim for salary
allegedly due him. The salary had been withheld by the state auditor
because she contended that special counsel for the Commission was not
permitted; only the Attorney General could furnish legal assistance.
6 5
Interpreting the same phrase - "as prescribed by law" 66 - that was at issue
in Fergus, the Arizona court held that "law" meant only statutes and that
the constitutional powers of the Attorney General, rather than including
common law powers, could be ascertained only by reference to the statutes
implementing the constitutional provision.67 Any powers exercised by the
Attorney General prior to enactment of the constitution were abolished
unless they were revived by statute.68
The Shute court explained the variations in the interpretations of "law"
as resulting from the differences in the origins of the states' legal systems.
According to the Yates majority, the Shute distinction was drawn between
states which evolved from United States territories, never having adopted
the English common law, and states which from their inception had
accepted English common law.69 Legislatures had no power to abrogate
59. 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
60. Id. at 333-37, 110 N.E. at 142-44.
61. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 1, quoted in Fergus v. Russel, 270 111. 304, 335, 110 N.E.
130, 143 (1915).
62. 270 Ill. at 337, 110 N.E. at 143.
63. Id. at 342, 110 N.E. at 145.
64. 53 Ariz. 483, 90 P.2d 998 (1939).
65. Id. at 486, 90 P.2d at 1000.
66. ARIz. CONST. art. V, § 9.
67. 53 Ariz. at 488, 90 P.2d at 1001.
68. Courts following this view concede, however, that when a constitution merely
designates an office existing at common law without prescribing, limiting, or
qualifying the functions of that office, the pre-constitution common law powers may
remain. Shute v. Frohmiller, 53 Ariz. 483, 487, 90 P.2d 998, 1000 (1939); State v.
Huston, 21 Okla. 782, 787, 97 P. 982, 992 (1908).
69. 276 Md. at 493-94, 348 A.2d at 847. The actual distinction in Shute was:
"[T]he statement [of the Fergus court] was made by a court in a common law state,
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common law rights in states in which the common law had been
constitutionally adopted. The Yates court readily accepted this explanation
and, referring to the adoption of the common law in the Maryland
Declaration of Rights,70 decided that the Attorney General and, derivatively,
the State's Attorney retained the rights possessed by an attorney general
under common law. 71 The validity of the Shute explanation is doubtful,
however, in view of the jurisdictions that follow each rule. New York, one of
the original colonies, strongly espouses the position that "prescribed by law"
refers only to statutes, 72 while North Dakota, a territory until 1889, is one of
two states which have read such a constitutional provision as referring to
rights at common law. 73 Thus the Shute distinction is not universally
applicable.
Neither the Fergus nor the Shute courts apparently considered the
possibility that a constitutional reference to "law" might include both
common law traditions and statutory provisions. At least one jurisdiction,
however, has adopted such a position. In Johnson v. Commonwealth,74 a
Kentucky statute authorizing any administrative department to employ its
own attorney to counsel the department and represent it at all hearings was
attacked by the Attorney General as one designed to abolish his office
indirectly. 75 As in Illinois and Arizona, the Kentucky constitution provided
that the powers of the Attorney General were to be "as prescribed by law. '76
The Johnson court, after classifying the "prescribed by law" cases into
three, rather than two, categories, 77 adopted the position that a constitu-
tional provision may be implemented by both common law and statute:78
common law duties are initially included among the responsibilities of the
constitutional office, but the legislature may later expand or limit them. The
powers and duties of such an officer would be governed by rules of both
common law and statutory origin existing at the time of the constitutional
enactment, until such time as the legislature supplemented or modified
them.
one where that system was the rule of decision, unless expressly abrogated by statute,
and in which the distinction between common law and equity procedure was still
preserved." 53 Ariz. at 493, 90 P.2d at 1003, quoted in 276 Md. at 493, 348 A.2d at 847.
70. See note 30 supra.
71. 276 Md. at 493-94, 348 A.2d at 847.
72. People v. Santa Clara Lumber Co., 55 Misc. 507, 106 N.Y.S. 624 (1907); see
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 14 (common law adopted provided it is not repugnant to the
constitution, but subject to legislative change).
73. Ex parte Corliss, 16 N.D. 470, 114 N.W. 962 (1907); see note 55 supra.
74. 291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 820 (1942).
75. Id. at 830, 165 S.W.2d at 823.
76. Id. at 832, 165 S.W.2d at 826.
77. The three categories are: (1) "[t]he term 'as prescribed by law' negatives the
existence of any common law duties, so that the Attorney General has none, and the
legislature may deal with the office at will." (Shute position); (2) "the legislature may
add to the common law duties of the office, but they are inviolable and cannot be
diminished. (Fergus position); and (3) "[tlhe legislature may not only add duties but
may lessen or limit common law duties." (adopted by Johnson). Id. at 832, 165 S.W.2d
at 826-27.
78. Id. at 836, 165 S.W.2d at 829.
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Kentucky, like Maryland, specifically adopted English common law in
its constitution,7 9 leaving the common law in force where it is applicable. 80
Therefore, since the Yates court apparently analogized the office of State's
Attorney to that of the attorney general, it might easily have applied the
Johnson court's analysis, thereby permitting the legislature to alter the
common law rule. Judge Levine, in dissent, arrived at the same result as did
the Kentucky court, but he did not distinguish between Johnson and
Shute.8 1 The majority did not even mention Johnson.
The Court of Appeals had previously considered constitutional language
similar to "prescribed by law" in cases concerning other officials;8 2 in each
case the court concluded that the legislature could alter the powers of the
common law offices involved. In the leading case of Beasley v. Ridout,8 3 a
statute transferred the burden of caring for prisoners from a local sheriff,
whose constitutional powers were "as are now or may hereafter be fixed by
law,"8 4 to a Board of Visitors appointed by a circuit court. The Sheriff
challenged the statute on the ground that it encroached upon his vested
constitutional powers, arguing that because his office was known at
common law, all powers and duties of the common law office, including the
care of prisoners, were vested in the current office by the constitution and
were not subject to modification by the legislature.8 5 The Beasley court, on
its own initiative, held that a circuit court judge could not perform the non-
judicial act of appointing a board of visitors.86 However, in a dictum
answering the Sheriffs argument, it concluded that the constitutional
language permitted the legislature to diminish the powers of a Sheriff. 7 The
Yates dissent relied upon this dictum,88 while the majority distinguished it.89
79. Kentucky adopted the applicable laws of Virginia, which had previously
adopted English common law. See id. at 832, 165 S.W.2d at 827.
80. Compare Ky. CONST. § 233 (laws of Virginia in force until altered or repealed
by the general assembly) with MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 5 (Maryland
inhabitants entitled to applicable English common law).
81. 276 Md. at 507, 348 A.2d at 854.
82. Woelfel v. State, 177 Md. 494, 9 A.2d 826 (1939) (justice of the peace); Prince
George's County v. Mitchell, 97 Md. 330, 55 A. 673 (1903) (county commissioner);
Beasley v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641, 52 A. 61 (1902) (sheriff).
83. 94 Md. 641, 52 A. 61 (1902).
84. Id. at 653, 52 A. at 63 (quoting MD. CONsT. art. IV, § 44).
85. Id. at 650, 52 A. at 62-63.
86. Id. at 658-59, 52 A. at 66.
87. Id. at 656-57, 52 A. at 65.
88. 276 Md. at 507-09, 348 A.2d at 854-55.
89. Id. at 491-92, 348 A.2d at 846. Judge Singley, apparently seeking to discredit
Beasley, implicitly criticized that court's asserted reliance upon a concurring opinion
in Mayor of Baltimore v. Board of Police, 15 Md. 376, 74 Am. Dec. 572 (1860)
(LeGrand, C.J., concurring), which in adopting the position that the sheriff was a
ministerial officer whose powers were alterable by statute had rejected the majority
rule that the holder of a constitutional office clearly vested with specific common law
powers could not be deprived of them by legislative action. However, the Beasley court
stated specifically that its decision did not rest upon Mayor of Baltimore, for the
constitution had been amended subsequent to that decision. 94 Md. at 656-57, 52 A. at
65. The Yates dissent, although interpreting Beasley more accurately than the
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The distinction of Beasley drawn by the Yates majority rested
ultimately upon the nature of the Sheriffs office: the Sheriffs functions were
considered "ministerial," whereas the essential duties of a State's Attorney
were deemed "discretionary." Without further discussion of Beasley, the
court concluded that the common law powers transferred to the State's
Attorneys, unlike those of a Sheriff, could not be restricted by legislative
actY° This distinction is not wholly satisfactory, however, because it fails to
explain why the difference between discretionary and ministerial offices
should alter the interpretation of identical constitutional language.91
Although the Beasley precedent was readily available as a basis for
decision, the majority instead chose to strain the constitutional language
and construct a line of analysis based on rather tenuous reasoning to reach
its conclusion. This analysis entailed placing undue weight on statutory
history that was, at best, equivocal and overruling prior cases that had
addressed the origins and powers of the State's Attorneys. Moreover, the
court found it necessary to adopt the minority view on the interpretation of
constitutional language describing the powers of attorneys general.
Applying this minority view meant that identical constitutional language
would be read differently depending on the office to which it was applied.
That it was necessary to engage in such judicial legerdemain to establish
the court's major premise - that the constitutional language represented a
conclusive grant of prosecutorial discretion to the local State's Attorneys -
refutes the validity of that proposition. Questions naturally arise as to why
the court labored so mightily.
One possible explanation may be found in the court's views on the
nature of the office of prosecutor. The court observed:
The simple fact is that the Special Prosecutor's power to initiate an
investigation and to commence prosecution if a State's Attorney does
majority, somewhat misstated the case in claiming that Beasley had expressed doubt
concerning Mayor of Baltimore. Although the Beasley court expressed "sincere
respect" for the courts that opposed the position taken in Mayor of Baltimore, it
remarked that if it were necessary to rule on the issue, it "should be compelled to
hesitate long before we could decline to follow [Mayor of Baltimore]." 94 Md. at 656, 52
A. at 65.
90. "The situation of the State's Attorneys, being discretionary officers vested
with specific common law and statutory powers by the Constitution is vastly different
from that of the sheriffs." 276 Md. at 492, 348 A.2d at 846. The Yates dissent failed to
discuss the majority's distinction based on discretion; rather, it merely attacked the
majority's misreading of the Beasley case. See note 89 supra.
91. The Beasley position on the language "prescribed by law" was also applied to
a justice of the peace in Woelfel v. State, 177 Md. 494, 9 A.2d 826 (1939), where the
jurisdiction of justices of the peace was limited by the appointment of magistrates,
and to a county commissioner in dicta in Prince George's County v. Mitchell, 97 Md.
330, 336-37, 55 A. 673, 674 (1903), where the "care, custody, and control" of the county
courthouse was transferred to the circuit court crier.
The same distinction that Yates used in distinguishing Beasley might also
have been used in regard to these cases. The constitutional justice of the peace had
significantly limited powers in comparison with the common law justice; other
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not act is a clear invasion of the State's Attorney's most awesome
discretionary power: to determine whether or not to prosecute ...
Moreover, in each instance the power is transferred from what has
traditionally been an elected official to an appointed official.
92
Two themes emerge from this language. The first is that discretion over
whether to commence prosecution forms the core of a prosecutor's powers.
Any diminution of this discretion would therefore reach the essence of the
State's Attorney office. The Yates court apparently reasoned that since
State's Attorneys were constitutional officers, their essential powers could
not be impaired by the legislature. The second theme is that prosecutorial
discretion should be reposed solely in elected officials. Although the court
did not develop this idea, it apparently viewed the appointment of a State
Prosecutor as a further conflict with the constitutional scheme.
Prosecutors in Maryland have traditionally exercised broad discretion
over the selection of cases. This practice received judicial approval in Brack
v. Wells,9 3 which disallowed a writ of mandamus to compel a State's
Attorney to take action on a case presented to him by a complainant. The
initial right of a prosecutor to "distinguish between the guilty and the
innocent" 94 has frequently been reaffirmed,95 judicial review of prosecutorial
discretion being limited to those instances where the prosecutor clearly
abused his discretion.
96
Prior to the enactment of the State Prosecutor Act, constitutional and
statutory provisions in Maryland had placed few limitations on the broad
powers of State's Attorneys. Statutory provisions allow persons other than
State's Attorneys to prosecute criminal cases in only three narrow cir-
cumstances. An assistant State's Attorney may, depending upon the local
rule, be appointed by either the State's Attorney himself, or by an overseeing
judge.97 When a State's Attorney is unable to perform his duties because of
judicial officers had been given much of his trial power by constitutional enactments.
Control of the courthouse was not necessary to enable the county commissioners to
perform their more discretionary functions.
92. 276 Md. at 494-95, 348 A.2d at 848.
93. 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944).
94. Id. at 90, 40 A.2d at 321.
95. See, e.g., Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. State's Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 517, 298
A.2d 427, 436 (1973); Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 296, 114 A.2d 66, 71 (1955).
96. Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976), however, demonstrates that
a degree of responsibility accompanies the power of a State's Attorney. In that case
the prosecuting State's Attorney had allegedly represented private parties in a related
civil action against the criminal defendant. The court held on the basis of public
policy that if a prosecutor had a pecuniary or significant personal interest in a civil
matter that could impair his ability to act impartially toward both the defendant and
the state, he would be disqualified from' participating in the prosecution of a
subsequent criminal charge. See generally United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th
Cir. 1965); Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 64, 83 (1948).
97. MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 40 (1976). The constitution indirectly authorizes
Deputy and Assistant State's Attorneys by providing for their appointment and for
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"absence, sickness, resignation, or death," the court in which his cases are
pending may appoint an interim State's Attorney.98 Finally, under a statute
permitting appointment of court officers generally, a court in any proceeding
may appoint assistant counsel for the state.99 A fourth exception to the
absolute prosecutorial authority of the State's Attorney is a constitutional
one. The Attorney General, when requested by the Governor or the General
Assembly, may "aid" any State's Attorney or "commence and prosecute or
defend" suits or actions in state courts.100
The Yates dissent, describing the power of the State Prosecutor as
concurrent with that of the State's Attorneys,' 0' contended that the State
Prosecutor Act did not strip the office of State's Attorney of its essential
functions. 10 2 While conceding that the State's Attorneys would lose some
power, Judges Eldridge and Levine rejected the notion that a prosecutor
required absolute discretion in order to perform his constitutional function.
They found it unnecessary to decide whether the legislature could strip the
State's Attorneys of all powers and transfer them to another office, for, in
their view, the concurrent authority of a State Prosecutor had no such
their salaries .in Baltimore City. MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, §9 (prior to 1976
amendment).
98. MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 41 (1976). The constitution provides support for the
interim appointment by allowing the judges in a county to fill vacancies in the State's
Attorney's office. MD. CONST. art. V, § 11.
99. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2-102 (1974). Section 2-102 is an
enabling statute under a constitutional provision authorizing judges to appoint
needed court personnel. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
In State v. Ensor, 277 Md. 529, 356 A.2d 259 (1976), the Court of Appeals
considered whether an Assistant Attorney General, appointed as a Special Assistant
State's Attorney under § 2-102 at the request of the State's Attorney, could appear and
present evidence before a grand jury. The criminal defendants in Ensor challenged
the appearance of the Assistant Attorney General on the theory that only a State's
Attorney could appear. Observing that under § 2-102 an appointed state counsel is
limited to an appearance in a single "specific proceeding," the court interpreted
"specific proceeding" to include pretrial investigation and grand jury presentation. Id.
at 548, 356 A.2d at 269. The Court of Appeals also determined that a presiding judge
in Baltimore City may appoint counsel under § 2-102 without the concurrence of the
Supreme Bench, as would be required for the appointment of a permanent Assistant
State's Attorney under article V, § 9 of the constitution. Id. at 548-49, 356 A.2d at 269.
Finally, the court found no conflict with Murphy v. Yates: "[T]he positive request of
the State's Attorney that the appointment be made eliminates any possible conflict
with our holding in Murphy." Id. at 552, 356 A.2d at 271.
100. MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, § 3 (prior to 1976 amendment).
In recent years, investigations that would have been handled by a State
Prosecutor have been conducted by the Attorney General under this authority. See
Green v. State, 25 Md. App. 679, 337 A.2d 729 (1975); Irvin v. State, 23 Md. App. 457,
328 A.2d 329 (1974); Maloney v. State, 17 Md. App. 609, 304 A.2d 260 (1973); cf.
Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 130 A.2d 762 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 (1957)
(Governor gave subsequent authorization for injunctive action by the Attorney
General).
101. 276 Md. at 505, 348 A.2d at 853.
102. Id. at 510, 348 A.2d at 856.
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effect. 0 3 Thus, the differences between the majority and the dissent
ultimately turned on the nature of prosecutorial discretion.
Analysis of the functions of prosecutors, however, reveals serious flaws
in the majority's theory of unitary discretion. First, although the exercise of
discretion by prosecutors often produces salutary results through plea
bargaining, 0 4 it is not clear that this discretion must be absolute in order to
be effective. Plea bargaining by State's Attorneys could be coordinated with
the State Prosecutor in those narrow areas where their jurisdictions overlap.
There may also be areas where prosecutorial discretion is not desirable. A
prosecutor might forego prosecution because of external political pressures
or because he lacks the resources to pursue statewide criminal activity. The
State Prosecutor Act attempted to improve the prosecutorial system by
eliminating these two deficiencies.10 5 Finally, it should be noted that a
State's Attorney's discretion over whether to prosecute is not truly absolute.
A criminal prosecution can only be commenced through an indictment or
information, which can be frustrated by a grand jury or judge.10 6 Thus, while
prosecutorial discretion certainly constitutes an "awesome power," that
power need not be absolute in order for the office to fulfill its constitutional
function. Nevertheless, a majority of the Court of Appeals apparently
concluded that a prosecutor, by definition, must have absolute discretion.
Having been rebuffed in its first attempt to create a state prosecutor, the
General Assembly reacted to the Yates decision by proposing a constitu-
tional amendment. 107 The amendment, which was ratified in November,
1976, provides that the duties and powers of the State's Attorneys are to be
prescribed not "by law" but by "the General Assembly."'1 8 Furthermore, the
103. Id. It is not clear whether the dissent's reservation of this question can be
reconciled with its expansive reading of "prescribed by law." Recognition of
legislative power to alter the common law attributes of the office would seem to imply
the power to abolish it entirely. Nevertheless, it might be argued that inclusion of the
office within the constitution provides the office with certain minimum powers, such
as the right to commence prosecutions. Although nonessential powers, such as
discretion over the selection of cases, might be eliminated, these essential powers
would remain.
104. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-53 (1970); State v. Watson, 17
Md. App. 263, 301 A.2d 29 (1973).
105. See notes 3 to 7 and accompanying text supra.
106. A criminal defendant in Maryland can be prosecuted only upon an indictment
or an information. MD. R.P. 710 (1977). Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights grants an accused the right to receive a copy of the indictment, although an
indictment need not be used in every case. See Heath v. State, 198 Md. 455, 85 A.2d 43
(1951). An information is proper: where the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony
within the jurisdiction of the District Court, where the defendant consents to being
charged by information, where the defendant is charged with a felony at a
preliminary hearing which results in a finding of probable cause, or where the
defendant waives a preliminary hearing with regard to the charged felony. MD. R.P.
710(c) (1977).
107. An act concerning the Attorney General and State's Attorneys, ch. 545, 1976
Md. Laws 435.
108. Compare MD. CONST. OF 1867, art. V, § 9 (prior to 1976 amendment) with MD.
CONsT. art. V, § 9 (1867, amended 1976).
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amendment limits the Attorney General's role in appellate proceedings
through an exception for "criminal appeals otherwise prescribed by the
General Assembly," and the Attorney General may now assist State's
Attorneys or "any other authorized prosecuting office."'1 9 Anticipating the
authority to be granted by this amendment, the General Assembly enacted a
statute during the 1976 session which, with some changes, restored the 1975
version of the State Prosecutor Act.110 The Act, being contingent upon the
enactment and ratification of the constitutional amendment, became
effective January 1, 1977.
The language of the constitutional amendment poses a new difficulty
concerning the authority of State's Attorneys. If the powers of the State's
Attorneys are to be "prescribed by the General Assembly," a literal reading
of the phrase would indicate that the State's Attorneys no longer have any
common law powers. Under that reading, the General Assembly, acting
without further constitutional amendment, could abridge or completely
abolish the powers of the State's Attorney. Whether the legislature intended
so broad an amendment or merely sought to allow the creation of a State
Prosecutor cannot be known. Although it seems clear that the amendment
was drafted chiefly to circumvent the Yates invalidation of the State
Prosecutor Act, the Assembly may have envisioned future changes in the
office of State's Attorney."' The ambiguity of the Yates decision may create
difficulties in interpreting the new constitutional language. One could argue
that the bare mention of State's Attorneys in the constitution includes some
minimal grant of the historical discretion accorded that office; so that
modifications of the office might still be limited absent further constitu-
tional change. However, if the Yates decision is viewed as depending
ultimately upon the construction of the "prescribed by law" phrase, the
General Assembly may have acquired the right to abolish the State's
Attorney's office.
If this new attempt to establish a Special Prosecutor proves successful,
the actual holding of Yates will lose all practical significance. Nevertheless,
the decision raises interesting questions about the Court of Appeals'
approach to construing the language of the Maryland Constitution.
Confronted with an ambiguously worded provision that clearly granted
some lawmaking authority to the General Assembly, the court strained
mightily to read the language in a manner that thwarted the legislation. In
so doing, the court apparently chose to disregard the established principle of
constitutional interpretation that constitutional grants of authority to the
109. MD. CoNsT. art. V, §3 (1867, amended 1976).
110. MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, §§ 33A-33F (1976). Most of the changes were minor,
reflecting some of the objections raised by the original version of the statute. Among
the more important changes are the removal of all judges from the Selection and
Disabilities Commission and the placement of the Prosecutor within the Attorney
General's office. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, §§ 33A-33F (1976) with ch. 255,
§§ 33A-33H, 1975 Md. Laws 1259.
111. The original version of ch. 255, 1975 Md. Laws 1259, involved a complete
reorganization of the prosecutorial function in Maryland. See note 2 supra.
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lawmaking body are to be liberally construed. 112 The court's failure to
explain its reasons for its departure from this accepted theory of
interpretation can only raise doubts as to how such politically involved
questions will be decided in future cases.
III. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
1. AUTOMATIC STANDING FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS -
Duncan v. State.' - In Duncan, the Court of Appeals considered the difficult
question of a criminal defendant's standing to challenge the legality of a
search and seizure. Sherman Duncan and Cornell Smith were arrested in the
vicinity of an automobile they had allegedly used in the commission of a
larceny. After a subsequent warrantless search of the automobile trunk
revealed clothing recently stolen from a nearby department store,2 both men
were charged with grand larceny and receiving stolen goods. At separate
trials3 each defendant moved to have the clothing excluded from evidence,
asserting that the search of the car had been unlawful. In each case, the
trial court found the search to have been reasonable and denied the motion
to suppress.4 Smith was convicted of grand larceny, and Duncan was
convicted of receiving stolen goods, each verdict based on the presumption
that one in possession of recently stolen goods has not come by them
legitimately.5
Duncan and Smith appealed their convictions, contending that the
clothing found in the automobile should not have been admitted into
evidence against them because the search of the automobile had been
unlawful. However, the Court of Special Appeals bypassed the defendants'
112. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (commerce clause);
Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 652, 366 A.2d 21, 40 (1977); cf. Governor v. Exxon
Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977) (grant of authority implicit in police power to
be read liberally).
1. 276 Md. 715, 351 A.2d 144 (1976).
2. Employees of the store were unaware of the theft until the clothing was
retrieved by the police. However, employees in a nearby J.C. Penney's store had seen
two men remove plastic bags filled with Penney's merchandise from the store and
deposit them in a nearby trash can. While a security officer watched, an automobile
containing two men approached the trash can. When the occupants of the car
observed the security guard, they sped off. This car was later found parked in the
front yard of a neighboring house and Duncan and Smith were arrested at a place a
few hundred yards away. The owner of the house where the car was parked identified
them as the men who had alighted from the car. Duncan v. State, 27 Md. App. 302,
307-10, 340 A.2d 722, 726-28 (1975). The search of the car was conducted after the
defendants were taken to police headquarters. Agreed Statement of Facts, Brief for
Appellants at 5, Duncan v. State, 276 Md. 715, 351 A.2d 144 (1976).
3. The defendants were indicted jointly, but difficulty in arranging legal
representation for Duncan caused his trial to be severed. 27 Md. App. at 306-07, 340
A.2d at 725.
4. 276 Md. at 717-18, 351 A.2d at 145.
5. 276 Md. at 717, 351 A.2d at 145.
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argument concerning the search and held that the defendants lacked
standing to raise such an objection because they had failed to demonstrate
any legitimate possessory interest in the automobile.6
In a unanimous opinion the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of
the Court of Special Appeals.7 Applying the rule of Jones v. United States,'
the court held that both Duncan and Smith had automatic standing to
contest the legality of the search. The case was remanded to the Court of
Special Appeals for a determination of the reasonableness of the search. 9
Cases such as Duncan, where the possession of the property seized is
itself a crime or an essential element of a crime, raise a special problem
involving the proof required to establish standing to challenge an unlawful
search and seizure. The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is violated when a
search or seizure infringes upon a person's "reasonable expectation of
freedom from governmental intrusion."' 0 In order to deter law enforcement
officials from violating this privacy interest, evidence acquired by means of
an unlawful search or seizure may not be introduced at a criminal trial on
the issue of the defendant's guilt." For a defendant to invoke the
6. Duncan v. State, 27 Md. App. 302, 340 A.2d 722 (1975). No evidence
concerning the ownership of the automobile was introduced at Duncan's trial. At
Smith's trial, evidence was introduced showing the car was registered to a Shirley
Ann Duncan, but no connection was established between the owner Duncan and the
defendant Duncan. The Court of Special Appeals refused to infer a familial
relationship or a permitted use of the auto merely from the identity of names. 27 Md.
App. at 310, 340 A.2d at 727-28.
7. 276 Md. 715, 351 A.2d 144.
8. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). For discussion of Jones, see text accompanying notes 16
to 25 infra.
9. On remand, the Court of Special Appeals found the search to be reasonable
both because the automobile had been abandoned by the defendants and because the
search had been undertaken pursuant to a community caretaking function of the
police in relation to automobiles. Duncan v. State, 34 Md. App. 267, 366 A.2d 1058
(1976) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433 (1973)), aff'd, - Md. -, 378 A.2d 1108 (1977).
10. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). See Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
11. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Illegally seized evidence may, however, be introduced at trial to impeach a
defendant's credibility. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); cf. Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (a confession inadmissible as direct evidence because elicited
in violation of the defendant's Miranda rights can be introduced to impeach the
defendant's credibility).
Three theories have been propounded to justify the exclusion from trial of
illegally seized evidence. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928),
Justice Brandeis, in dissent, joined by Justice Holmes, suggested that the introduction
of illegally seized evidence contaminates the judicial process and undermines judicial
integrity. Justice Black, concurring in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961), took the
position that the exclusionary rule is required by a reading of the fourth amendment
in conjunction with the fifth amendment's ban on self-incrimination. In Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), Justice Clark, writing for the Court, asserted that the
exclusionary rule is based on the need to deter unlawful police action. In Stone v.
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exclusionary rule, however, he must do more than merely show that illegal
police activity occurred. Because the rights protected by the fourth
amendment are personal in nature, the defendant must also show that the
illegal police activity violated his own reasonable expectation of freedom
from governmental intrusion, as opposed to the expectation of another. 12 In
order to establish standing," a defendant generally must prove he has an
interest of some kind in either the place searched 14 or the property seized.' 5
But a defendant faces a dilemma when possession of the items seized itself
constitutes a criminal offense or an element of an offense; in that situation
the proof required of a defendant to establish affirmatively the standing to
challenge the search may often be the same proof which the state must
adduce to convict the defendant of the crime.
In Jones v. United States,1 6 the Supreme Court confronted the issue
whether defendants charged with possessory crimes 17 must prove their
standing by establishing a possessory interest in the seized items. Jones was
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court elevated the police deterrence rationale to
preeminence as the "primary justification for the exclusionary rule." Id. at 3048. The
wisdom of the exclusionary rule has been vigorously challenged. See id. at 3052
(Burger, C.J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
12. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
13. The defendant must establish his standing by a preponderance of the
evidence. Duncan v. State, 27 Md. App. 302, 304-05, 340 A.2d 722 (1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 276 Md. 715, 351 A.2d 144 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364 (1968). In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court asserted
that the fourth amendment "protects people, not places." 389 U.S. at 351. As Justice
Harlan noted in his concurrence, however, the question of what protection the
amendment affords those people is generally answered by reference to a place in
which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 361.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); United States v. Bozza,
365 F.2d 206, 224 (2d Cir. 1966); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 391
(1968) (as the defendant was not on the premises during the search, the "most natural"
way by which he could establish standing would be to testify as to ownership of the
seized property); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (possession of the seized
property leads to standing to protest the search and seizure). See generally Grove,
Suppression of Illegally Seized Evidence: The Standing Requirement on its Last Leg,
18 CATH. U.L. REV. 150, 169-72 (1968); Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing
Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 BROOKLYN. L. REV. 421, 446 (1975). But see United
States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976). The
defendant in Lisk sought to protest the seizure of a bomb belonging to him which had
been found by the police in the search of the car of a third person. The court held that
ownership of the seized property would give standing to challenge the seizure, but not
the search. Since no right of the defendant's had been violated by the admittedly
unlawful search, the seizure was analogous to the seizure of an object in plain view,
and thereby reasonable. Contra, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), where the
Supreme Court stated that a search and seizure constituted a single transaction and
could not be considered separately. 342 U.S. at 52.
16. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
17. A possessory crime is one in which possession of the article seized is itself a
crime or an essential element of a crime. See note 54 infra.
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charged with a violation of federal narcotics law based on his possession of
narcotics that were discovered by police officers in a search of an apartment
rented by a friend. 18 Although the friend was not in the apartment at the
time of the search, Jones had permission to use the apartment in his friend's
absence and was present at the search.' 9 The Supreme Court found that
Jones had standing to challenge the search, resting its holding on two
separate grounds. On one line of analysis, the Court held that proof that the
defendant was legitimately on the premises at the time of the search
demonstrated a sufficient interest in the situs of the search to allow him to
raise his fourth amendment objection. 2° Alternatively, the Court held that
standing would arise automatically for a defendant charged with a crime for
which possession of the property seized in the contested search constituted
prima facie evidence of a violation. 21 That the defendant could be convicted
simply by proof of possession established his standing to protest the search
and seizure. Jones therefore was not required to produce evidence of his
possessory interest in the property.
The Jones Court reached this result by analyzing the consequences of
requiring a defendant charged with a possessory crime to establish standing
by affirmative proof. First, the defendant's testimony at the suppression
hearing, in which he, in effect, would admit the charge against him by
asserting his possessory interest in the seized property, might later be used
against him at trial.22 This prospect would confront the defendant with a
dilemma: the search could be challenged only at the cost of an admission of
guilt.23 Secondly, the defendant might be tempted to perjure himself either at
18. Jones was charged with a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1958) (repealed
1970) and 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1958) (repealed 1970). Section 4704(a) made it illegal for any
person to "purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute narcotic drugs except in the original
stamped package .... " Possession of narcotics lacking the appropriate tax stamps
constituted prima facie evidence of a violation of the statute. Section 174 made it
illegal for any person to receive, conceal, buy, sell or facilitate the transportation of
any narcotic known to have been illegally imported into the United States. Possession
of a narcotic was deemed, by statute, sufficient evidence to support conviction. Thus,
although Jones was not charged with possession of narcotics, proof that he had
narcotics in his possession would be sufficient to obtain a conviction under either
statute.
19. 362 U.S. at 258-59.
20. Id. at 267. This aspect of the Jones decision has never been questioned. See
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Lopata v. State, 18 Md. App. 451, 307
A.2d 721 (1973).
21. 362 U.S. at 263-65.
22. Id. at 262. While the Court recognized that this particular problem could be
alleviated by simply holding that the defendant's suppression hearing testimony
could not later be introduced against him at trial, id., it declined to adopt this more
limited rule.
23. This dilemma was best described by Judge Learned Hand:
Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession, of
contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a possessor,
and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they come
as victims, they must take on that role, with enough detail to cast them
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the suppression hearing, where he would wish to establish his possession of
the seized property, or at trial, where he might seek to deny that
possession.2 4 Finally, the government would be able to assert contradictory
positions against the defendant: in denying the defendant's standing at the
suppression hearing, the government would seem to be denying the
possessory interest which it would later seek to prove at trial.
25
without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but
they were obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma.
Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932).
24. 362 U.S. at 262. The Court's decision in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971), that an illegally obtained confession may be introduced at trial to impeach a
defendant's testimony, casts doubt on the current force of this argument. Assuming
the logic of Harris applies, the potential use of a defendant's suppression hearing
testimony as impeachment evidence would seem an adequate deterrent to perjury. But
see Commonwealth v. Weeden, 457 Pa. 436, 322 A.2d 343 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
937 (1975) (granting a defendant charged with felony murder automatic standing to
protest the seizure of fruits of a theft, in part because to deny automatic standing
would encourage the defendant to perjure himself at the suppression hearing).
McCormick, however, argues that removal of the defendant's incentive to perjure
himself is not a sufficient consideration to support the automatic standing rule. C.
MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 179 (2d ed. 1972).
25. 362 U.S. at 263. The Court stated, "It is not consonant with the amenities, to
put it mildly, of the administration of criminal justice to sanction such squarely
contradictory assertions of power by the Government." Id. at 263-64.
But Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 15, argue that the Court erred in
asserting that the prosecutor would be taking inherently contradictory positions.
They contend that no inconsistency exists in asserting that a person possesses an
object in such a way as to bring him within the reach of the criminal law but not
within the ambit of fourth amendment protection. "Justice Frankfurter fell prey to the
'tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in
connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope
in all of them.'" Id. at 437 (quoting Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the
Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933)).
In the context of a prosecution stemming from possession of narcotics,
however, Justice Frankfurter had a sound basis for assuming that possession would
confer standing as well as convict. In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), the
Court had held that possession of narcotics gave rise to standing to contest a seizure
of those narcotics. Id. at 54. Therefore, when the prosecutor in Jones argued that
Jones did not have a sufficient interest for the purpose of asserting standing but did
have a sufficient interest for the purpose of conviction, he asserted contradictory
positions.
Nevertheless, in a prosecution for possession of stolen property - property
rightfully owned by another - the prosecutor may not be asserting inconsistent
positions because it is unclear whether the defendant can base standing on a
possessory interest in stolen property. It has been held that standing may be based on
a possessory interest in stolen property, using the common law principle that the thief
has a right of possession against all but the true owner. See Cotton v. United States,
371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967). Other courts have held that a thief has no standing to
challenge a search and seizure based on a property interest in the stolen goods. See,
e.g., United States v. Sacco, 436 F.2d 780 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 834 (1971).
The Supreme Court has indicated that it may subscribe to the latter view. See Brown
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 n.4 (1973). In any event, the issue is not so clear
that the Jones Court could properly assume that a prosecutor always asserted
inconsistent positions where the indictment charges possession; further clarification
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Although the automatic standing rule of Jones alleviated these
difficulties for defendants charged with crimes of possession, similar
problems remained for defendants charged with nonpossessory crimes who
sought to establish standing based on their interest in seized property. 26
Such defendants were still forced to give incriminating testimony by
admitting their interest in a damaging piece of evidence, although they were
not required to admit the whole substance of the charge. And prosecutors
still enjoyed the benefit of contradictory positions from denying that the
defendant possessed the property for purposes of fourth amendment
protection but later attempting to use possession of the property as evidence
to convict the defendant of a crime.
The Supreme Court finally decided the issue of standing in nonposses-
sory crimes in Simmons v. United States.27 The defendant, charged with
armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association, sought to
establish standing to challenge the seizure of a suitcase containing
incriminating evidence by asserting, at the suppression hearing, that the
suitcase looked like one he owned. 28 The prosecutor thereafter introduced
this testimony at trial.29 Finding it intolerable that a defendant be required
to relinquish his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination at trial in
order to assert his fourth amendment right at a suppression hearing, the
Supreme Court held that testimony given by a defendant at a suppression
hearing could not be introduced at trial on the issue of guilt.3° Nevertheless,
the Simmons Court did not extend the Jones rule of automatic standing to a
defendant charged with a nonpossessory crime; affirmative proof of
standing was still required.
In Duncan v. State, the Court of Special Appeals, agreeing with a
number of commentators,3' determined that the Simmons rule afforded
by the Court of the nature of a defendant's rights arising from a possessory interest in
stolen property would have been helpful. In this respect, the argument of Trager and
Lobenfeld is persuasive.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 930 (1964) (possession and concealment); Fox v. United States, 381 F.2d 125 (9th
Cir. 1967) (smuggling and conspiracy to smuggle).
27. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
28. The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress and admitted the
suitcase into evidence. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, finding that the
search was made with permission of the owner of the house from which the suitcase
was seized. United States v. Garrett, 371 F.2d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1966), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
29. The testimony given during the suppression hearing, in which the defendant
virtually admitted ownership of a suitcase containing coin cards and bill wrappers
from the bank which had been robbed, was "undoubtedly a strong piece of evidence
against him." 390 U.S. at 391.
30. Id. at 394. The suppression hearing testimony probably could be used as
impeachment evidence, however. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971),
discussed in notes 11 & 24 supra.
31. See Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 15, at 428-29; White & Greenspan,
Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 334 (1970). See also
People v. Hansen, 38 N.Y.2d 17, 24, 339 N.E.2d 873, 877, 377 N.Y.S.2d 461, 467 (1975)
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part); Commonwealth v. Knowles, 459 Pa. 70, 81, 327 A.2d
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adequate protection to all defendants, regardless of the nature of the offense
with which they were charged. Indeed, in its view, the Simmons approach
had completely supplanted the Jones rule of automatic standing for
defendants charged with possessory crimes. However, the Court of Appeals
rejected this position and held that the automatic standing rule of Jones
continued to control in cases where possession constitutes the gravamen of
an offense.32 Proceeding on the assumption that the automatic standing rule
was a Supreme Court interpretation of the fourth amendment which, unless
directly overruled, was still binding on the states,3 3 the Court of Appeals
observed that Simmons had specifically recognized Jones as "relaxing the
standing requirements" for defendants charged with possessory crimes and
that Simmons had purported to establish a rule solely for nonpossessory
crimes.2 4 The court then noted that several Supreme Court decisions since
Simmons had referred to the automatic standing rule, although not actually
applying it to any defendants. 35 This observation was followed by a long list
19, 24 (1974) (Pomeroy, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Rowe, 443 Pa. 14, 17 n.3, 249
A.2d 911, 912 n.3 (1969).
32. 276 Md. 715, 351 A.2d 144 (1976).
33. 276 Md. at 730, 351 A.2d at 152. The determination of standing made in Jones
was technically an interpretation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) which, at the time,
established the procedure for suppressing evidence in the federal courts. However, the
rule has been interpreted to be no broader than is constitutionally required. Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 n.6 (1969). Therefore, a determination of standing
under Rule 41(e) is also a determination of standing under the fourth amendment.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which extended the exclusionary rule to the states,
imposed federal interpretation of the fourth amendment, including the relaxation of
the standing requirement, upon the states. See Ker v. California, 347 U.S. 23, 34
(1963). But see White & Greenspan, supra note 31, at 343 (contending that Jones was
only an interpretation of the rule, not a constitutional decision, and thus not binding
on the states).
In 1972, Rule 41(e) was divided into two sections, and the procedure for a
motion to suppress evidence is now contained in Rule 41(f). This change was only
intended to require that the motion to suppress be made in the trial court rather than
in the district where the evidence had been seized, 18 U.S.C. Appendix, Rule 41 (Supp.
III 1973), Note of the Advisory Committee on Rules, 1972 Amendments at 664, and
should not alter the interpretations of the old Rule 41(e).
At the time of the Duncan opinion, the procedure for challenging searches and
seizures in Maryland was contained in Maryland Rule of Procedure 729. Effective
July 1, 1977, the Court of Appeals has adopted Rule 736 to replace Rule 729 as part of
a comprehensive revision of Chapter 700 of the Maryland Rules on Criminal Causes.
See 4 Md. Reg. 235, 245-46 (1977). The main effect of the change is to require that all
motions to suppress evidence be raised and decided before trial. If not raised before
trial, the objection to the search and seizure is waived unless the court, for cause
shown, orders otherwise. This change also should not affect the substantive
interpretations concerning suppression of evidence made under Rule 729.
34. 276 Md. at 722, 351 A.2d at 147-48 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 391-92 (1968)).
35. 276 Md. at 723-27, 351 A.2d at 148-50. The court discussed Brown v. United
States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), where the Supreme Court reserved decision on whether the
automatic standing rule survived Simmons, and Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224
(1972) (per curiam). The court also cited Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969),
and Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). However, since these cases dealt only
with the "legitimately on the premises" aspect of the Jones holding, they are
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of cases from both state and federal jurisdictions, decided after Simmons,
which either applied the automatic standing rule, distinguished it, or
recognized it in dictum. 36 The sheer weight of this authority apparently
persuaded the Court of Appeals that the rule of automatic standing for
defendants charged with possessory crimes remained valid.
One reason cited by the court for the continued application of automatic
standing after Simmons was the fear that testimony at a suppression
hearing might unduly benefit the prosecution. Although the evidence given
by the defendant may no longer be introduced at trial, it can be used to
acquire leads for the development of further incriminating evidence. The
court considered this possibility to be "one of the very vices which Jones was
intended to prevent. '37 Because the Simmons rule allows the prosecutor
access to additional evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded that it did not
adequately protect defendants charged with possessory crimes. While the
court did not explain the basis for giving defendents charged with
possessory crimes preference over defendants charged with nonpossessory
crimes regarding the disclosure at a hearing of detrimental information, an
argument can be made that the distinction is proper given the more serious
nature of pretrial admissions made by defendants charged with possessory
crimes. For admissions made by such defendants might aid the prosecutor
in proving the only necessary element of the crime - possession. Statements
made by defendants charged with nonpossessory crimes, on the other hand,
would provide only indirect assistance to a prosecutor. Whether this
distinction is sufficient to support the preferential treatment affordedl one
group of defendants is not clear.38
An additional argument for the continued application of automatic
standing after Simmons rests on the prosecutorial inconsistency rationale of
the Jones decision. If a defendant in a possessory case were required to show
standing at a suppression hearing, a prosecutor could claim that the
defendant lacked a sufficient possessory interest in the property for purposes
of fourth amendment protection yet assert that the defendant had a
sufficient interest for purposes of criminal conviction, a stance which the
Court in Jones found objectionable. As Simmons seemingly permits this
type of contradiction, the concept of prosecutorial inconsistency may no
irrelevant to the automatic standing issue. Mancusi did cite the automatic standing
rule, 392 U.S. at 368 n.5, but this note was not cited by the Court of Appeals in its
discussion of the case.
36. See 276 Md. at 727-30, 351 A.2d at 150-52.
37. Id. at 730, 351 A.2d at 152.
38. In terms of the Jones analysis, the defendant to a possessory charge arguably
does face a more difficult dilemma in choosing between incriminating himself by
aiding the prosecutor in this way or relinquishing any challenge to the search.
Simmons lends some support for this position through its characterization of the
dilemma of the defendant to a possessory charge as "most extreme." 390 U.S. at 391.
But see Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. at 223 (1973). The Court in Brown implied
that it considered the self-incrimination dilemmas of the two groups of defendants to
be indistinguishable by its blanket statement that "Simmons has removed the danger
of coerced self-incrimination." 411 U.S. at 229.
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longer constitute a convincing rationale for automatic standing.39 Neverthe-
less, the Court of Appeals apparently still considered this theory persuasive,
for it quoted an extensive passage from the Fourth Circuit opinion in United
States v. Cobb,40 which portrayed prosecutorial inconsistency as a vice of a
magnitude sufficient to sustain the use of automatic standing for possessory
crimes. The Duncan court remarked that the views expressed in Cobb were
"highly persuasive.
' 41
The reaffirmance of the automatic standing rule by the Court of Appeals
in Duncan reversed the trend of recent decisions by the Court of Special
Appeals. The automatic standing rule of Jones was first recognized by the
Court of Special Appeals in Kleinbart v. State,4 2 where the defendants,
39. Insofar as the Simmons Court was not persuaded to establish a rule for
nonpossessory cases which would eliminate all prosecutorial inconsistency, this may
indicate a retreat from the Jones view that prosecutorial inconsistency is a vice which
should be avoided. If so, the removal of the defendant's dilemma would remove the
need for the automatic standing rule. However, in order to eliminate prosecutorial
inconsistency in nonpossessory cases to the extent that Jones eliminated it in
possessory ones, the Court would have been required to establish an automatic
standing rule for nonpossessory cases as well. This would completely eliminate the
standing requirement, a step which the Court has consistently refused to take. See
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
The rationale of the position that prosecutorial inconsistency is a vice which
must be avoided in the possessory case but may be overlooked in the nonpossessory
case rests on the difference between the degree of inconsistency. While the prosecutor
charging possession negates his entire case at the suppression hearing, the prosecutor
in the nonpossessory case is inconsistent only on an evidentiary issue. Considerations
of fairness may require that the prosecutor avoid fundamental inconsistencies, yet
tolerate minor ones.
40. 432 F.2d 716, 721-22 (4th Cir. 1970), cited at 276 Md. at 731-32, 351 A.2d at
152-53. In Cobb, the defendant was charged with transportation and possession of
untaxed distilled spirits. The court granted the defendant automatic standing to
contest the search of a car from which the defendant had alighted shortly prior to the
search, even though the car was registered in the name of a third person. The court
based its holding on the fact that the defendant was charged with a possessory crime
and the fact that the search had been "directed at" the defendant. For a discussion of
the "directed at" test for granting standing, see note 68 infra.
41. 276 Md. at 731, 351 A.2d at 152. The applicability of the prosecutorial
inconsistency rationale had been recognized in Maryland prior to Duncan. In Walters
v. State, 8 Md. App. 583, 261 A.2d 189 (1970), the Court of Special Appeals noted that
Maryland Rule of Procedure 729, which at that time detailed the procedure for
challenging a search and seizure in Maryland, see note 33 supra, was sufficiently
comparable to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) "as to make the rationale of
the holding in Jones applicable." 8 Md. App. at 590-91 n.7, 261 A.2d at 193 n.7. See
also Palmer v. State, 14 Md. App. 159, 164 n.9, 286 A.2d 572, 575 n.9 (1972).
42. 2 Md. App. 183, 234 A.2d 288 (1967). Defendant Mullin was the driver of and
defendant Kleinbart was a passenger in an automobile that a police officer observed
being driven erratically. The police officer instructed Mullin to pull the car onto the
median and arrested her for reckless driving and driving under the influence of
narcotics. Kleinbart was arrested for public drunkenness after he left the car and
staggered across the street. The automobile, which was registered to Mullin's sister,
was towed to a nearby service station. The police later returned to the service station,
searched the automobile, and discovered stolen property. Id. at 184-88, 234 A.2d at
290-92.
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charged with breaking and entering, grand larceny, and receiving stolen
goods, were convicted on the grand larceny count. Although the court cited
the automatic standing rule, it apparently based its finding of standing to
contest the search of a car registered to the defendant's sister on the
alternative holding of Jones - the defendants had been legitimately in the
automobile immediately prior to their arrest.43 In Walters v. State,44 which
constitutes the clearest discussion of the automatic standing rule by a
Maryland court to date, the court, distinguishing Jones, held that a
defendant charged with possession of narcotics did not have automatic
standing to contest the search of a codefendant.4 5 Finally, in Anderson v.
State,4 6 the Court of Special Appeals found that a defendant charged with
receiving stolen goods and maintaining a dwelling house for the sale of
narcotics was entitled to automatic standing to challenge the search of that
house because the charges were based on possession. Subsequent to this line
of cases, which incorporated automatic standing into the law of Maryland,
the Court of Special Appeals, in a series of opinions written by Judge
Moylan, began to restrict the scope of the rule. In Palmer v. State,47 the
defendant was charged with possession of narcotics paraphernalia and
carrying a concealed weapon. These items had been discovered by police
while searching a stolen car driven by the defendant. After noting the
existence of the automatic standing rule for defendants charged with
possessory crimes, the court ignored the possible relevance of the rule to the
case before it and denied the defendant standing to contest the search of the
stolen car on the ground that he had not been legitimately in it.48 In Lopata
v. State,49 where the defendant was charged with receiving a stolen
automobile which had been discovered by police in the search of a friend's
garage, the court did not even cite the automatic standing rule for
defendants charged with possessory crimes or attempt to distinguish the
43. The basis for decision of the Kleinbart court is not clear. While purporting to
grant standing because the defendants had been legitimately in the car, the court
asserted that the prosecutor had subjected the defendants to the penalties of lawless
possession without the remedies. Id. at 208, 234 A.2d at 303. However, such language
is typically used in connection with the automatic standing aspect of Jones.
Furthermore, while the defendants were legitimately on the premises at the time of
the arrest, or immediately prior to arrest in the case of Kleinbart, they were not
legitimately on the premises at the time of the search, which is a customary
requirement for a grant of standing under the "legitimately on the premises" rule of
Jones. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Lopata v. State, 18 Md. App.
451, 307 A.2d 721 (1973). But see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412 n.2 (1969).
The Supreme Court in Spinelli stated that the defendant had standing to challenge
the search of an apartment, although he was not on the premises at the time of the
search, where agents had delayed their arrest until the defendant entered the hallway.
44. 8 Md. App. 583, 261 A.2d 189 (1970).
45. The court reasoned that the automatic standing rule was inapplicable because
the defendant was not in possession of the seized property at the time of the search.
See text accompanying notes 62 to 68 infra.
46. 9 Md. App. 532, 267 A.2d 296 (1970).
47. 14 Md. App. 159, 286 A.2d 572 (1972).
48. Id. at 168-69, 286 A.2d at 578.
49. 18 Md. App. 451, 307 A.2d 721 (1973).
[VOL. 37
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
instant case from Jones. Rather, the court held that the defendant had no
standing, because he was in jail at the time of the search and so could not fit
within 'he "legitimately on the premises" alternative of Jones.O In Duncan,
Judge Moylan abandoned all pretense and held that the automatic standing
rule was a "dead letter," no longer to be applied in Maryland.5' The Court of
Appeals, by holding that automatic standing remained part of the law of
standing in Maryland, halted this retreat from the doctrine in the Court of
Special Appeals, at least in its more obvious manifestations.52
The Court of Appeals restated Jones as "providing automatic standing
for challenge to the legality of a search and seizure where the fruits of that
seizure would go far to convict of a possessory crime such as here
charged. '5 3 However, the Duncan opinion did not specify which crimes could
properly be considered possessory. 54 Both defendants had been charged with
50. Id. at 453-54, 307 A.2d at 722.
51. 27 Md. App. at 317, 340 A.2d at 732. Judge Moylan had presaged this decision
in a footnote in Palmer v. State, 14 Md. App. 159, 167-68 n.12, 286 A.2d 572, 577 n.12
(1972), where he asserted that Simmons probably had rendered automatic standing
"superfluous."
52. Despite the Duncan decision, the erosion of the automatic standing rule has
continued in the Court of Special Appeals. In Haina v. State, 30 Md. App. 295, 352
A.2d 874 (1976), decided after the Court of Appeals decision in Duncan, the defendant
was charged with violation of the narcotics laws. He sought to challenge the search of
a neighbor's yard which had uncovered narcotics placed there by a codefendant. The
court held that the defendant had automatic standing to contest the search, citing
Duncan, but went on to hold that because the defendant had proved no right to store
his property under his neighbor's porch, "it was simply not an area in which he had a
right to expect privacy. The Jones . . .rule is limited to a person rightfully on the
property." Id. at 316, 352 A.2d at 887. This analysis appears reminiscent of that used
in Palmer v. State, 14 Md. App. 159, 286 A.2d 572 (1972), where the defendant was
denied standing because of his illegitimate presence in a stolen car. See text
accompanying note 47 supra. The Haina court's analysis is inconsistent with Duncan,
which granted automatic standing to defendants charged with possession irrespective
of the legitimacy of their presence on the premises; in Duncan the defendants made no
showing that their presence in the car was legitimate. See note 6 supra. The court in
Haina, however, could have achieved the same result without doing violence to the
automatic standing rule by holding that the automatic standing rule was inapplicable
because the defendant did not possess the property at the time of the search. See notes
62 to 68 and accompanying text infra.
53. 276 Md. at 728, 351 A.2d at 150.
54. Grove, supra note 15, at 158-61, states that the seized evidence relevant to a
Jones analysis can be divided into four categories: 1) Contraband per se - those items
the possession of which is illegal in and of itself, e.g., narcotics. The automatic
standing rule clearly applies to these cases. See Walters v. State, 8 Md. App. 583, 261
A.2d 189 (1970). Cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (fact of possession
presumptive evidence that statute was violated). 2) Derivative contraband - items
which though not themselves illegal are possessed in illegal conditions. A typical
charge under this category would be receiving or possession of stolen goods. The
automatic standing rule is generally held to apply to these cases also. See Anderson v.
State, 9 Md. App. 532, 267 A.2d 296 (1970). 3) Fruits of the theft - the items again are
stolen goods, but the charge involved is larceny, burglary, or robbery. Courts are
divided on the applicability of automatic standing in this class of cases. Compare
Cassady v. United States, 410 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), and Harper v.
State, 84 Nev. 233, 440 P.2d 893 (1968), with Wattenberg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853
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receiving stolen goods, the essence of the charge being that the defendant
unlawfully possessed the goods. This charge had previously been held to
give rise to autoinatic standing for a defendant to protest a search.5 5 The
defendant Smith, however, was convicted only on a grand larceny count.
Although the court, in discussing the application of automatic standing,
addressed itself only to the charge of receiving stolen goods,56 Smith's
acquittal on the receiving charge suggests that his automatic standing
stemmed from the larceny count.5 7 If that were indeed the basis of the
decision, Duncan would be the first Maryland case in which a larceny
defendant received automatic standing.5 8 This would mark a significant
development because possession plays a more attenuated role in a larceny
case than in a prosecution for receiving stolen goods. While possession is an
essential element of the receiving offense, 9 it is merely a fact from which
the violation can be inferred in a larceny case.6° Since the Duncan court
(9th Cir. 1968). 4) Evidentiary items - these are generally held not to give rise to
automatic standing. See, e.g., Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94, 292 N.E.2d 790 (1973)
(defendant charged with felony murder denied automatic standing to protest the
search and seizure of the fruits of the robbery which led to the murder). But see
Commonwealth v. Weeden, 457 Pa. 436, 322 A.2d 343 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 937
(1975).
55. See Anderson v. State, 9 Md. App. 532, 267 A.2d 296 (1970).
56. The court stated that "possession of recently stolen goods is a very important
element in the proof where the crime charged is receiving stolen goods." 276 Md. at
727, 351 A.2d at 150.
57. The Court of Special Appeals had indicated that the automatic standing rule,
if recognized, did not extend to Smith because the seizure as to him was a seizure of
"fruits of the theft," see note 54 supra, which the court considered to be outside the
boundaries of the Jones holding. 27 Md. App. at 322-23, 340 A.2d at 375. The contrary
view is that since the charge filed originally was receiving stolen goods as well as
grand larceny, and the determination of automatic standing is based on the original
charge, Smith had standing to protest the search at all subsequent stages of the
proceeding on the basis of the original charge of which he had been acquitted. If one
adheres to the view of the Court of Special Appeals - that the status of the defendant
Smith on appeal was the same as that of a grand larceny defendant - then the Court
of Appeals has extended the automatic standing rule to include the seizure of fruits of
the theft from a larceny defendant. If one accepts the other view - that standing is to
be determined by reference to the original indictment - then Duncan does not work
an extension.
58. See Palmer v. State, 14 Md. App. 159, 165 n.10, 286 A.2d 572, 575-76 n.10
(1972).
59. The offense of receiving stolen goods by definition involves a receipt of those
goods. See Jordan v. State, 219 Md. 36, 148 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 849 (1959)
(construing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 466 (1976)). Receiving has been broadly
construed as equivalent to possession. It includes the obtaining of a measure of
control or dominion over the property, see id., and the concept of "constructive
possession," see Polansky v. State, 205 Md. 362, 109 A.2d 52 (1954). The proposed
revision of the Maryland Criminal Code replaces the receiving offense with the crime
of larceny by possession. See MARYLAND COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL LAw, PROPOSED
CRIMINAL CODE § 155.45, at 307 (1974). Possession is clearly the gravamen of this
proposed offense. See comment to § 155.45, id. at 308.
60. The offense of larceny entails the taking and carrying away of another's
property without claim of right and with the intent to convert it to a use other than
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failed to address the status of the grand larceny count, it is not clear
whether the court intended to categorize that offense as a possessory crime.
While the granting of automatic standing to larceny defendants would
expand the application of the rule in Maryland, this extension might well be
consistent with the rationale of Jones because the defendant's possession of
the fruits of the seizure constitutes prima facie evidence of a violation.61
Automatic standing is not always available where the defendant has
been charged with possession of the fruits of the contested search and
seizure. As Jones has been interpreted by most courts, the automatic
standing doctrine is applicable only when the defendant possessed the
contraband at the time of the contested search and seizure.62 Although the
Court of Appeals did not specifically incorporate this caveat into its
restatement of the automatic standing rule, its operation can be inferred
from the court's attempt to distinguish Brown v. United States.63 The
defendants in Brown were charged with transporting stolen goods and
conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce. They sought to
that of the owner. State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 298 A.2d 378 (1973) (construing MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 340 (1976)). Exclusive possession of recently stolen goods raises
the inference that the possessor is either the thief or a receiver of stolen goods. See
Anglin v. State, 244 Md. 652, 224 A.2d 668 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 947 (1967).
Where the circumstances make one inference as reasonable as the other, however, the
inference favoring the less serious crime - receiving stolen goods - prevails. See
Jordan v. State, 219 Md. 36, 148 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 849 (1959). Thus, as in
Jones, possession of the goods allows the inference that they have been improperly
obtained but the inference in a larceny case is much more easily rebuffed.
The proposed revision of the Maryland Criminal Code eliminates any
confusion over the inference to be drawn from the possession of stolen goods by
recognizing the crime of larceny by possession. See note 59 supra. Establishing
larceny by possession as a distinct category among the other larceny offenses clearly
delineates the role of possession in a larceny prosecution.
61. Kleinbart v. State, 2 Md. App. 183, 234 A.2d 288 (1967), although not directly
on point, supports this result. Id. at 207-08, 234 A.2d at 303 (citing the inference which
arises from the possession of recently stolen goods when the charge is larceny and
declaring that the defendant was subjected to the penalties meted out to one in
lawless possession, while being denied the remedies designed for one in that
situation). But the Court of Special Appeals took the position in Duncan that
automatic standing did not apply to larceny defendants. 27 Md. App. at 322-23, 340
A.2d at 735-36.
62. This rule is based on the language of Jones stating, "[p]etitioner's conviction
flows from his possession of the narcotics at the time of the search." 362 U.S. at 263.
See, e.g., United States v. Dye, 508 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974
(1975); United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 109, 280 A.2d 430 (1971); State v. Christel, 61 Wis. 143, 211
N.W.2d 801 (1973). Cf. People v. Hansen, 38 N.Y.2d 17, 339 N.E.2d 873, 377 N.Y.S.2d
461 (1975) (court granted defendant standing, finding basis of charge to be possession
at the time of the search). But see Gebert v. State, 85 Nev. 331, 454 P.2d 897 (1969);
State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1974).
63. 411 U.S. 223 (1973), discussed in 276 Md. at 725-27, 351 A.2d at 149-50. The
defendants in Brown were arrested and charged with transporting stolen goods and
conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce. Subsequently, a store
belonging to a co-conspirator was searched pursuant to a defective warrant, and
stolen goods, which formed the basis of the prosecution, were seized.
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invoke the automatic standing doctrine to challenge a search of the property
of a codefendent, which revealed the stolen goods, conducted while they were
imprisoned in another state.64 The Supreme Court denied the defendants
automatic standing because the prosecution was not based on possession of
the goods at the time of the search.65 To the extent that standing is based on
the possessory interest of the defendant with regard to the situs of the
search or the property seized, the defendant who has no possessory interest
at the time of the search is not "aggreived" by that search.66 Thus, the
prosecutor can assert that the search did not violate the defendant's fourth
amendment rights without being inconsistent in claiming at trial that the
defendant had committed a crime by possessing the goods at some other
64. The codefendant who owned the store succeeded in the district court in having
the stolen goods suppressed, but the other defendants were denied standing to protest
the search. 411 U.S. at 226.
65. Id. at 229. The charge against the defendants in Brown - transporting and
conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce - is arguably not a crime
of possession. See United States v. Sacco, 436 F.2d 780 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
834 (1971). The opinion of the Court is not clear as to whether automatic standing was
denied because the charge was not based on possession, or because it was based on
possession at a time prior to the search. The Court states,
[Ilt is not necessary for us now to determine whether our decision in
Simmons, supra, makes Jones' "automatic" standing unnecessary. We reserve
that question for a case where possession at the time of the contested search
and seizure is "an essential element of the offense ... charged." Simmons,
390 U.S., at 390. Here, unlike Jones, the Government's case against petitioners
does not depend on petitioners' possession of the seized evidence at the time of
the contested search and seizure.
411 at 228. The opinion then cites the language of Jones, "'Petitioner's conviction
flows from his possession of the narcotics at the time of the search.'" Id. at 228 n.3
(quoting Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. at 263 (emphasis in the Brown opinion)). In another
ambiguous passage, the Court states:
In deciding this case, therefore, it is sufficient to hold that there is no
standing to contest a search and seizure where, as here, the defendants:...
(c) were not charged with an offense that includes, as an essential element of
the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the time of the
contested search and seizure. The vice of allowing the Government to allege
possession as part of the crime charged, and yet deny that there was
possession sufficient for standing purposes, is not present. The Government
cannot be accused of taking "advantage of contradictory positions."
Id. at 229.
In Commonwealth v. Knowles, 459 Pa. 70, 78 n.12, 327 A.2d 19, 22-23 n.12
(1974), the court asserted that the basis of the decision in Brown was that the charge
was not based on possession. Contra, State v. Christel, 61 Wis. 2d 143, 155, 211 N.W.2d
801, 807 (1973).
66. But see State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1974), where the court held
that a defendant had automatic standing to protest a search even though he did not
have possession of the seized property at the time of the search. The police had
searched a package in a freight office which had not yet been claimed and discovered
that it contained marijuana. The defendants, arrested after they picked up the
package, were charged with possession of marijuana at the time of the arrest, but not
at the time of the search. The court distinguished Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223 (1973), on the ground that Brown dealt with possession prior to a search, while the
case before it dealt with possession subsequent to a search. However, the possessory
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time. 67 This interpretation of the automatic standing rule presumably limits
the protection of the fourth amendment to those whose rights have been
violated.68
The requirement that time of possession correspond to the time of the
search raises questions regarding the application of automatic standing to
Duncan and Smith. The Court of Appeals distinguished Brown, stating, "In
Brown the persons protesting were not in immediate possession of the seized
evidence. '69 However, the facts of Duncan indicate that the defendants in
that case also may not have been in immediate possession of the seized
evidence. They had parked the automobile containing the stolen property
and were arrested at a point some distance from the car. Indeed, they were
later held to have abandoned the car.70 Like the defendants in Brown, they
were in custody elsewhere at the time of the search. Thus, the court's
assertion that the facts of Duncan were distinguishable from those in Brown
interest of the defendant is the same whether possession exists prior to the search or
subsequent to the search. There is no possessory interest at the time of the search, the
act which violates the fourth amendment. It would seem that if Brown forecloses
automatic standing for a charge based on possession prior to the search, it also
forecloses automatic standing based on possession subsequent to the search.
67. The Court of Special Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Walters v. State,
8 Md. App. 583, 261 A.2d 189 (1970). A police officer observed Walters pass something
white to the codefendant Logan. The officer then stopped Logan for questioning.
During the interview, according to the officer's testimony, a pill fell from Logan's
person to the ground. Logan and Walters were then arrested and searched. Because
the trial court was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the pill had actually
fallen from Logan's person, it found that the arrest and subsequent search of Logan
were not based on probable cause. However, the court ruled that Walters had no
standing to challenge the search of Logan. The decision in Lopata, see notes 49 and
50 and accompanying text supra, can also be explained as an application of this
principle. In a case with somewhat similar, if more bizarre, facts, a defendant was
granted automatic standing to protest a vaginal search of his female companion
which yielded narcotics. United States v. Boston, 510 F.2d 35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 990 (1974). Although this case was decided after Brown, the court held that
the defendant was entitled to automatic standing because he had a right of possession
at the time of the search and seizure, even though he did not have actual possession at
that time.
68. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), Justice Fortas, concurring
in part and dissenting in part, urged the Court to consider anyone against whom a
search was directed to be a "person aggrieved." When the facts of the case indicate
that the police sought to acquire evidence against a particular defendant, that
defendant would be considered a victim of an invasion of privacy and a "person
aggrieved" by a search, even though it was not his property which was searched or
seized. Id. at 208-09. Defining the standing requirement in this way, rather than
relying on an interest in property at the time of the search, might better ensure the
enforcement of constitutional rights by bringing a wider range of police activity
within the ambit of judicial review.
69. 276 Md. at 731, 351 A.2d at 152.
70. Duncan v. State, 34 Md. App. 267, 366 A.2d 1058 (1976), aff'd, - Md. -, 378
A.2d 1108 (1977). If the automobile and the property in it had been abandoned, it
would seem that the possessory interest of the defendants had been extinguished at
some time prior to the search, and, therefore, the prosecution could not have been
based on possession at the time of the search.
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does not adequately explain the distinction perceived by the Court of
Appeals.
7 1
The automatic standing rule relieves a defendant of the requirement
that he prove standing. Under its operation, standing arises automatically
whenever: (1) the defendant is charged with the crime of possessing the
article which was the fruit of the contested search and seizure; and (2) he
possessed that article at the time of the contested search and seizure.
Nothing in the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Duncan purported to
depart from this rule. However, the court failed to resolve questions
regarding the type of possessory interest which the defendant must have in
order to assert automatic standing and the type of charge considered
sufficiently based on possession for the automatic standing rule to be
applicable. Therefore, further clarification of the automatic standing rule
and the scope of Duncan is needed.
2. DOUBLE JEOPARDY - SAME TRANSACTION TEST RE-
JECTED - Thomas v. State,' Cousins v. State.2 - The United States
Constitution 3 and the common law 4 of Maryland protect a criminal
71. The holding of the Court of Appeals seems to have been based on the theory
that the defendants had constructive possession of the stolen property at the time of
the search. A less plausible explanation is that the Duncan court recognized a "right
of" possession in stolen property similar to that found in United States v. Boston, 510
F.2d 35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 990 (1974), discussed in note 67, supra.
Acceptance of this explanation would mean, however, that the Court of Appeals
adopted, sub silentio, the common law right of the thief against all but the rightful
owner. See note 25 supra. This argument had previously been rejected in Palmer v.
State, 14 Md. App. 159, 168-69, 286 A.2d 572, 578 (1972). If the constructive possession
theory can be used, the effect on the automatic standing rule in Maryland could be
significant. Factual situations such as those involved in Walters v. State, 8 Md. App.
583, 261 A.2d 189 (1970), note 67 supra, where the defendant sought to protest the
search of the person of a codefendant, could conceivably give rise to automatic
standing. The constructive possession rationale could expand the scope of the
automatic standing rule far beyond the actual possession tests previously used in
Maryland, and even beyond the "right of possession" test used by the Ninth Circuit in
Boston.
1. 277 Md. 257, 353 A.2d 240 (1976).
2. 277 Md. 383, 354 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 652 (1976).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part that no person shall "be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .. " In
addition, the constitutions of all states except Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts,
North Carolina and Vermont contain similar double jeopardy provisions. See Note,
The Protection From Multiple Trials, 11 STAN. L. REV. 735, 735 n.1 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as Multiple Trials]. The double jeopardy clause was made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). For a
discussion of the historical roots of the double jeopardy provision, see Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 200-02 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Note, Twice in
Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Twice in Jeopardy].
4. The common law principles of double jeopardy are expressed in two maxims,
memo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa; "no one should be twice vexed for one
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defendant against multiple prosecutions for the "same offense." While
successive prosecutions based on the same facts and brought under the same
statutory provisions plainly contravene the constitutional and common law
prohibitions against double jeopardy,5 the extent to which double jeopardy
bars a subsequent prosecution for an offense factually or statutorily distinct
from that originally charged but stemming from the same course of conduct
is less clear. In deciding these cases, the courts have advanced two principal
theories to explain the coverage of the double jeopardy provision. Some
courts have adopted a "same transaction" test, under which a subsequent
prosecution is barred whenever the offense charged arises out of the same
criminal episode or transaction as the crime for which the defendant was
initially tried.7 A majority, however, have relied on the "required evidence"
test: under that formulation, subsequent prosecution is barred only in the
event that the evidence required to support a conviction at one trial would
and the same cause," and memo debet bis puniri pro uno delecto; "one punishment for
one wrong." Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 265 nn.11 & 12. A history of the
development of double jeopardy at the common law, tracing its roots to principles of
Greek and Roman law, is found in Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J.
LEGAL HIST. 283 (1963).
5. "Retrial after an acquittal was barred at common law by the plea of autrefois
acquit." Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 265 n.11. Under the fifth amendment, a
verdict of acquittal is also final. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896); cf.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957) (reprosecution after an "implicit
acquittal" barred). Retrial after a conviction was prohibited at common law by the
pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois attaint, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at
265 n.12, and under the fifth amendment, see Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163,
173 (1874). The position of the Maryland Court of Appeals at common law with
respect to reprosecution has been virtually identical to that of the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 466, 121 A. 354, 355 (1923).
6. Scholarly treatment of this question has been extensive. See J. SIGLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969); Carroway, Pervasive Multiple Offense Problems - A
Policy Analysis, 1971 UTAH L REV. 105 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Carroway];
Chilingirian, Double Jeopardy: Vandercomb to Chicos - Two Centuries of Judicial
Failure in Search of a Standard, 45 J. OF U.L. 405 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Chilingirian]; Fisher, Double Jeopardy: Six Common Boners Summarized, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 81, 86 (1967); Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single
Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1937); Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and
Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949); Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and
Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REV. 317 (1954); Mayers and Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New
Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1960); Multiple Trials, supra
note 3; Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3.
7. See notes 33 to 53 and accompanying text infra.
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sustain such a finding at the other.8 The Court of Appeals addressed this
troublesome problem in two decisions in the September, 1975 term.9
I
In Thomas v. State, 10 the court applied the required evidence test to bar
successive prosecutions under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment. The defendant had been convicted in the District Court of
Baltimore City of driving an automobile without the owner's consent."
When he was subsequently indicted in the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County for the same incident under a statute prohibiting the unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle, 12 Thomas moved to dismiss the indictment on
8. It is generally agreed that the same or required evidence test was originally
stated in King v. Vandercomb & Abbott, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796). See, e.g., Twice in
Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 271. The defendant in Vandercomb was acquitted at his
initial trial because of a fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence
offered at trial - the indictment charged a crime actually committed one day earlier.
He was subsequently reprosecuted and convicted under an indictment which alleged
the proper date. The court ruled that the second prosecution did not place the
defendant in double jeopardy, since proof of the offense charged in the second,
accurate indictment would not have been sufficient to convict the defendant on the
first indictment. The offenses were therefore different and an acquittal on the first did
not bar prosecution on the second. The Vandercomb test was modified significantly in
Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871), the first case to apply the test in this
country. The Morey court reasoned that "[a] single act may be an offence against two
statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant
from prosecution and punishment under the other." Id. at 434. As one commentator
wrote:
Morey changed the original test in two ways. First, prior convictions were
held to give no more immunity from reprosecution than prior acquittals, even
though the policy of preventing variances from causing binding acquittals is
irrelevant in prior conviction cases. Second, if the evidence of either offense
would be sufficient to convict of the other, the later prosecution is barred.
Under the Vandercomb test reprosecution would not be barred unless evidence
necessary to convict under the second indictment would be sufficient to
convict under the first indictment. Further, Morey underscores that the crucial
evidence is not the evidence actually presented, but rather that minimally
necessary to prove the crime charged.
Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 272.
9. Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 354 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 652 (1976);
Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 353 A.2d 240 (1976).
10. 277 Md. 257, 353 A.2d 240 (1976).
11. MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 4-102 (1970 Repl. Vol.) makes it a misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine of $500 or less or by imprisonment for two months or less or both,
see MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 17-101(b)(ii) (1976), for anyone to drive "a vehicle, not
his own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent temporarily to
deprive the owner of his possession of such vehicle. .. ."
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 349 (1976 Repl. Vol.) states in relevant part that:
[a]ny person . . . who shall enter, or . . . shall, against the will and
consent of [the owner] wilfully take and carry away ... [a] cart or any other
vehicle including motor vehicle ... or take and carry away out of the custody,
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grounds of double jeopardy. His motions were denied by the trial court. 13 The
ensuing conviction was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals,1 4 which
held that under established precedent successive prosecutions were barred
only for offenses considered the "same" under the required evidence test.15
Finding in this instance that each offense required proof of a fact which the
other did not, the court ruled that a second prosecution for the same conduct
was permissible.' 6
The Court of Appeals reversed in an opinion by Judge Eldridge. As an
initial matter, it agreed with the lower courts that the Supreme Court's
decisions in Gavieres v. United States17 and Blockburger v. United States5
established the required evidence standard as the controlling test on the
validity of multiple prosecutions arising under the fifth amendment. 9 Thus
only in the event that the evidence "minimally necessary" to establish one
statutory crime would also be sufficient to prove the other would the two
offenses be considered the "same" so as to bar separate prosecutions for
each. 20 Conversely, the court observed that "if each offense requires proof of
a fact which the other does not, or in other words, if each offense contains
an element which the other does not, the offenses are not the same. . . even
though arising from the same conduct .... ,,21
or use of any person or persons . . . any of [the previously mentioned
property] at whatsoever place the same may be found, shall upon conviction
thereof.., be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.
Violation of § 349 is punishable by a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $100 or by
imprisonment of not less than six months nor more than four years or by both fine
and imprisonment. Thomas had been arrested by Baltimore Harbor Tunnel Police
after he was spotted backing away from a toll booth. A subsequent registration check
of the vehicle disclosed that it had been taken from the lot of a Montgomery County
automobile repair shop. 277 Md. at 259, 353 A.2d at 242.
13. The trial judge, stating that the proper test for determining whether two
separate statutory provisions constituted the same offense for double jeopardy
purposes was "whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not," found that the driving statute, see note 11 supra, and the unauthorized use
statute, see note 12 supra, contained at least one dissimilar element and thus were not
the same offense. 277 Md. at 260, 353 A.2d at 242.
14. Thomas v. State, 26 Md. App. 232, 337 A.2d 137 (1975).
15. Id. at 238-39, 337 A.2d at 140-41.
16. Id. The court ruled that the driving statute, see note 11 supra, required proof of
driving, an element not contained in the unauthorized use statute, see note 12 supra.
In addition, the unauthorized use statute required proof of entry, an element not found
in the driving statute. 26 Md. App. at 240, 337 A.2d at 141.
17. 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
18. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). In Blockburger, the Court applied the required evidence
test in a multiple punishment, single trial context. The Blockburger rule was
subsequently reaffirmed in Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19 (1959).
19. 277 Md. at 267 n.5, 353 A.2d at 246 n.5. In addition, the Court of Appeals noted
that the required evidence test had been consistently followed in Maryland at
common law. Id. at 266-67, 353 A.2d at 246 (citing Veney v. State, 227 Md. 608,
613-14, 177 A.2d 883 (1962); Young v. State, 220 Md. 95, 100, 151 A.2d 140 (1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 853 (1960)).
20. See 277 Md. at 267, 353 A.2d at 246-47.
21. Id., 353 A.2d at 247.
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The Court of Appeals disagreed, however, with the conclusions reached
by the lower courts from application of the test. First, it stated that the lower
courts had incorrectly interpreted the unauthorized use statute as containing
an element of entry not present in the driving statute.22 Second, the court
noted that despite the differences between the scope of the driving statute
and the unauthorized use statute - the former covers only the driving of a
motor vehicle, while the latter comprehends any form of "taking and
carrying away" 23 - those differences were immaterial in this case because
the specific taking alleged in the indictment was in the form. of driving.
Thus the two offenses required proof of the identical fact and were therefore
the "same. '24 In the court's view, it was unnecessary for the state to prove
any additional facts to secure Thomas' conviction for unauthorized use
than had been required to sustain his conviction for driving without
consent. A prosecution for the former offenses following a conviction for the
latter therefore placed the defendant in double jeopardy.
In reaching this result, however, the Court of Appeals appears to have
applied a required evidence test different from that set forth in Gavieres and
Blockburger. The Supreme Court in Gavieres held that successive prosecu-
tions for drunk and disorderly conduct and for insulting a public official did
not offend double jeopardy after comparing the respective ordinances and
concluding that each contained disparate elements. 25 Similarly, in Block-
burger, the Court found that separate punishment for selling morphine not
in or from the original stamped package and selling the drug without a
written purchase order after convictions at a single trial was permissible
because on the "face of the statute" each offense required proof of a different
element. 26 It is clear from these two cases that the narrow focus of the
required evidence test is on the elements of proof required by statute.27
22. The Court of Appeals noted that the statute for unauthorized use, see note 12
supra, was framed in the disjunctive - "[tihe offense can be established either by
showing an entry and a taking or by showing a taking of a vehicle from wherever it
may be located" - and that this construction was buttressed by an earlier decision,
Anello v. State, 201 Md. 164, 93 A.2d 71 (1952). 277 Md. at 269, 353 A.2d at 247-48. The
Thomas court also pointed out that the indictment itself did not allege unlawful entry,
and if it was an element of the crime as the state contended, the indictment would
have been defective. 277 Md. at 269 n.8, 353 A.2d at 248 n.8. Wright v. Sas, 187 Md.
507, 50 A.2d 809 (1947), relied upon by the Court of Special Appeals in support of its
ruling that the driving and unauthorized use statutes were not the same, see 26 Md.
App. at 240, 337 A.2d at 141, was not considered controlling by the Court of Appeals.
Wright was distinguished on the ground that it involved the issue of whether
enactment of the motor vehicle code repealed the unauthorized use statute by
inconsistency, not whether the two statutes were the same for double jeopardy
purposes. See 277 Md. at 269-70, 353 A.2d at 248.
23. See 277 Md. at 270, 353 A.2d at 248.
24. Id.
25. 220 U.S. 338, 424 (1911).
26. 284 U.S. at 299, 304 (1932).
27. See Brown v. Ohio, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225 (1977).
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While the statutory elements of "driving" and "taking and carrying
away" are similar, and overlap to the extent that the same proof might be
used at trial to satisfy each, they are nonetheless clearly different. 28 Because
each statute thus contains an element which the other does not, the two
offenses are not the "same" under the Blockburger-Gavieres required
evidence test; separate prosecution and punishment for each does not,
therefore, offend double jeopardy.
Consistent with this view, the Thomas court carefully refrained from
characterizing "driving" as identical to "taking and carrying away," and at
one point expressly recognized that the two concepts are different. 29 But,
surprisingly, however, the court could have reached its conclusion only by
equating the two elements. To do so, the Court of Appeals looked beyond the
general language of the unauthorized use statute to examine the specific
allegations contained in the indictment. Noting that the act of driving relied
upon in the indictment to establish the broad, non-specific statutory element
of "taking" was also a required element of the driving statute, the court
determined that unauthorized "taking and carrying away" as alleged in the
indictment was the factual equivalent of unauthorized driving and thus the
same as "driving" without consent.
By considering factors other than the strict language of the statute, the
court has relaxed the Blockburger-Gavieres test. Indeed, at first glance, in
examining the indictment the court appears to be applying an "alleged
evidence" test which focuses not on the similarity of required statutory
elements but on the allegations contained in the indictments. 3° Interest
ingly, however, the court focused on only one indictment - that for
unauthorized use - and did not look beyond the language of the statute
prohibiting driving without consent. A comprehensive alleged evidence test,
by contrast, would compare the evidence alleged in both indictments;
therefore, that does not appear to be the standard followed by the Thomas
court. Moreover, if one views the court's examination of the unauthorized
use indictment as merely an attempt to narrow the broad element of "taking
and carrying away," its approach once again begins to resemble the
required evidence test in most essential characteristics - except for a
limited excursion into the indictment, the court's primary focus clearly
remained on the statutory elements. That the same evidence would be used
at both trials was irrelevant. 31 Nevertheless, the court did relax the test to
permit a wider inquiry where a broad element in one statute can be narrowly
defined through reference to the indictment so as to coincide with a
necessary element of a second statute. Where comparison of the statutory
elements themselves indicates that no such overlap is possible, however, the
28. For instance, "taking and carrying away" might be proved by evidence that
the defendant towed the car away without either entering or "driving" it.
29. 277 Md. at 270, 353 A.2d at 248.
30. See Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 269.
31. See 277 Md. at 265 n.4, 353 A.2d at 245 n.4.
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strict required evidence test set forth in Blockburger and Gavieres will be
applied. 32 Thus, while Thomas carves out an apparent exception to the strict
application of the required evidence rule, the peculiar facts of the case
indicate that the extent of additional double jeopardy protection it affords
will be very limited. The Blockburger-Gavieres required evidence test will in
most instances determine the permissibility of multiple prosecutions.
II
In contrast to the required evidence test, which focuses on the statutes in
order to determine whether the subsequent prosecution involves the "same
offense" for purposes of double jeopardy, the same transaction test, which
requires the state to join in a single prosecution all criminal charges against
a defendant arising from the same criminal episode, 33 focuses on the
defendant's conduct. 3 4 Although advocated by some commentators,
35
proposed by several national commissions,
3 6 and adopted by the courts 37
32. See note 65 infra.
33. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448-60 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 389-97, 354 A.2d 825, 829-34 (1976); Multiple Trials,
supra note 3, at 744.
34. Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 269-70.
35. See, e.g., Multiple Trials, supra note 3, at 753-59; Carroway, supra note 6, at
129-30.
36. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) reads, in pertinent
part:
(2) Limitation on Separate Trials for Multiple Offenses. Except as provided
in Subsection (3) of this Section, a defendant shall not be subject to separate
trials for multiple offenses on the same conduct or arising from the same
criminal episode, if such are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at
the time of the commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction
of a single court.
(3) Authority of Court to Order Separate Trials. When a defendant is charged
with two or more offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same
criminal episode, the Court, on application of the prosecuting attorney or of
the defendant, may order any such charge to be tried separately, if it is
satisfied that justice so requires.
(emphasis added); Section 1.3 of the ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, JOINDER AND SEVERANCE (Approved Official Draft 1967) (approved by ABA
House of Delegates, August 1968) provides in part:
1.3 (a) Two or more offenses are related offenses, for purposes of this
standard, if they are within the jurisdiction of the same court and are based
on the same conduct or arise out of the same criminal episode. (b) When the
defendant has been charged with two or more related offenses, his timely
motion to join them for trial should be granted unless the Court determines
that because the prosecuting attorney does not have sufficient evidence to
warrant trying some of the offenses at that time, or for some other reason, the
ends of justice would be defeated if the motion were granted. A defendant's
failure to so move constitutes a waiver of any right of joinder as to related
offenses with which the defendant knew he was charged. (c) A defendant who
has been tried for one offense may thereafter move to dismiss a charge for a
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and legislatures 38 of several jurisdictions, the same transaction test has
never been applied by the Supreme Court. In Ashe v. Swenson,3 9 the Court
avoided a strict application of the Blockburger required evidence test in
holding that the principle of collateral estoppel4° was embodied in the fifth
amendment double jeopardy guarantee. 41 The majority, however, declined
the invitation of Justice Brennan, expressed in a concurring opinion, to
abandon the required evidence test completely and hold that "the Double
Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution, except in most limited
circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant
that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or
transaction. '"4 2 Justice Brennan insisted that the required evidence test
"virtually annuls" the constitutional guarantee of double jeopardy by
permitting multiple prosecutions where a single transaction can be divided
into chronologically discrete crimes or where a single act transgresses
several different statutes.43 Contending that the required evidence test was
not constitutionally mandated,44 and had not been adopted by the Court as
related offense, unless the motion for joinder of these offenses was previously
denied or the right of joinder was waived as provided in section (b). The
motion to dismiss ... should be granted unless the court determines that
because the prosecuting attorney did not have sufficient evidence to warrant
trying this offense at the time of the first trial, or for some other reason, the
ends of justice would be defeated if the motion were granted;
(emphasis added); STUDY DRAFT OF A NEw FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 703(a) (1970).
The Model Penal Code provision has been "[b]y far the most efficient and
enthusiastically received proposal for preventing successive prosecutions." Common-
wealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 247 & n.30, 304 A.2d 432, 438 & n.30 (1973) (citing
commentators). While the Model Penal Code places the burden for joinder on the
prosecution, the ABA version accords the defendant the right to request joinder. For a
discussion and comparison of the two, see Carroway, supra note 6, at 128-30; Multiple
Trials, supra note 3, at 753-59.
37. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 19 Ala. App. 600, 99 So. 770 (1924); Crumley v. City of
Atlanta, 68 Ga. App. 69, 22 S.E.2d 181 (1942) (dictum); People v. White, 41 Mich. App.
370, 200 N.W.2d 326 (1972), aff'd, 390 Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973); State v.
Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 333 A.2d 257 (1975); State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 497 P.2d 1191
(1972) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973),
vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), aff'd, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1954), construed in Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11,
357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 (West 1963); N.Y.
CGlM. PROC. LAw § 40.20(2) (McKinney 1970); OR. REV. STAT. § 131.515(2) (1973); PA.
CONS. STAT. (1973).
39. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
40. "Collateral estoppel prevents the state from litigating a second time an issue
of ultimate fact where there has already been a final determination of that issue in the
accused's favor." Cousins v. State, 277 Md. at 398, 354 A.2d at 834.
41. 397 U.S. at 445.
42. Id. at 453-54.
43. Id. at 451-52.
44. Justice Brennan pointed out that the test was adopted five years after the
enactment of the fifth amendment with the Bill of Rights. 397 U.S. at 452. See
Carroway, supra note 6, at 115.
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controlling precedent, 45 he would have required joinder except 1) where. a
crime was not completed or discovered, despite police diligence, until after a
prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction had begun, 2)
where no single court had jurisdiction over all the alleged crimes and 3)
where joinder would prejudice either the defense or prosecution. 46
Although Justice Brennan has "continued to hammer away at the
court's reluctance to consider anew what constitutes the 'same offense' for
double jeopardy purposes" 47 in both concurring opinions 48 and dissents from
the denial of certiorari, 49 the Court has shown no inclination to follow his
recommendations. Indeed, this past term, the Court, in Brown v. Ohio,50
ruled definitively on the status of the required evidence test in the multiple
prosecution context,51 clearly adopting it as the constitutional standard.
52
The prospect for adoption of the same transaction test under the fifth
amendment therefore appears dim. Any reform in this area must come from
the individual states in interpreting and creating their own law.
53
In Cousins v. State,54 the Maryland Court of Appeals was asked to
consider and adopt the same transaction approach. The defendant had been
arrested on a warrant charging him with shoplifting and the assault of two
store detectives, Ronald Wood and Marilyn Neal. 5  When he was subse-
quently indicted by a Montgomery County grand jury, however, Cousins
was accused of an assault upon Neal but not upon Wood. At trial in the
45. See 397 U.S. at 452-53. ("[The same evidence test] ... has never been
squarely held by this Court to be the required construction of the constitutional
phrase 'same offense' in a case involving multiple trials . . . ."); United States v.
Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 496_97 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.). Any doubt as to the
constitutional status of the test, however, was removed last term by the Court's
opinion in Brown v. Ohio, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225 (1977), clearly adopting the required
evidence test.
46. 397 U.S. at 453 n.7 & 455 n.11.
47. United States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 497 n.5 (2d Cir. 1973).
48. See Brown v. Ohio, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (1977); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505,
511 (1973); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 57 (1971); Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S.
384, 387 (1971).
49. See Grubb v. Oklahoma, 409 U.S. 1017 (1972); Miller v. Oregon, 405 U.S. 1047
(1972); Duncan v. Tennessee, 405 U.S. 127 (1972) (writ dismissed as improvidently
granted).
50. 97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977).
51. Up to the time of the decision, it had been viewed by some as uncertain. See
notes 79-92 and accompanying text infra.
52. 97 S. Ct. at 2225.
53. For commentary on the response of state courts in this area of criminal
procedure in the wake of the Burger court's conservatism, see Wilkes, More on the
New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873, 887-89 (1975).
54. 277 Md. 303, 354 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 652 (1976).
55. A companion allegedly removed several leather coats from a display rack,
handed them to the defendant, who placed them in a fabric suit bag and then,
dragging the suit bag on the floor, left the store with the two store detectives in
pursuit. Confronted by the detectives in the shopping mall and told that he was under
arrest for shoplifting, Cousins brandished a knife which he pointed at Miss Neal and,
using the knife to keep the detectives at bay, made his getaway. 277 Md. at 385-86,
354 A.2d at 827.
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district court on the warrant, 56 the state elected to proceed only on the
charge of assault on Wood, reserving the charge of an assault on Neal for
possible trial in the circuit court on the indictment. 57 Following a verdict of
acquittal on the assault charge in the district court, 58 the defendant moved
to dismiss the grand jury indictment which in addition to the assault count
alleged two counts of larceny,59 two counts of shoplifting,60 two counts of
receiving stolen property,6 1 and one count of carrying openly a weapon with
intent to injure.6 2 Cousins contended that the state was barred by the
principle of collateral estoppel from retrying him by virtue of the findings of
the district court,63 or, in the alternative, that more than one prosecution for
crimes arising from the shoplifting incident was prohibited under the same
transaction test. Finding both defenses to be without merit,64 the circuit
court ruled that a second trial did not offend double jeopardy. On direct
appeal from the circuit court, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Writing for a
unanimous court, Judge Eldridge found no state law precedent granting the
defendant a right of compulsory joinder. Acting in accordance with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the fifth amendment, the Cousins court
held that trial in the circuit court was permissible under the traditional
required evidence test.65 Additionally, since no ultimate issue of fact had
56. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 4.-201, 4-301 & 302 (1974) (trial on
warrants to be held in district court).
57. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-501 (1974) (circuit court has full
jurisdiction over crimes committed within the state). Since shoplifting is a felony, see
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551A (1976 Repl. Vol.), it must be tried by indictment or
information in the circuit court. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 592(3) (1976 Repl. Vol.).
58. The court stated that while the evidence indicated that there had been an
assault on Neal, it was insufficient to establish the requisite intent by the defendant
to assault Wood. 277 Md. at 387, 354 A.2d at 828.
59. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 340 (1976).
60. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551A (1976).
61. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 466 (1976).
62. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36 (1976).
63. 277 Md. at 387, 354 A.2d at 828.
64. Id. The circuit court found that no ultimate issue relating to the assault
charge had been resolved in Cousin's favor. Assuming arguendo that the same
transaction test was applicable, the court concluded that the offenses alleged in the
remaining counts were not part of the same transaction as involved in the assault
charge before the district court since they had been completed at the time the alleged
assault took place. 277 Md. at 387-88, 354 A.2d at 828. It can be argued, however, that
the second assault charge would have been barred under the same transaction test
since it allegedly occurred concommitantly with the assault charged in district court.
Therefore, the circuit court would appear to have erred in concluding that a second
trial, at least on the assault count, was not barred under the same transaction test.
65. The court stated:
[tihose counts of the indictment charging larceny, shoplifting, and receiving
stolen property all obviously require different evidence and have different
elements than the previous charge of assault. The count charging . .. [the]
carrying of a weapon openly with intent to injure, requires proof that the
defendant carried a weapon openly, an element not found in the offense of
assault. Assault requires proof of an attempt to injure another by force, an
element not found in the [former] offense .... And a prior acquittal for an
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been decided in the defendant's favor at trial in the district court, the Court
of Appeals ruled that the collateral estoppel defense did not prevent a second
trial. 66
The court employed a four step reasoning process to reach this
conclusion. First, it considered whether there was any federal ground for
adopting the same transaction rule. Concluding that it was "not free" to
interpret the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy as
providing greater protection against the threat of multiple prosecution than
that mandated by the Supreme Court, the court considered itself "bound by
the Supreme Court's holding that multiple prosecutions are barred under the
double jeopardy clause only for offenses which are the same under the
required evidence test. ' 67 In light of the Supreme Court's numerous refusals
to embrace the same transaction test,68 the Cousins court argued that it
could not "'impose such [a test] as a matter of federal constitutional law
when th[e] Court specifically refrain[ed] [from doing so].'-"69
Second, the Court of Appeals observed that the same transaction test
has been adopted in several states as a means of implementing state
constitutional double jeopardy provisions.70 Maryland, in contrast, has no
constitutional provision comparable to the fifth amendment double jeopardy
clause. 71 Therefore, the court concluded that there was no state constitu-
assault upon one person does not bar a subsequent prosecution for assault
upon another even though both offenses may have occurred at the same time
277 Md. at 397-98, 354 A.2d at 834.
66. Id.
67. 277 Md. at 394, 354 A.2d at 832.
68. See, e.g., Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973); Grubb v. Oklahoma, 409 U.S.
1017 (1972); Miller v. Oregon, 405 U.S. 1047 (1972); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436
(1970); Cuicci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958);
Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915).
69. 277 Md. at 394, 354 A.2d at 832 (quoting Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719
(1975)).
70. 277 Md. at 390-91, 354 A.2d at 830 (citing People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 212
N.W.2d 222 (1973); State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 497 P.2d 1191 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432, vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973),
aff'd, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974)). Campana is discussed at notes 92-93 and
accompanying text infra.
71. 277 Md. at 394, 354 A.2d at 832. The Constitutional Convention Commission
of Maryland, organized in 1966-67 to study the drafting of a new state constitution,
recommended adoption of a double jeopardy clause similar to that found in the fifth
amendment, stating that such a provision was "of basic importance and warrants
constitutional expression." REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION COMMISSION
(1967) at 110. The Commission's recommendation was presented to the Maryland
Constitutional Convention on September 22, 1967, in the form of Delegate Proposal
132, which recommended that the new declaration of rights include the following
provision: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of criminal punishment for the
same offense." The proposal was referred to the Convention's Committee on Personal
Rights and the Preamble, see JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
MARYLAND (1967-68) at 58, 248, and it eventually emerged, unchanged from its
original form, as Section 6 of Committee proposal R&P-1. See id. at 312. On December
13, R&P-1, with Section 6, was adopted by the Delegates by a vote of 120 to 0.
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tional basis for adopting the rule. Moreover, it observed that unlike several
other states, no statutory basis existed in Maryland for requiring compul-
sory joinder at a single trial of all offenses arising from the same act.7 2
Third, the court reviewed state common law precedent in an effort to
find a common law basis for embracing the same transaction test. It noted
that at least one prior case had rejected a contention that offenses were the
same under common law double jeopardy principles if they arose from the
same criminal act or transaction. 73 In light of this precedent the court
concluded that no right of compulsory joinder existed at common law and
the common law rule had always been "whether the same offense [was]
charged under the required evidence test.
'7 4
Fourth, the Court of Appeals focused on the Maryland Rules of
Procedure. Searching the rules for any provision which could be construed
as requiring compulsory joinder but finding none, the Cousins court
concluded that there was "no basis for applying the same transaction
test."
75
The Court of Appeals in Cousins thus foreclosed judicial adoption of the
same transaction test in Maryland. In the absence of Supreme Court action
or legislation by the General Assembly,7 6 the court will continue to apply the
required evidence standard in both multiple prosecution and multiple
punishment contexts. 77 But while continued adherence to the traditional rule
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1967) at 9621.
The proposed constitution, presented for referendum at a special election held May 14,
1968, was rejected by Maryland voters. Maryland is one of only five states without a
state constitutional double jeopardy provision.
72. 277 Md. at 394, 354 A.2d at 832. See note 38 supra. A statutory double jeopardy
provision was proposed by the Maryland Commission on Criminal Law. See
PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE § 5.40 (1972).
73. 277 Md. at 395, 354 A.2d at 832 (citing Novak v. State, 139 Md. 538, 115 A. 853
(1921)). The defendant in Novak was indicted for the assault and robbery of a truck
driver after being previously acquitted on a similar indictment charging the assault
and robbery of the driver's co-worker arising from a single robbery of a liquor truck.
Rejecting the defendant's contention that the offenses in both indictments arose from
the same criminal episode and that his former acquittal of assaulting the co-worker
barred prosecution for a similar attack on the driver, the Novak court, applying the
required evidence test, held that since at least one element of the crime in the second
indictment was different from that charged in the first - the identity of the victim -
the second trial was not barred by the former acquittal.
74. 277 Md. at 396, 354 A.2d at 833.
75. Id.
76. At least one court declined to adopt the same transaction test in deference to
legislative action on the subject. See People v. Grimmett, 388 Mich. 590, 202 N.W.2d
278 (1972). Grimmett was subsequently overruled in People v. White, 41 Mich. App.
370, 200 N.W.2d 326 (1972), affl'd, 390 Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973). For a
discussion of legislative alternatives in the double jeopardy area, see Note, Statutory
Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional
Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Implementation].
77. For a recent case in the Court of Appeals discussing and applying the same
evidence test in a single prosecution, multiple punishment context, see Newton v.
State, 280 Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977).
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may be justifiable on policy grounds, 7 the result in Cousins cannot be
adequately explained by a lack of any federal or state law basis for adoption
of the same transaction test, for such grounds demonstrably exist.
First, the extent of protection provided by the fifth amendment in
multiple prosecution cases at the time of the Cousins case was viewed as
uncertain by some courts and commentators. 79 Gavieres v. United States,80
cited by both the Thomas and Cousins courts as establishing the required
evidence test as controlling in multiple prosecution cases, only interpreted a
Phillipine double jeopardy statute, not the fifth amendment.8 ' Since
Blockburger v. United States, 2 the Court has consistently applied the
required evidence test in the context of a single prosecution to determine the
constitutionality of separate punishments for offenses arising out of the
same conduct.8 3 Nevertheless, the decision has been viewed as weak
precedent in the multiple prosecution context by those who have argued that
the prohibitions against multiple punishment and multiple prosecution,
while they once may have been doctrinal twins,8 4 in reality further separate
78. See note 115 & accompanying text infra.
79. People v. White, 41 Mich. App. 370, 376, 200 N.W.2d 326, 329 (1972), affl'd, 390
Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973); State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 453, 497 P.2d 1191, 1195
(1972); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 252, 304 A.2d 432, 441 (1973),
vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973); Carroway, supra note 6, at 112-16; note 45
supra; cf. Chilingirian, supra note 6, at 446-47 (Supreme Court applied same
transaction test in one case, required evidence test in another, rejected latter on
several occasions). But see Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 263, 304 A.2d
432, 443 (dissenting opinion), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), on remand,
455 Pa. 622, 628-32, 314 A.2d 854, 857-59 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
80. 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
81. See Abbatte v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959) (Brennan, J., separate
opinion). The Cousins court noted, however, that the court in Gavieres stated that the
Phillipine statute "had the same meaning as the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy." 277 Md. at 393 n.4, 354 A.2d at 831 n.4. However, even if this view
were accepted, Gavieres involved a prior prosecution which resulted in a conviction.
Thus the Gavieres court's reference to the use of the Morey same or required evidence
standard in cases of prior acquittal was technically dictum. See Chilingirian, supra
note 6, at 437 n.177. Yet, while some federal courts have been critical of the required
evidence test, see, e.g., United States v. Rollerson, 449 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
United States v. Mirra, 220 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), most federal courts continue
to follow it. See, e.g., United States v. Cala, 521 F.2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)
(quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871)); United States v. Wilder,
463 F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Some courts have refused to apply it with rigid
formalism. Compare United States v. Sabella, 272 F.2d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 1959) (two
offenses stemming from a single narcotics sale technically included unique elements
nevertheless held the same as the same proof could support both convictions) with
United States v. Nathan, 467 F.2d 456, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1973) (essential difference of
conspiracy offenses charged in multiple trials negated possibility that same proof
could sustain both). See also Ballerini v. Aderholt, 44 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1930) (sale of
narcotics in violation of two statutes held the "same offense").
82. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
83. See note 18 supra.
84. At early common law, there was less need for a distinction between the
protections given against double prosecution and double punishment. Since the
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policies and therefore should be implemented by different rules.85 Because
commentators generally agree that the prohibition against multiple
prosecution is largely procedural - "meant to relieve the defendant of the
threat of repeated prosecution, embarrassment, and harassment; establish
finality of the proceedings; and protect both the defendant and the public
from undue expenditures of time and money [while t]he purpose of the
protections against multiple punishment are largely substantive - to insure
that the punishment is commensurate with the criminal culpability"8 6 - a
few have contended that decisions in one area should not control the other.87
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's reluctance to employ the required
evidence test in several cases involving multiple prosecution, 8 and its
accommodation of the Justice Department in vacating convictions that
might have called for reconsideration of the test,8 9 made it extremely
number of offenses was relatively small, and each offense covered a broad area of
conduct, rarely did the defendant's conduct amount to more than one substantive
offense. Therefore, by preventing a second prosecution for the "same offense,"
adequate protection was afforded against multiple punishment for the same
substantive offense, and against the harassment of multiple trials based upon the
same criminal transaction. Multiple Trials, supra note 3, at 741 (footnote omitted). See
Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 242-43, 304 A.2d 432, 435-36 (1972); Twice
in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 267.
85. See Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 267. "When criminal activity that was
formerly considered a single violation of substantive law is broken down into
numerous component parts, each of which is separately proscribed by statute, the
substantive and procedural objectives underlying the double jeopardy concept must be
implemented separately rather than jointly as at common law." Statutory Implemen-
tation, supra note 76, at 346.
86. Carroway, supra note 6, at 111 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Multiple Trials,
supra note 3, at 735-41 (passim); Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 266-67.
87. One commentator argues that "[b]ecause of the different policies underlying
the two protections, the question of permitting double prosecution should be
considered independently from the issue of punishment." Multiple Trials, supra note
3, at 740. See Carroway, supra note 6, at 111 (advocating different tests for
determining meaning of "same offense" depending on context and citing other
commentators in accord); Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 267. Much of the
confusion in the double jeopardy area has, in fact, been attributed to the failure of
most courts to distinguish between multiple prosecution and multiple punishment. See
Multiple Trials, supra note 3, at 735.
88. See United States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.)
(citing Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 511 (1973); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 390
(1970); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1966)).
89. Since 1959 it has been the policy of the Justice Department that "no federal
case be tried when there has already been a state prosecution for substantially the
same act or acts without [theI approval of the appropriate Assistant Attorney General
after consultation with the Attorney General]," Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032,
1035 (1975) (order) (Burger, C.J. dissenting). Indeed, on several occasions the Solicitor
General has asked the court to vacate sentences resulting from a federal prosecution
following a state conviction, even if the prosecution was permissible under the
required evidence rule established in Gavieres and the "dual sovereignty" exception
set forth in Abbatte v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). See, e.g., Watts v. United
States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975) (order); Marakar v. United States, 370 U.S. 723 (1962) (per
curiam); Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960) (per curiam). The policy has
apparently been dictated by considerations of fairness to the defendant, but in both
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difficult for state courts to apply properly the fifth amendment in the
successive trial area. Several courts contended that since the fifth
amendment double jeopardy provision was made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland,90 they had been
left without any specific guidance from the Court.91 One court reasoned that,
as a result, it was free to interpret the double jeopardy clause as embodying
a same transaction test.92 While that court ultimately retreated from this
position upon remand from the Supreme Court,93 its opinion suggests that
the Maryland Court of Appeals, if it had been favorably disposed towards
the same transaction test, might have easily taken advantage of the existing
confusion in federal law to adopt the standard under the fifth amendment.
In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Brown v. Ohio,94 however,
the Cousins court cannot be criticized for its refusal to do so.
A more persuasive case that the Cousins court was not foreclosed from
adopting the same transaction test rests on state law grounds. That no
common law precedent could be found to support such a course clearly did
not prevent the Court of Appeals from establishing a new precedent.
Because a common law court is not bound by the constraints of stare decisis
but retains instead the flexibility to reexamine common law rules when they
are challenged as outdated and unresponsive to the policies they supposedly
serve, the Court of Appeals had the capability of discarding the required
evidence test in favor of the same transaction standard. Such a course has
in fact been taken in England, where the required evidence test has been
Petite and Marakar, Justices Brennan, Black, and Douglas would have reached the
constitutional question and barred a second proceeding under double jeopardy. See
Marakar v. United States, 370 U.S. at 723; Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. at 533.
Chief Justice Burger, a strong opponent of the same transaction rule, see Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 460-70 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), filed a strongly worded
dissent in Watts attacking the Court's wisdom in "automatically conform[ing] its
judgments to results allegedly dictated by a policy, however wise, which the judicial
branch had no part in formulating." 422 U.S. at 1036.
90. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
91. See People v. White, 41 Mich. App. 370, 376 n.4, 200 N.W.2d 326, 329 n.4 (1972),
State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 451, 497 P.2d 1191, 1195 (1972); Commonwealth v.
Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 252, 304 A.2d 432, 441 (1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S.
808 (1973).
92. See Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 252-53, 304 A.2d 432, 441
(1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973).
93. See Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 624- 26, 314 A.2d 854 (1974) (per
curiam). The Supreme Court had vacated and remanded to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to allow it to consider whether its judgment was based on federal or state
grounds. See 414 U.S. 808 (1973). On remand, the Campana court decided to rest its
holding on the supervisory power over state criminal proceedings granted it by the
state constitution. 455 Pa. at 625-26, 314 A.2d at 855 (citing PA. CONST. art. V, § 10).
In thus avoiding additional review by the Supreme Court, the court in Campana
"intended to avoid any future decision of the Burger court squarely holding that the
'single transaction' test is not the test by which to judge" double jeopardy violations
under the fifth amendment. Wilkes, Moore on the New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure, 63 Ky. L. J. 873, 887-89 (1975).
94. 97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977). See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
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abandoned and a compulsory joinder rule adopted under the common law. 95
Even if the Cousins court ultimately opted for the former test, it failed in its
responsibility to weigh the relative merits of the two tests and articulate
reasons for rejecting the latter. To imply that the absence of precedent
prevented it from establishing a precedent was, therefore, misleading at the
very least.
Furthermore, while the Maryland Rules of Procedure contain no
compulsory joinder provision, the Court of Appeals has the power under the
state constitution to promulgate such a rule.96 Two state courts, acting under
powers granted by their constitutions, have, in fact, judicially adopted the
Model Penal Code joinder provision preparatory to its enactment as a rule of
procedure. 97 The conspicuous absence of any provision for compulsory
joinder in the Court of Appeals' recent revision of the criminal rules of
procedure in Chapter 700 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure9" indicates,
however, that its rule-making power will not be used to adopt such a
provision in the near future.
Since the Court of Appeals could have taken the opportunity in Cousins
to embrace the same transaction test or included a compulsory joinder
provision in the rules revision, its continued adherence to the required
evidence test suggests that, like a majority of American jurisdictions,99 it
regards that test, coupled with the additional protection provided by the
principle of collateral estoppel, as affording a defendant adequate safe-
guards against arbitrary reprosecution and harassment. 1 ° This view is
disputed by most commentators, who have generally been extremely critical
of the required evidence test and have argued that collateral estoppel has
limited utility in a double jeopardy setting.0 1 Critics point out that the test
95. Connelly v. Director, [1969] A.C. 1254. For a discussion of Connelly, see
Schaefer, Unresolved Issues in the Law of Double Jeopardy: Waller and Ashe, 58
CALIF. L. REV. 391, 394-98 (1970).
96. See MD. CONST. art. 4, § 18 which gives the Court of Appeals power to
promulgate rules. Under MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-201(a) (1974), the
court has general authority to make rules in civil and criminal cases. See Johnson v.
State, 274 Md. 29, 333 A.2d 37 (1975).
97. See State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 333 A.2d 257 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974) (per curiam).
98. See 4 Md. Register 234-57 (Feb. 16, 1977).
99. See 277 Md. at 392, 354 A.2d at 831 (citing cases).
100. See id. at 397, 354 A.2d at 833. The court recognized in dicta that "there may
be situations where the required evidence test, coupled with the principle of collateral
estoppel, might not be adequate to afford the protection against undue harassment
embodied in the purpose of the prohibition against double jeopardy." Id. But it
concluded that "the prosecutions here [were] neither arbitrary nor particularly
burdensome. The prosecution in the district court for assault on Ronald Wood was
based upon a warrant. The remaining charges are all contained in a single
indictment. There is no evidence that the separate prosecutions were for the purpose
of harassing or 'wearing down' Cousins, or in expectation of procuring a harsher
penalty, evils which the double jeopardy clause was intended to prevent. See Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 . . . (1957)." 277 Md. at 397, 354 A.2d at 833-34.
101. [U]se of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not sufficient because (1) it is too
difficult to determine just what a jury has necessarily decided so as to
19771
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
as originally conceived was a response to a procedural problem peculiar to
formal common law pleading. Because it was not possible at that time to
amend pleadings to conform to proof, the required evidence test developed as
a method by which the prosecution could retry the defendant on another
theory when the evidence developed in an unanticipated manner at the first
trial." 2 Yet, while the rule has remained in effect, the problem it was
designed to solve no longer exists - prosecutors are now freely permitted to
amend indictments at any time before the rendering of a verdict.
10 3
The mechanical application of the test in modern criminal proceedings
has often led to absurd and unfair procedural results. 10 4 In addition, the
essential policies of the double jeopardy ban against multiple trials10 5 have
often been frustrated by its continued use. 06 Also, the proliferation of
offense categories'017 has enabled a prosecutor "by assiduously using his
Thesaurus and statute book and continually redefining the crime, each time
requiring slightly different criminal elements, [to] secure repeated convic-
preclude retrial on essentially the same issue, (2) it is not only difficult but
hazardous for an appellate court to be required to decipher what issues, if any,
were necessarily determined, and (3) most importantly, because most criminal
cases involve a multitude of issues, there are often no issues of fact that are
necessarily decided. Therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel will be of no
aid in many successive trial problems.
Carroway, supra note 6, at 129. See Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 246-47,
304 A.2d 432, 438 (1972).
102. See Carroway, supra note 6, at 110.
103. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(e) which provides:
(e) Amendment of Information. The court may permit an information to be
amended at any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different
offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not
prejudiced.
Cf. MD. R.P. 714(a) (empowering a court, on motion of the State's Attorney or on its
own motion, to permit an indictment to be amended as to matters of form at any time
before verdict; as to matters of substance, only with the consent of the defendant). It is
clear that the test used for determining the meaning of the phrase "same offense"
should, as one scholar wrote, "be molded by 20th Century American, not 18th Century
English, rules of procedure." Carroway, supra note 6, at 116 (footnote omitted).
104. See, e.g., Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915) (defendant punished
separately for cutting and tearing six mail bags in one robbery attempt); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923) (separate prosecutions for each of
seventy-five hands of poker ruled permissible); Commonwealth v. Butterick, 100 Mass.
8-9 (1968) (defendant punished separately for the embezzlement of each of several
bonds at the same time from the same person). See also Statutory Implementation,
supra note 76, at 347-49
105. See notes 86-87 and accompanying text supra.
106. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Campana, 425 Pa. 233, 245, 304 A.2d 432, 437
(1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973).
107. Courts and commentators have noted with regularity that the trend of penal
legislation toward a more detailed specification of crimes such that a single act may
violate an increasing number of statutory provisions threatens to frustrate the
policies of double jeopardy. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Campana, 425 Pa. 233,
242- 43, 304 A.2d 432, 436 (1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973); Multiple
Trials, supra note 3, at 741-42; Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 279; Statutory
Implementation, supra note 76, at 346.
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tions for the same offense."10 8 Prosecutorial discretion, coupled with the
modern legislative tendency to divide a criminal act into numerous
subcategories will, therefore, continue to undermine the guarantee against
successive prosecutions until courts develop a rule for identifying double
jeopardy protection that is more in concert with its underlying policies.
The same transaction rule, on the other hand, has been offered as a
better response to the policies of finality and the prevention of undue
harassment of the defendant through repeated, arbitrary reprosecution. It
also furthers vital societal interests in avoiding piecemeal litigation and
conserving public and judicial resources. 10 9 Despite these apparent advan-
tages, the same transaction test has failed to displace the older required
evidence test in most jurisdictions, although recent decisions suggest a trend
in that direction. 110 One obvious reason is the continued opposition of the
Supreme Court,"' which holds the view, shared by many, that the required
evidence test itself defines the scope of the constitutional double jeopardy
guarantee." 2 The conceptual difficulty in construing the constitutional
phrase "same offense" to mean "same transaction" has also proved
troublesome," 3 as has the unwillingness of courts to consider multiple
prosecution and multiple punishment independently.
11 4
In the final analysis, the reason for the continued majority status of the
required evidence test and the repeated rejection of the same transaction
formula may be more basic: a reluctance of courts to promote judicial
efficiency at the expense of the interest of the state in ensuring that
criminals receive punishments commensurate with the crimes they com-
108. Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L. REV.
317 (1954).
109. See Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 251, 304 A.2d 432, 440-41
(1973), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973); Multiple Trials, supra note 3, at
744; Carroway, supra note 6, at 127.
110. See People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973); State v. Gregory, 66
N.J. 510, 333 A.2d 257 (1975); Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854
(1974) (per curiam).
111. See cases cited note 68 supra.
112. See Carroway, supra note 6, at 115.
113. See Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 257, 304 A.2d 432, 451 (1972)
(Eagen, J., concurring), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973) In addition, the
term "same transaction" itself presents conceptual and definitional problems since a
"transaction" is a "shapeless term and its utility depends on the way it is defined and
applied." State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 516, 333 A.2d 257, 260 (1975) (citing cases). See
Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 276-77. One court recently declined to adopt the
test because of the difficulties in establishing workable guidelines by which to
determine if two crimes were contained in the same criminal episode or transaction.
See State v. Tanton, 88 N.M. 5, 536 P.2d 269 (1975). An "episode" is defined by the
proposed ABA test as "an occurrence or connected series of occurrences and
developments which may be viewed as distinctive and apart although part of a larger
or more comprehensive series." ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND
SEVERANCE § 1.3(a) (commentary).
114. See note 87 supra.
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mit."15 Given the local autonomy of Maryland state's attorneys, it is
conceivable that an individual guilty of a serious crime might escape
punishment for such crime because he had already been tried in another
county for a far lesser offense arising from the same conduct. Such
anomalies would reduce even further public confidence in the courts and
vitiate a vital societal interest in bringing criminals to justice. Nevertheless,
while it is possible to formulate a principled basis for the rejection of the
same transaction test, the Cousins court failed to do so. This absence of
supporting reasons detracts from the force of its conclusion.
3. HARMLESS ERROR: MARYLAND'S NEW UNIFORM RULE -
Dorsey v. State.' - In Chapman v. California,2 the Supreme Court
enunciated a harmless error standard for some trial errors of federal
constitutional dimension. The standard required that reviewing courts
reverse criminal convictions unless they were convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt 'that no reasonable possibility existed that a constitutional error
had affected the verdict. 3 The states were nevertheless free after Chapman
to apply their own review standards in judging the harmlessness of
nonconstitutional evidentiary and procedural errors, provided that such
tests satisfied due process criteria.4 In Maryland, reversal for nonconstitu-
tional error was required only if it was reasonably probable that the error
influenced the outcome.' Finding no justification for separate review
standards based on the type of errors committed at trial, the Court of
Appeals, in Dorsey v. State,6 extended the more stringent Chapman rule to
nonconstitutional errors, thus establishing a uniform standard of review for
115. See Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 257-58, 304 A.2d 432, 451-52
(1972) (Eagen, J., concurring). Justice Eagen conceded that the same transaction test
was probably viable in a situation where only felonies and misdemeanors were
involved. But, he argued that it was not viable where a summary offense and a felony
- such as disorderly conduct and murder - or a misdemeanor were charged. Under
the same transaction test, a prosecution for one would bar trial on the other if they
grew out of the same episode, an absurd result he contended would "leave [the citizens
of the state] unprotected and result in many criminals escaping justice without good
reason." Id. Therefore, he proposed that an exception be grafted on to the same
transaction test which would permit multiple prosecution if the purpose of the crime
charged at the second trial was to "prevent a substantially different harm or evil." In
his view, such a test would "protect the interests of the people ... in those situations
where the [same transaction] rule leaves them unprotected," while promoting finality
and foreclosing "the use of the courts as a tool of harassment and oppression." Id.
1. 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976).
2. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
3. Id. at 24.
4. See note 117 infra.
5. See, e.g., Dobbs v. State, 148 Md. 34, 48-49, 129 A. 275, 281 (1925) (Offutt, J.,
concurring); Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140 (1873). See text accompanying notes 70 to
99 infra.
6. 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976).
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all trial errors. In a series of subsequent decisions in the September Term,
1975, 7 the court set forth some of the factors to be considered in evaluating
the effect of such errors on the verdict, and indicated, at least initially, that
it would strictly apply the standard and criteria enunciated in Chapman
and its progeny.8
The defendant in Dorsey was charged with robbery, assault, and the use
of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.9 The arresting
officer, called as a witness by the defense, testified that the defendant had
denied knowledge of the robbery and had insisted that he had been at home
ill at the time. Moreover, the defendant had submitted evidence supporting
these contentions.10 On cross-examination the officer testified, over objec-
tion, that approximately 80 percent of the suspects he had arrested similarly
denied criminal involvement, and, of the cases he had investigated fully, 75
percent to 80 percent of the defendants were convicted." Dorsey was
convicted on all charges and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment.
On appeal the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.12 The court ruled that
the trial judge had erred in admitting the officer's cross-examination
testimony. 13 Nevertheless, because there was, in its view, "ample evidence,
legally sufficient to support the finding of appellant's guilt... [which] was
not dissipated by the erroneous admission of the officer's testimony,"14 the
court held that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus
did not require reversal.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether it should
apply the Chapman standard to nonconstitutional error and whether the
error could properly be declared harmless. 15 Reasoning that a uniform
standard was desirable and that state evidentiary and procedural rules often
afford a defendant his primary protection against an unfair trial, the Dorsey
court decided to adopt the Chapman standard uniformly for all errors.' 6
Applying the standard to the Dorsey facts, the court was unable to conclude
that the erroneously admitted testimony could not possibly have influenced
the verdict; it therefore reversed the conviction. 17
7. Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571, 357 A.2d 360 (1976); Dempsey v. State, 277 Md.
134, 355 A.2d 455 (1976); Brafman v. State, 276 Md. 676, 350 A.2d 665 (1975); Ross v.
State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1975).
8. See text accompanying notes 152 to 182 infra.
9. 276 Md. at 639, 350 A.2d at 667.
10. Id. at 641 n.2, 350 A.2d at 667 n.2. Further, the State's principal witness who
identified Dorsey as the robber had previously identified Dorsey's brother as the
perpetrator. Id. at 640, 350A.2d at 667.
11. 276 Md. at 642, 350 A.2d at 668.
12. Dorsey v. State, No. 74-282 (Md. Ct. Sp. App., filed Dec. 5, 1974) (per curiam).
13. The court held that the testimony was incompetent and collateral as to
whether the defendant was guilty. See 276 Md. at 642, 350 A.2d at 668.
14. Id. at 642-43, 350 A.2d at 667.
15. Id. at 641, 350 A.2d at 667.
16. Id. at 657-59, 350 A.2d at 677-78.
17. Id. at 643, 659-60, 350 A.2d at 668, 678-79. The Court of Appeals agreed with
the Court of Special Appeals that the testimony had been erroneously admitted. Id. at
647, 350 A.2d at 670. But the court disagreed that the strength of the other evidence
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HARMLESS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR: THE RuLE OF
Chapman v. California18
In England the common law rule provided that an error committed at
trial was not ground for reversal if the appellate court believed that the jury
had reached the correct result on the basis of sufficient evidence.19 In 1835
this rule was supplanted by the "Exchequer rule,"'2 which came to be
interpreted in American jurisdictions as a rule mandating a new trial
whenever an error occurred in the trial court.2 1 Responding to criticism that
the rule delayed litigation and encouraged gamesmanship at the trial level,
22
the states and the federal government adopted constitutional or statutory
reforms that allowed courts to develop harmless error doctrines.23 In
applying their harmless error rules, state24 and federal25 courts opted for a
case-by-case inquiry into specific errors - an approach reflecting the view
that close scrutiny of the facts of each case was more important than the
application of a broad general rule.
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not have affected the
verdict. Id. at 643, 659-60,350 A.2d at 668, 678-79.
18. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
19. Rex v. Ball, 168 Eng. Rep. 721 (K.B. 1807); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21, at
365 (3d ed. 1940).
20. Crease v. Barrett, 1 C. M. & R. 919 (Ex. 1835).
21. For a critical appraisal of the rule, see 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (3d ed.
1940).
22. In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), Justice Rutledge
commented that "[s]o great was the threat of reversal, in many jurisdictions, that
criminal trial became a game for sowing reversible error in the record, only to have
repeated the same matching of wits when a new trial had been thus obtained." Id. at
759. See Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence in Federal
Courts, 3 VILL. L. REV. 48, 49 (1957); Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP., Pt. 1, at 395 (1906).
23. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1964); CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 13; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 27-117 (1956). Maryland never adopted the Exchequer rule. See Nicholson v. State,
38 Md. 140 (1873).
24. See, e.g., O'Loughlin v. People, 90 Colo. 368, 10 P.2d 543 (1932) (reference to
suppressed confession held harmless); Martini v. State, 200 Md. 609, 92 A.2d 456
(1952) (allegedly illegal evidence not prejudicial where it could not have changed
result). The state courts have developed, as yet, no generally accepted rules for
treating errors in criminal cases. While many jurisdictions nominally place the
burden on defendants to show prejudice, the case law suggests that the actual
allocation depends to a great extent on how potentially prejudicial the appellate court
perceives the error to be in the given factual context. Compare State v. Goodagor, 56
Or. 198, 106 P. 638 (1910) (burden on state to show harmlessness) with State v.
DeJonge, 152 Or. 315, 51 P.2d 674 (1935), rev'd on other grounds, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
(burden on defendant to show prejudice) and State v. McLean, 255 Or. 464, 468 P.2d
521 (1970) (no discussion of burdens). See also Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless
Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 938, 1010-12 (1973) [hereinafter Saltzburg].
25. The federal approach was best expressed by the Supreme Court in Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762-66 (1946). The Court specifically rejected the view
that one party should bear the burden of persuasion on whether an error was
prejudicial or harmless. Id. at 765-66. Rather than relying on easy formulas, the
Supreme Court urged a searching inquiry into the facts of each case to discover
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While the state and federal courts were withdrawing generally from
automatic reversal, no such tendency was indicated in the Supreme Court's
treatment of constitutional errors. Most reversals on constitutional grounds
contained no discussion of the possible harmlessness of the 'error.26
whether the error influenced the verdict, even in the face of substantial untainted
evidence. Id. at 764-65.
Ignoring the plain directive to avoid easy formulas, the lower federal courts
continued to rely extensively, albeit inconsistently, on presumptions and allocations
of the burden of persuasion. Compare, e.g., Black v. United States, 309 F.2d 331, 334
(8th Cir. 1962) (burden on defendant to show prejudice) with Ford v. United States,
379 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (burden on state to show harmlessness) and Blackwell v.
United States, 244 F.2d 423 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 838 (1957) (burden on
neither party).
The federal harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. §2111 (1964), mandates
disregarding "errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties." That the statute was designed only to obviate reversals for technical errors is
clear from the legislative history of its nearly identical predecessor, 28 U.S.C. § 391:
"The proposed legislation affects only technical errors. If the error is of such a
character that its natural effect is to prejudice a litigant's substantial rights, the
burden of sustaining a verdict will, notwithstanding this legislation, rest upon the one
who claims under it." H.R. REP. No. 913, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1919), quoted in
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946).
Although adequate in the case of procedurally insignificant errors, such
language provides no standard for determining when nontechnical errors are
harmless. Determining that an error has affected a substantial right rather than a
technical prerequisite does no more than set the stage for the basic inquiry: by what
criteria and under what standard does a court assess whether the error actually
affected the verdict? Justice Traynor discusses the shortcomings of the federal statute
and those enactments modeled after it in R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS
ERROR 14-17 (1970) [hereinafter R. TRAYNOR]. See also Saltzburg, supra note 24, at
1007.
26. Before Chapman, the Supreme Court had directly faced the issue of harmless
error only three times. In Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the prosecution
urged that an improperly admitted, coerced statement was harmless because it was
exculpatory. Rejecting the argument on grounds that the prosecution cannot offer
evidence to prove guilt and then argue that it did not tend to do so, the Court stated
curtly that reversal was required once it was determined that the statement was
illegally obtained. Id. at 541. In Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), the
defendant took the stand and confessed after evidence had been admitted in violation
of his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him. Id. at 476. The Court
reversed a codefendant's conviction, but affirmed Motes' conviction. It was the
Court's view that Motes' confession was evidence so inculpatory as "to require a
verdict of guilty" and, hence, "[i]t would be trifling with the administration of the
criminal law" to award him a new trial. Id. at 475-76. Since the confession was
tantamount to a guilty plea, the Court may have reasoned that Motes had no need, in
the face of the confession, to confront his accusers. In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927), the Court held that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause was
violated where the trial judge's salary depended upon revenue raised from traffic
convictions. In reversing the conviction, the Court stated that the defendant had a
constitutional right to trial before an impartial judge regardless of the strength of the
evidence against him. Id. at 535.
Subsequently, the Court reversed convictions involving constitutional error
without discussion of the possible harmlessness of the error. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (denial of speedy trial); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
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Moreover, the Court implied that a harmless error rule might not apply at all
where "the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of
Congress. '2 7 Consequently, the circuits split over whether such errors as
admitting evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment could be
deemed harmless.
28
This controversy exerted pressure on the Supreme Court to decide
whether constitutional errors could be harmless. In Chapman v. Califor-
nia,29 the Court finally confronted the issue of harmless constitutional
error.30 The Chapman defendants were convicted of robbery, kidnapping,
and murder in a trial where the prosecutor had repeatedly referred to the
defendants' failure to testify and the judge had advised the jury that it could
(1967) (discrimination in selection of jurors); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)
(holding trial in community permeated with adverse pretrial publicity); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (admission into evidence of coerced confession);
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946) (instructing jury on an unconstitu-
tional presumption).
27. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946) (footnote omitted). In a
concurring opinion in Chapman, Mr. Justice Stewart observed:
In devising a harmless-error rule for violation of federal constitutional
rights, both the Court and the dissent proceed as if the question were one of
first impression. But in a long line of cases, involving a variety of
constitutional claims in both state and federal prosecutions, this Court has
steadfastly rejected any notion that constitutional violations might be
disregarded on the ground that they were "harmless." Illustrations of the
principle are legion.
386 U.S. at 42.
Most commentators were of the view that constitutional errors could never be
harmless. See, e.g., Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence
in Federal Courts, 3 VILL. L. REV. 48, 67 (1957); Manwaring, California and the
Fourth Amendment, 16 STAN. L. REV. 318, 325-26 (1964).
28. Evidence obtained in illegal searches and seizures was most frequently
deemed nonprejudicial. See generally Thompson, Unconstitutional Search and
Seizure and the Myth of Harmless Error, 42 NOTRE DAME LAw. 457, 460-61 (1967); see
also Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83, 86 n.30 (1967) (citing
cases).
Four circuits applied the federal harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111
(1964): see Hernandez v. United States, 353 F.2d 624, 628 (9th Cir. 1965); McDonald v.
United States, 307 F.2d 272, 275 (10th Cir. 1962) (alternative holding); United States v.
McCall, 291 F.2d 859, 860 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Donnelly, 179 F.2d 227, 233
(7th Cir. 1950). One circuit applied automatic reversal: see Honig v. United States, 208
F.2d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 1953). And one circuit seemed to vacillate: compare Williams v.
United States, 263 F.2d 487, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1959) with Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d
37, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 941 (1957).
29. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
30. Five years earlier, the Court had faced the issue in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375
U.S. 85 (1963). However, it avoided the question by re-examining the facts of the case
and deciding that the state court had misapplied its own harmless error rule. Stating
the test as "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence ... might
have contributed to the conviction," id. at 86-87, the Court held that under
Connecticut's rule the illegally seized evidence could not have been deemed harmless.
Id. at 91-92.
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take this silence into consideration. 31 The California Supreme Court rejected
the appellants' contentions that this constitutional error required automatic
reversal, finding the error harmless under the state's constitutional
standard.
32
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Black, reversed the
state court decision. Considering first whether a state or federal rule should
govern cases involving constitutional violations, the Court held that because
such violations were federal in nature, a federal standard was preferable.
33
Moreover, Justice Black suggested that it was inappropriate to allow the
states to formulate rules to safeguard individuals from state infractions of
federally guaranteed rights. 34 Rejecting the notion that automatic reversal
was required for even the most insignificant constitutional errors, 35 Justice
Black articulated a federal harmless error rule to be applied to most
constitutional violations. 36 Errors could be deemed harmless if an appellate
31. 386 U.S. at 18-19. See appendix to the opinion of the Court, id. at 26-42.
Shortly after the conviction, the Supreme Court held such conduct violated a person's
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965).
32. People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 404 P.2d 209, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1965), rev'd sub
nom. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The California Constitution
prohibited reversal unless "the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained
of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 13.
33. 386 U.S. at 20-22.
34. Id. Although the California harmless error rule met constitutional due process
criteria, the Court stated that it could not "leave to the States the formulation of the
authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people from infractions by
the States of federally guaranteed rights" and, "in the absence of appropriate
congressional action, it is our responsibility to protect [these rights] by fashioning the
necessary rule." Id. at 21.
Justice Harlan, in dissent, vigorously opposed this view. Id. at 45-54. He
believed that state harmless error rules should be overturned only if they violated due
process by being fundamentally unfair. He characterized state rules as procedural
practices which could be legitimately applied to determine the impact of constitutional
errors. See id. at 46-48. The majority did not address this precise issue, but by
preferring a federal standard and by holding that constitutional errors were federal
questions, the majority appeared to accept the view that harmless error rules are
substantive rather than procedural in nature. See id. at 20. Justice Traynor forcefully
argues this position on the ground that rather than mandating the procedures to be
followed in presenting the facts, the rule determines the legal conclusion that follows
from the factual data. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 25, at 39-40. See generally Morgan,
Rules of Evidence: Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REV. 467, 468 (1957).
Justice Harlan's view has not reappeared in subsequent cases. See Schneble v.
Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
35. 386 U.S. at 22.
36. Id. at 23. Automatic reversal was reserved for violations of those "constitu-
tional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless." Id. Justice Black cited three cases to illustrate the kind of error requiring
automatic reversal: Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927) (impartial judge). See 386 U.S. at 23 n.8. Other possible instances of automatic
reversal were cited in Justice Stewart's concurrence, 386 U.S. at 42-44. For an
analysis of these and other cases, see Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN.
L. REV. 83 (1967).
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court was "able to declare a belief that it is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. '37 Further, the burden of showing harmlessness was placed not on
the appellant, but on the state, the party which had presumably benefited
from the error.38 The Court did not explain its rejection of the California
standard in favor of this more rigorous test. Moreover, while it may have
been retreating from the stringency of automatic reversal, its action
represented a broad exertion of federal judicial power over state courts.39
In view of the multifariousness of the states' tests,40 the Court
apparently wished to establish a uniform standard that could be easily
monitored.41 The "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" language was chosen specifi-
cally because it was a standard familiar to all courts 42 and would provide a
workable gauge for ensuring that only those errors that were insignificant
in a particular factual setting would be found harmless.43 Moreover, a strict
rule would prevent courts not in sympathy with modern criminal safeguards
from vitiating them by holding their violation harmless. 44 A less stringent
test would, of course, give state appellate courts more discretion in dealing
with the facts of each case. Such a test, however, would not only be more
difficult to monitor for evenhanded application but, would be more
susceptible to abuse.
Having formulated the test, Justice Black went on to hold that, in the
circumstance of the case, the constitutional violation could not be deemed
harmless, for "absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fair-
minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts. '45 This
constituted the only indication in Chapman of the criteria that were to
govern the application of the test. Moreover, this justification for a finding
of harmfulness merely echoed the Court's previous language in Fahy v.
Connecticut that an error is harmful if "there is a reasonable possibility that
the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. '4 6
37. 386 U.S. at 24.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 21. That the rule articulated by Justice Black is not of constitutional
origin is clear from the fact that the rule was fashioned only "in the absence of
appropriate congressional action." Id. at 21. Moreover, there was no intimation that
the state rule could not have been adopted since it equally satisfied due process
criteria. Id. Rather, the result is more closely akin to that of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), where the Court imposed a prophylactic rule upon the states while
assuming that Congress (or state legislatures) could constitutionally prescribe a
different one. See id. at 467. See also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (Court
will not review whether state correctly applied its rule to nonconstitutional error).
40. See notes 22 and 24 supra.
41. An indication of this is to be found in the Court's statement that "we must
recognize that harmless-error rules can work very unfair and mischievous results
.... What harmless-error rules all aim at is a rule that will save the good in
harmless-error practices while avoiding the bad, so far as possible." 386 U.S. at 22-23.
42. Id. at 24.
43. Id. at 22.
44. See id. at 21.
45. Id. at 25-26.
46. 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963). See note 30 supra.
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Since the Chapman Court explicitly equated the Fahy dicta with the test it
had enunciated, 47 the "justification" simply amounts to a restatement of the
rule. Among the questions left unanswered by Chapman were whether the
reviewing court could consider the strength of untainted evidence in
assessing the possibility that the jury relied on tainted evidence in reaching
its verdict and whether other, properly admitted evidence on the same issue
could render an error harmless. Further, the Court's terse reference to what
fair-minded jurors might do left ambiguous whether the inquiry was to focus
on the possible effect of the error on the actual jury or whether a court could
declare the error harmless if it believed that, absent the error, the same
result would be reached on retrial.
PosT-Chapman CASES: THE SEARCH FOR CRITERIA
The first indication that the Court might increase whatever distance
there was between the Chapman test and automatic reversal came in
Harrington v. California.48 The error in Harrington involved the introduc-
tion of the confessions of two nontestifying codefendants in contravention of
defendant Harrington's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses
against him, as that right had been construed a year earlier in Bruton v.
United States.49 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas concluded that the
error was harmless.5 Justice Douglas based his decision not on the
reasonably possible 5 impact of the error on the verdict but on the probable
impact of the error on the jury in light of the overwhelming amount of
untainted evidence against the accused.52 The Harrington Court repeated,
however, that some errors required automatic reversal 3 and reiterated54 the
Chapman Court's warning5 5 against placing undue emphasis on overwhelm-
ing untainted evidence of guilt. Justice Douglas specifically reaffirmed the
stringency of the Chapman test and stated that the Harrington findings
were not intended to dilute or depart from Chapman.56
47. 386 U.S. at 24.
48. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
49. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
50. 395 U.S. at 254.
51. The Chapman Court had seemed to direct the reviewing court to examine the
tainted evidence and determine whether there was a reasonable possibility that it had
affected the verdict. See 386 U.S. at 24.
52. In the Court's view the substance of the illegally admitted confessions added
nothing beyond Harrington's own testimony. By contrast, the statements of testifying
codefendants were far more damaging to Harrington. See 395 U.S. at 254.
53. Id. at 251.
54. Id. at 254.
55. 386 U.S. at 23.
56. 395 U.S. at 254. Justice Brennan, in a dissent in which Justice Marshall and
Chief Justice Burger joined, viewed the shift in emphasis as compromising the
implicit Chapman requirement that the reviewing court look only to the tainted
evidence and inquire whether it might have influenced the verdict. Id. at 255. Relying
solely on the reasonable possibility test, the dissenters concluded that absent the error
the jury might not have reached a guilty verdict. Id. at 257.
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If the trend toward a liberal interpretation of the "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt" language was not clear in Harrington, it became far more
apparent in Schneble v. Florida.57 In this case the Bruton violation involved
a codefendant's confession implicating Schneble in a murder. But because
Schneble's own confession was also introduced at trial, Justice Rehnquist
had no difficulty finding that the illegally admitted evidence was merely
cumulative:
Having concluded that petitioner's confession was considered by the
jury, we must determine on the basis of "our own reading of the record
and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact ... on the
minds of an average jury," Harrington v. California, supra, at 254,
whether [the codefendant's] admissions were sufficiently prejudicial to
petitioner as to require reversal . . . . [U]nless there is a reasonable
possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the
conviction, reversal is not required. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 24 (1967). In this case, we conclude that the "minds of an average
jury" would not have found the State's case significantly less persuasive
had the testimony as to [the codefendant's] admissions been excluded.
The admission into evidence of these statements, therefore, was at most
harmless error.58
Significantly, the Court retained both the "probable impact" language of
Harrington and the "reasonable possibility" statement from Chapman to
bolster its finding that the jury,5 9 having Schneble's confession, could not be
more persuaded by illegally obtained evidence on the same facts.
57. 405 U.S. 427, 432-37 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. 405 U.S. at 431-32. Justice Marshall's dissent centered on the possibility that
Schneble's confession had been coerced. Because the issue of voluntariness had been
submitted to the jury, Justice Marshall could envisage the possibility that the jury
had rejected all or part of Schneble's confession, relying instead primarily on the
codefendant's statement to support the conviction. Id. at 436-37. The dispute between
the majority and Justice Marshall centered, then, on the reliability of the untainted
evidence.
59. From the context it is clear that Justice Rehnquist's meaning was that, on
review, one must assume that the average person on the actual jury was rational. See
405 U.S. at 431. As our system has no mechanism for asking the actual jurors what
motivated the verdict, an assumption of rationality must accompany any assessment
of the probabilities that they may have been influenced by an error. Id. But the focus
must remain at all times on the error's effect on the actual jury. If the overwhelming
evidence test is construed as focusing on whether the average jury would have
convicted on the weight of the untainted evidence alone, the appellate court would, in
effect, be conducting a quasi-trial on appeal. Such de novo treatment would deprive
the defendant of an opportunity to confront witnesses against him and, more
importantly, of the right to a jury trial. The court would be weighing the untainted
evidence for its sufficiency and basing its affirmance solely on its view that the
properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supported the verdict and, hence, an
"average jury" would have found the defendant guilty even absent the error. But the
issue is not whether another jury would find the evidence persuasive, but rather
whether the actual jury relied on the erroneously admitted evidence in reaching their
verdict. For, as Justice Traynor puts it, "[tihe crucial question is not what might
happen tomorrow on an edited rerun, but what did happen yesterday on the actual
run." R. TRAYNOR, supra note 25, at 22. See also notes 67 and 68 infra.
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In Schneble, while developing guidelines, the Court stressed that no
single factor was dispositive with regard to a finding of harmlessness. For
example, the Harrington Court warned that the cumulative nature of the
evidence did not necessarily mean the error was harmless: "We do not
suggest that, if evidence bearing on all ingredients of the crime is tendered,
the use of cumulative evidence, though tainted, is harmless error." 60 Yet the
Harrington Court ultimately concluded that the evidence against Harring-
ton was "so overwhelming that unless we say that no violation of Bruton
can constitute harmless error, we must leave this conviction undisturbed."'1
Hence, cumulativeness may lead to a finding of harmlessness where the
remaining evidence is so overwhelming that there is little likelihood that the
jury relied on the tainted evidence. But in both Chapman and Harrington
the Court had cautioned against undue reliance on the overwhelming-other-
evidence test.62 Thus, a reviewing court should not base a finding of
harmlessness solely on cumulativeness or solely on the belief that the
untainted evidence firmly established the defendant's guilt, for it is possible
that the jury relied on the tainted evidence and disbelieved some or all of the
remaining evidence. Hence, it was significant that in both Harrington and
Schneble the evidence was cumulative - it tended to prove facts which
properly admitted evidence also tended to prove.63 The Court in each case
emphasized that, on the record, it was the cumulative nature of the
erroneously admitted evidence, taken together with the overwhelming other
evidence of guilt, that militated against the inference of prejudice otherwise
inherent in the nature of the violation6 4
In view of the factual basis for these decisions and the Court's warnings
against overemphasizing the weight of the untainted evidence, the Schneble
Court's retention of both the "reasonable possibility" and "probable impact"
language can be reconciled. The reviewing court must in the first instance
judge whether the error obviously contributed to the conviction. Reversal is
required if there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the
verdict or, conversely stated, unless the court believes beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not influence the verdict. 65 In making this
60. 395 U.S. at 254.
61. Id.
62. 395 U.S. at 254; 386 U.S. at 23.
63. In Harrington, a third codefendant's confession as well as Harrington's own
statement placed him at the scene of the crime; this was the precise effect of the
unconstitutionally admitted confession. See 395 U.S. at 253-54. In Schneble, the
defendant's own confession, corroborated by other evidence, was not amplified by the
content of the codefendant's statement. See 405 U.S. at 431.
64. See text accompanying notes 49 and 57 supra.
65. The Chapman Court treated these two formulations as equivalent. 386 U.S. at
24. There may, however, be situations where a reversal could be possible under one
formulation but not under the other. For instance, in a situation where certain persons
were unconstitutionally excluded from the jury, the appeals court, absent a showing
that the remaining jurors were less than fair, might have no basis for reversal under
the first formulation since it would have no way of assessing the possibilities. This
formulation grounds the justification for reversal on being able to point to something
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assessment, the court is to look at the probable impact of the tainted
evidence on the jury. If by the very nature of the error there is a reasonable
possibility that the error influenced the verdict, the court must reverse.
However, if the erroneously admitted material only corroborates other
evidence of equal probative value on the same issue, the court will then be
unable to determine whether the jury relied on the tainted or on the
untainted evidence in reaching the verdict. In that event, the court must
reverse unless the untainted evidence is so overwhelming that there is no
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the jury would have acquitted
the defendant.
Hence, the overwhelming evidence test is not determinative, but serves
instead as a supplement to resolving the harmlessness issue on review. 66
Indeed, the focus of the inquiry should not be whether there is substantial or
even overwhelming evidence to support the verdict,67 but whether there is
any likelihood that the error in fact influenced the verdict.68 The
overwhelming nature of the case against the defendant serves, at most, as
additional support for the probability that the jury in fact did not rely on the
erroneously admitted evidence in reaching its verdict. In this capacity the
test serves as an important aid to determining the probable impact of the
error on the jury and, a fortiori, whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the error contributed to the verdict.
that can show a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. Under the
second formulation, they must reverse unless there is a showing of harmlessness.
66. Most commentators agree that the Supreme Court's approach in this area is
not completely coherent in light of inconsistent emphases in the cases. However, there
is wide agreement that the effect of the error on the verdict is of primary importance,
with the examination of the untainted evidence being merely a supplement to that
basic inquiry. See, e.g., Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional
Error - A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 14 (1976); Note,
Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 814 (1970); Note,
Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (1967).
67. Even in the face of overwhelming evidence an error might be so forceful as to
leave its mark on the verdict. See People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 76, 429 P.2d 606, 615,
60 Cal. Rptr. 254, 263 (1967) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Ross v.
California, 391 U.S. 470 (1968).
68. Initially, there is appeal in the argument that if a new trial without the error
would clearly reach the same result, a new trial would be a waste of judicial resources.
Such an argument, however, assumes that the record on retrial would not vary
significantly from the present record - i.e., that the trial tactics, judge's rulings and
jury reactions would be ,the same. Moreover, the argument fails because, in this
situation, the defendant's right to be found guilty in a jury trial would have been
impaired. Since the focus would be solely on whether the evidence overwhelmingly
shows the defendant is guilty regardless of the error, the appellate court is, in effect,
performing the jury function. The only finding that does not impair the jury right is
the finding that, on the record, the error below did not influence the actual jury's
verdict. This finding does not involve speculation on what would occur at a perfect
retrial. Rather, the court would be fulfilling the traditional appellate function of
deciding whether the proceedings in the trial court were affected by error.
See generally R. TRAYNOR, supra note 25, at 20-30; Field, Assessing the
Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error - A Process in Need of a Rationale,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 33-35 (1976).
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MARYLAND DECISIONS AFrER Chapman: PROBLEMS
IN APPLYING Two STANDARDS
Although the Exchequer rule69 had gained favor in a substantial
number of jurisdictions in the early part of this century, it was never
embraced by the Maryland Court of Appeals. 70 Rather, in Maryland,
establishing reversible error required a showing of both error and prejudice
to the defendant. 71 Moreover, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Chapman, constitutional error was likewise reversible only where prejudice
was shown. 72 Although the cases were not clear as to the allocation of the
burden of persuasion at the appellate level, as a practical matter the burden
was usually on the appellant to show prejudice. 73
The Dorsey court observed that the prevailing standard of review in
criminal cases was essentially the same as that applied on civil appeals:
reversal was required if there was a reasonable probability that the error
affected the verdict. 74 However, again the standard had been rarely
69. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
70. 276 Md. at 647, 350 A.2d at 671.
71. Id. at 652-53, 350 A.2d at 674-75. See Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 405, 326 A.2d
707 (1974); Ferrell v. Warden, 241 Md. 432, 434, 216 A.2d 740, 742 (1966); Baltimore &
Yorktown Turnpike Rd. Co. v. State, 63 Md. 573, 581, 1 A. 285, 287 (1885).
72. 276 Md. at 652, 350 A.2d at 675. However, it was a rare occurrence when
prejudice was not found. See, e.g., Combs v. State, 237 Md. 428, 206 A.2d 718 (1965)
(coerced confession); Cooper v. State, 231 Md. 248, 189 A.2d 620 (1963) (silence of
accused commented upon); Johnson v. State, 193 Md. 136, 66 A.2d 504 (1949) (products
of illegal search introduced into evidence). But see Gross v. State, 235 Md. 429, 442-43,
201 A.2d 808, 816 (1964) (although introduction of illegally seized note was prejudicial,
use of illegally seized contract was harmless error); Martini v. State, 200 Md. 609, 92
A.2d 456 (1952) (admission of small amount of illegally obtained evidence is not
prejudicial where the evidence could not possibly have changed the result).
73. See 276 Md. at 652, 350 A.2d at 674 (citing cases). Compare Ferrell v. Warden,
241 Md. 432, 434, 216 A.2d 740, 742 (1966) (no reversal without injury shown) with
Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 41, 139 A.2d 209, 217 (1958) (instructions confusing to
jury can never be nonprejudicial). Further, the strength of what must be shown to give
rise to an inference of prejudice differed with the facts of the case even though the
kinds of errors involved were similar. Consider, for example, the separation of the jury
with the court's consent after the case has been submitted to them but before the
verdict has been returned. In Kennard v. State, 177 Md. 549, 10 A.2d 710 (1940), the
Court of Appeals held that if circumstances permit a rational inference that prejudice
may have resulted, the state has the burden of showing harmlessness. Id. at 557, 10
A.2d at 713. But in La Guardia v. State, 190 Md. 450, 58 A.2d 913 (1948), the court held
that the party complaining~has the burden of showing that the protection afforded by
the rule against jury separation was lost by separation, and that the question is not
reviewable absent an affirmative showing that the defendant was prejudiced by the
trial court's action. Id. at 456, 58 A.2d at 916. Oddly, Kennard, a bastardy case,
involved only a misdemeanor while La Guardia was a capital case.
Inconsistencies such as this arise in other contexts as well: compare
Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140, 155 (1873) (incorrect instruction causing no injury is
harmless) with Jackson v. State, 180 Md. 658, 667, 26 A.2d 815, 819 (1942) (any
erroneous advice to jury is ground for reversal).
74. 276 Md. at 651, 350 A.2d at 673. See Rippon v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit Co.,
213 Md. 215, 131 A.2d 695 (1957), where the court stated that "it is the policy of the
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articulated and the criteria governing the decisional process were never
precisely formulated. 75 Nevertheless, the likelihood of reversal was depen-
dent to a great extent on this inherently prejudicial quality of the particular
type of error, tempered by a flexible approach to the facts of each case.76
After the Supreme Court announced the stringent standard for finding
constitutional error harmless, it became increasingly difficult to administer
two rules and to justify the disparity in approach between errors that were
constitutional in nature and those that resulted from violations of state
evidentiary and procedural requirements. 77 The disparity raised difficulties
court not to reverse for harmless error, and the burden is on the appellant in all cases
to show prejudice as well as error." Id. at 222, 131 A.2d at 698 (1957). See also Kapiloff
v. Locke, 276 Md. 466, 472, 348 A.2d 697, 700 (1975) (citing cases).
75. The reasonable 11robability standard was articulated in one criminal case
noted by the Dorsey court, Dobbs v. State, 148 Md. 34, 48-49, 129 A. 275, 281 (1925).
However, as the Dorsey court noted, later cases did not cite the Dobbs standard nor
did they explain what criteria governed its application. 276 Md. at 652, 350 A.2d at
674.
76. Thus, some errors had a much greater inherent likelihood of prompting
reveysal than others. For example, errors such as confusing or erroneous jury
ins ructions or improper comments by the judge or counsel were likely to cause
reersal even if the evidence supported the verdict. See, e.g., State v. Grady, 276 Md.
8, 345 A.2d 436 (1975) (although the defendant had the burden to show prejudice,
instruction that alibi must cover the entire period in which the crime could
conceivably have been committed was prejudicial); Christensen v. State, 274 Md. 133,
333 A.2d 45 (1975) (failure to grant defense's requested instruction that no inference
may be drawn from failure to call missing witness held reversible error); Midgett v.
State, 216 Md. 26, 139 A.2d 209 (1958) (ambiguous, misleading, or confusing
instructions can never be classed as non-injurious, especially in a criminal case); La
Guardia v. State, 190 Md. 450, 458, 58 A.2d 913, 917 (1948) (where record discloses
error in judge's communication with the jury but record does not show error
prejudicial, it is presumed prejudicial so as to require reversal). But see Robinson v.
State, 249 Md. 200, 216-17, 238 A.2d 875, 885-86 (1968) (where voluntariness of
confession was uncontradicted and it was unlikely jury would have reached a
different verdict, communication of court's belief that it was voluntary was not
prejudicial); Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 558-59, 171 A.2d 699, 708 (1961) (giving
erroneous advisory instruction is not ground for reversal when defendant is not
prejudiced thereby).
Errors affecting the machinery of the judicial system were frequent grounds
for reversal. See, e.g., State v. Saul, 258 Md. 100, 265 A.2d 178 (1970) (defendant
involuntarily absent when jury charged); Brice v. State, 254 Md. 655, 255 A.2d 28
(1969) (defendant denied right to have rulings on motions); State v. Simms, 234 Md.
237, 198 A.2d 891 (1964) (refusal of change of venue request held prejudicial); Dize v.
State, 212 Md. 1, 128 A.2d 427 (1957) (arrest warrant held insufficient).
Those errors most frequently found harmless involved the admission into
evidence of irrelevant or immaterial matters. See, e.g., Moxley v. State, 205 Md. 507,
517-18, 109 A.2d 370, 374 (1954); Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 499-500, 69 A.2d 456,
460, appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 940 (1949); Wolf v. State, 143 Md. 489, 122 A. 641
(1923). However, failure to connect relevant evidence with the accused was ground for
reversal. See Sisk v. State, 232 Md. 155, 192 A.2d 108 (1963); Riley v. State, 179 Md.
304, 306-07, 18 A.2d 583, 584 (1941).
77. In fact, the Court of Appeals on one occasion admonished the Court of Special
Appeals against using the constitutional error rule where nonconstitutional error was
involved. Smith v. State, 273 Md. 152, 163 n.2, 328 A.2d 274, 281 n.2 (1974). See text
accompanying note 91 infra.
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not only because the allocation of burdens and degree of certainty required
for reversal were different but also because the constitutional standard was
to be applied according to certain criteria. 78 By contrast, the state standard,
representing an ad hoc approach to the facts of each case, followed no
discernible formula.
7 9
In the first two post-Chapman cases to come before it, Veney v. States'
and State v. Babb,81 the Court of Appeals found the constitutional errors
harmless. In Veney the court assumed, arguendo, that remarks by the
prosecutor concerning the accused's failure to take the stand had violated
Griffin v. California.8 2 In view of the judge's curative instructions, however,
the violation was held harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
8 3
In Babb, the defendant had been convicted of manslaughter by
automobile in a nonjury trial. On cross-examination the defendant was
required, over objection, to disclose a prior conviction for public drunken-
ness. Preferring not to reach a decision whether such admission violated the
defendant's fifth amendment right to remain silent,84 the Court of Appeals
assumed, arguendo, that it did, and applied the Chapman test.8 5 The court
held that in a nonjury setting and in the face of overwhelming other
evidence of guilt, there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously
admitted evidence affected the judgment.8 6
In Younie v. State,87 the Court of Appeals reached an opposite
conclusion and reversed the conviction. The court ruled that admitting
evidence of the accused's refusal to answer incriminating questions at a
police interrogation violated his fifth and sixth amendment rights. Before
announcing its decision on the harmlessness issue, the Younie court
emphasized that it viewed the Chapman test and the criteria for its
application as stringent:
[U]nless the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt ... that a
tainted confession in no way influenced the verdict such that the
defendant would undoubtedly have been found guilty even if that
evidence had not been received, its employment will always be error.
Conversely, if the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
violation was technical in nature, as well as that the erroneously
admitted evidence was merely cumulative, and that there was other,
78. See text accompanying notes 29 to 68 supra.
79. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
80. 251 Md. 159, 246 A.2d 608 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 948 (1969).
81. 258 Md. 547, 267 A.2d 190 (1970).
82. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
83. 251 Md. at 180-81, 246 A.2d at 621.
84. There is no indication that such an admission violates the accused's privilege
against self-incrimination. See People v. Perez, 65 Cal. 2d 615, 422 P.2d 597, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 909, (1967), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 395 U.S. 208 (1969).
85. 258 Md. at 552, 267 A.2d at 192-93.
86. Id. The court did not discuss whether the evidence of the conviction was
cumulative. Rather, it stressed the irrelevance of that evidence and overwhelming
other evidence of guilt. Id.
87. 272 Md. 233, 322 A.2d 211 (1974).
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overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence properly before the
trier of fact, then the error would be harmless.
88
Applying so strict a standard to a case where the principal incriminating
evidence was the testimony of the defendant's woman friend, whose
credibility had been seriously impugned on cross-examination, the Younie
court was unconvinced that the erroneously admitted evidence on the
defendant's silence in no way influenced the verdict.8 9
Having applied the Chapman test in Babb, in an arguably nonconstitu-
tional context, 9° and then having issued, in Younie, a strong statement on
the stringency of the test, it is not surprising that the Court of Appeals was
shortly faced with occasions where the Court of Special Appeals, wanting to
be on safe ground, had applied the stricter Chapman test in finding
nonconstitutional errors harmless. In Smith v. State9' the Court of Special
Appeals, in dicta, stated that the exclusion of proffered testimony "would
have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v.
California."92 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in order to determine
whether the proper review standard had been applied and whether the error
was harmless. 93 Admonishing the lower court against applying the more
rigorous test in a nonconstitutional context, the Court of Appeals reiterated
that the correct standard was whether the exclusion of evidence prejudiced
the defendant. 94 Applying the less stringent state test, the court found the
error prejudicial and reversed. 95
Shortly thereafter, in Johnson v. State,9 6 the Court of Special Appeals
applied the Chapman standard to a nonconstitutional error, not in dicta but
in holding: citing Younie as authority, the court held that admitting hearsay
testimony was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.97 In this instance,
88, Id. at 246-47, 322 A.2d at 218 (emphasis added). In fact, the test articulated in
Younie is arguably more strict than that mandated by the Supreme Court in
Chapman and its progeny, for none of the Supreme Court cases in this area requires
the violation to be both technical and cumulative before the overwhelming evidence
test applies. Further, none of the cases indicates that the untainted evidence must be
uncontroverted. See text accompanying notes 29 to 68 supra.
89. 272 Md. at 247-48, 322 A.2d at 218-19.
90. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
91. 20 Md. App. 254, 315 A.2d 76 (1974), rev'd, 273 Md. 152, 328 A.2d 274 (1974).
92. 20 Md. App. at 260, 315 A.2d at 80.
93. 23 Md. App. 131, 326 A.2d 38 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 275 Md. 291, 339 A.2d
289 (1975).
94. 23 Md. App. at 138-39, 326 A.2d at 43.
95. 273 Md. 152, 153, 328 A.2d 274, 275 (1974).
96. The court expressed the view "that Chapman applies only to violations of
federal constitutional rights, and that the issue here does not rise to that level. Hence,
the Chapman doctrine would appear inapplicable. In Maryland, therefore, the test is
whether the erroneous exclusion of evidence results in prejudice to the complaining
party ...." 273 Md. at 163 n.2, 328 A.2d at 281 n.2.
97. 273 Md. at 163, 328 A.2d at 281.
[VOL. 37
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
however, the Court of Appeals surprisingly affirmed the decision in a per
curiam opinion.95
THE Dorsey DECISION: ADOPTION OF A UNIFORM STANDARD
In the wake of uncertainty created by these decisions, the need for new
guidelines for dealing with nonconstitutional errors was apparent to the
Court of Appeals. It was against this background that the Dorsey court
opted for a uniform approach to all types of error.
The Dorsey court viewed the Chapman standard as differing from the
state standard primarily in two respects. First, the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" requirement was much more stringent than the "reasonable
probability" standard currently in use.99 Second, the Chapman standard
placed the burden of persuasion at the reviewing level on the state rather
than on the defendant. °0 Arguing that the requirements of In Re Winship 0 I
strongly support the Chapman approach, the Dorsey court concluded that
the prevailing state practice should be supplanted by the Chapman rule.
In Winship, the Supreme Court held that due process required that the
state bear the burden of proving the accused guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.10 2 The Dorsey court argued that since an error "might have
influenced the jury in connection with such requisite degree of proof," it
would be "incompatible" with the Winship holding to apply any harmless
error standard less stringent than Chapman required. 0 3 Unless the state
had the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that an error was
harmless, the standard on review would circumvent the evidentiary
standard at the trial level so as to undermine the Winship holding. 04
Other considerations also persuaded the court to extend the Chapman
test to all errors. Observing that state-created rules often embody a
defendant's primary safeguards against an unfair trial, the court concluded
that nonconstitutional errors can as seriously undermine the fundamental
fairness necessary to our judicial system as can errors of constitutional
dimension. 0 5 Further, since both types of error can have equally serious
effects upon the trial, the label attached to an error should not mandate
different standards on review. 0 6 Consequently, the Dorsey court reasoned
that there was no sound justification for distinguishing between constitu-
tional errors and violations of state evidentiary and procedural rules.
0 7
98. State v. Johnson, 275 Md. 291, 339 A.2d 289 (1975). The Dorsey court cited
Johnson to indicate that the Court of Appeals had previously embraced the Chapman
test in a case involving nonconstitutional error. 276 Md. at 657, 350 A.2d at 677.
99. See 276 Md. at 658, 350 A.2d at 677-78.
100. Id. at 650, 350 A.2d at 675.
101. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
102. Id.
103. 276 Md. at 658, 350 A.2d at 677.
104. Id., 350 A.2d at 677-78.
105. Id. at 657, 350 A.2d at 677.
106. Id. at 658, 350 A.2d at 677.
107. Id.
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Finally, since both types of error can be present in the same case, a uniform
test was preferable in order to avoid confusion. 08
Applying the test to the record at hand, the court was unable to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict. Aside
from the detective's testimony, Dorsey's conviction rested exclusively upon
an in-court identification by a witness who had previously identified
Dorsey's brother as the assailant. 10 9 The court concluded that the
identification was equivocal at best. 110 Since the remaining evidence of guilt
was neither overwhelming nor cumulative with the erroneously admitted
testimony, the Dorsey court found that there was a reasonable possibility
that the detective's testimony "did play a contributing role in the rendition
of the guilty verdict.""'
Chief Judge Murphy, in a special concurrence in which Judges Smith
and Levine joined," 2 agreed that the error was reversible. He disputed,
however, both the need for a uniform standard and the necessity of adopting
one as exacting as that enunciated in Chapman. Dismissing the Johnson
and Babb decisions as representing only "an indiscriminate failure to apply
the proper verbiage," 1 3 Chief Judge Murphy argued that the Supreme Court
did not purport in Chapman to extend its test to violations of state
evidentiary and procedural rules." 4 Moreover, since the Maryland standard
satisfied the due process requirements outlined in Kotteakos v. United
States,115 there was no compelling reason, in his view, to obliterate the
distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional errors. 1 6 Judge
Murphy did not discuss what he considered to be the reasons for the
distinction, nor did he address the majority's arguments for abolishing the
distinction. He simply warned that the majority had made a "grave
108. See id.
109. Id. at 660, 350 A.2d at 678.
110. Id.
111. Id., 350 A.2d at 679. In the court's view, the prosecution, faced with Dorsey's
exculpatory statement and other evidence tending to exonerate him, "resorted to
patently inadmissible testimony in an attempt to establish a mathematical
probability of his guilt .... " Id. The court added, as a caveat, that use of the
harmless error rule should be carefully circumscribed so as to discourage prosecutors
from bolstering strong cases with inadmissible testimony in the hope that it will be
held harmless. Id. at 661, 350 A.2d at 679. The court also expressed concern that
prosecutors might use inadmissible testimony in weak cases in order to secure a
conviction, hoping the issue would not be raised on appeal. Id.
112. Id. at 661-63, 350 A.2d at 679-80.
113. Id. at 663, 350 A.2d at 680.
114. The Chapman Court expressly stated that the standard for nonconstitutional
errors was a state question. 386 U.S. at 21.
115. See 276 Md. at 662, 350 A.2d at 678. In Kotteakos, the Supreme Court
enunciated the due process requirement as whether an appellate court is able to
conclude "with fair assurance" that "the judgment was not substantially swayed by
the error." 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946). Significantly, in Cooper v. California, decided
the same day as Chapman, the Court refused to consider whether a state court had
properly applied its harmless error rule to a nonconstitutional error. 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967).
116. See 276 Md. at 663, 350 A.2d at 680.
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mistake" in abandoning a flexible approach in favor of the stringent
Chapman test.
11 7
THE Dorsey ARGUMENTS: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
UNIFORM STANDARD
The Dorsey court's principal justification for adopting the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard was that a less exacting standard would
undermine the standard of proof required for conviction at the trial level. In
deciding that In re Winship mandates the Chapman standard for appellate
review, the Dorsey court explicitly relied 18 on arguments advanced in an
article by Professor Stephen Saltzburg of the University of Virginia. 19
Saltzburg's position apparently is that a lesser standard on review would, in
theory, allow the trier of fact to convict the defendant despite the existence
of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 2 He argues that because the
evidentiary rule that was violated at the trial might have furnished the
requisite degree of doubt, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard must be
applied in assessing the impact of the error; if not, the defendant will
effectively have been declared guilty by a process which at one stage failed
to meet the requirements of Winship for a finding of guilt.' 2' In this way a
less stringent review standard for harmless error would undermine the
stricter trial standard. 122
Professor Saltzburg's views concerning the function of appellate review
and the process of assessing error are analytically unsound in several
aspects. He seems to argue that applying a "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" test to the impact of error on the verdict ensures that the trier of fact
would not have had a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt had the
error not occurred. 23 Clearly, assessing the impact of error and judging
whether the standard for conviction had been met are radically dissimilar
inquiries. The former relates to whether the trier of fact relied on the
erroneously admitted material in reaching the verdict while the latter
concerns whether, absent the error, the remaining evidence is sufficient to
convict.
Professor Saltzburg links questions concerning sufficiency of evidence
with his harmless error analysis partly because he confuses the nature of an
inquiry into whether an error is harmless, 24 and partly because, as a result,
he views inquiry into the sufficiency of evidence as critically similar to
117. Id.
118. See id. at 655, 657-58, 350 A.2d at 676, 677-78.
119. Saltzburg, supra note 24, at 988.
120. See id. at 992, 1030-31. See 276 Md. at 658, 350 A.2d at 677-78.
121. Saltzburg, supra note 24, at 988, 992, 1021-22, 1028.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 1028, where Professor Saltzburg argues that under any lesser
standard the Winship evidentiary standard would be "watered down" because
appellate courts would be permitted "to affirm convictions even where there was a
reasonable possibility that, but for an error, the jury would not have convicted."
124. See id. at 988, 992, 998, 1014 n.89, 1021-22, 1028, 1031.
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assessing the effect of error.'2 5 Saltzburg views an inquiry into the impact of
error on the verdict as substantially equivalent to asking whether, but for
the error, the jury would have found the defendant guilty.126 However, the
former inquiry focuses on the error while the latter concerns only whether
the untainted evidence is sufficient to convict, thus shifting attention to the
probative value of that evidence alone.
The inquiry must remain focused at all times on the impact of the error
on the verdict, with the overwhelming evidence test merely supplementing
and supporting that inquiry. 127 If consideration of the probative value of the
untainted evidence alone were determinative of the harmlessness of the
error, the appellate court would be conducting a quasi-trial on appeal. Such
de novo treatment would deprive a criminal defendant of an opportunity to
confront witnesses against him128 and, more importantly, of the right to a
jury trial. For if the court can affirm solely on the basis that the evidence is
so overwhelming that, absent the error, the jury would be compelled to find
the defendant guilty, the appellate court has become, in effect, a second jury
and is engaged in judging the guilt of the accused by weighing the evidence
for its sufficiency. Hence, applying the "but for" analysis suggested by
Saltzburg rather than the "impact of the error on the verdict" approach, the
appellate court's affirmance would amount to basing a finding of
harmlessness on the court's conclusion from an examination of the record
that the defendant is guilty.
This equation of two disparate approaches leads Professor Saltzburg to
conclude erroneously that questions of sufficiency are critically similar to
inquiries into the harmlessness of error. 29 Viewing a harmless error
analysis as an inquiry into "whether the verdict would have been the same
but for the evidence erroneously admitted"' 3 he observes that weighing
evidence for its sufficiency "seems to be the exact converse."' 13 Therefore, he
concludes that a similar degree of certainty should be demanded of the
reviewing court in both sufficiency cases and cases where error has
occurred. 13 2 However, while there may be cogent reasons why Winship
supports a high standard of certainty in sufficiency of evidence cases, these
125. See id. at 996. The supposed similarity of the two inquiries leads Professor
Saltzburg to confuse the one for the other. He correctly observes that the Winship
standard is designed to ensure that before conviction the trier of fact has a high
degree of certainty that the defendant is guilty. Id. at 1030-31. But he goes on to
assert that the Chapman standard for assessing the impact of error "merely insures
that the same degree of certainty governs the review of a verdict on appeal as
governed the deliberations which led to that verdict at the trial court level." Id. at
1031 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 1014 n.89, 1028. See also notes 59 and 68 supra.
127. See notes 59 and 68 and accompanying text supra.
128. Moreover, an appeals court can never accurately appreciate the confrontation
that took place in the trial below. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
129. Saltzburg, supra note 24, at 988, 996.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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reasons do not suggest that a similar standard is necessary where the issue
is the impact of error on the verdict.
The Winship holding that a criminal conviction be based upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt reflects society's judgment that it is far more
important to acquit those actually innocent than to convict everyone who
ought to be found guilty.1 33 Consequently, in order for a conviction to stand,
society imposes upon the state the burden of furnishing a quantum of proof
sufficient to lead the trier of fact to infer that the accused is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, at the trial, the standard for conviction relates to
the sufficiency of the evidence.
When an appeal is based on the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to
support the conviction, the Court of Appeals has traditionally upheld the
trial verdict unless there has been an affirmative showing that the trial was
so unfair as to amount to a denial of due process.1 4 However, if the Winship
rationale argued by Saltzburg and the Dorsey court is to be taken seriously,
the Winship standard should apply to appeals alleging insufficiency of
evidence rather than to appeals alleging error. As Justice Traynor observes,
when considering whether the evidence is sufficient to convict, the appellate
court "should do more than determine simply whether the trier of fact could
reasonably conclude that the alleged fact was more probable than not. It
should determine whether the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that
the alleged fact was ...almost certain."'' 35
The merit in this view stems from the fact that the appellate court is
directly examining the same facts as does the trier of fact in order to decide
whether the trier of fact has a basis in the record from which it could reach
the requisite degree of certainty. The Winship standard is important to the
reviewing court's analysis because the standard operates on the material in
the record, and it is the sufficiency of this body of facts to overcome the
burden placed on the state by Winship that is directly at issue. Hence, the
reviewing court examines the facts in the record from the same perspective
as did the trier of fact and under the same standard. Resolving the issue
involves only a single inference - from the facts in the record to whether,
under the Winship standard, a finding of guilt is possible. Moreover, the
analysis is completely independent of what actually went on in the mind of
the trier of fact.
The situation is quite different where the inquiry is on the effect of error.
Whether the trier of fact applied the Winship standard in reaching the
verdict is not at issue. Since there is no contention that the evidence was
133. See id. at 995.
134. Compare Winkler v. State, 194 Md. 1, 69 A.2d 674 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
919 (1950) with Berger v. State, 179 Md. 410, 20 A.2d 146 (1941).
135. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 25, at 29. Justice Traynor argues that the different
standards of proof in civil and criminal cases require an appellate court, in judging
the sufficiency of evidence, to apply one rule for civil appeals and another for criminal
actions. In civil cases the evidence is sufficient if the trier of fact could reasonably
conclude, from the evidence, that the defendant was probably at fault. In criminal
actions, however, the appellate court must be able to declare a belief that the evidence
is sufficient to have convinced the jury that the accused is almost certainly guilty. Id.
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insufficient, the reviewing court need not inquire whether the trier of fact
could reach the level of certainty required by Winship; nor can it be argued
that the appellate court should adopt the Winship level of certainty because
the trial court failed to conform to it. Where error alone is the issue (and not
insufficiency), the mandate of Winship has been met and need not be
repeated on appeal.
What is at issue in reviewing the impact of error is not the sufficiency of
the facts in the record below, but rather the jury itself: did the error influence
them to render the verdict? The appellate court still reviews the record, but
this review serves a different function from the scrutiny of the record that
takes place where insufficiency is alleged. The court must resort to the
record because it is the only source from which to infer what went on in the
minds of the jurors; obtaining direct evidence on the issue by asking the
jurors is impossible. Hence, the reviewing court must make two inferences
rather than a single inference as in sufficiency cases: the facts in the record
give rise to an inference about the jurors' probable view of the evidence; from
this, together with the nature and seriousness of the error, the court then
makes a second inference that the error did or did not influence the jury to
render the verdict. 136
Hence, where the appeal concerns error rather than sufficiency, a double
inference is required precisely because the reviewer is examining indirect
rather than direct evidence on the issue. As a result, a standard so strict as
that mandated by Winship may be unworkable. In a trial setting, the
standard's plausibility stems from the fact that the jury is directly presented
with all the evidence that the state can muster. By contrast, the appeals
court can do no better than deal in probabilities: 137 what is the probability
that this kind of error in this sort of factual setting influenced the trier of
fact, assuming he is rational? Conscientiously pursuing the Chapman
standard, an appellate court may well balk at declaring that it is able to
believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jurors were in no way
influenced by the error. In short, the Winship standard is meant to be
applied where a trier of fact is determining guilt by examining, in the best
possible setting, all the direct evidence the state can muster. In an appellate
setting, where the issue is not even remotely the guilt of the accused, but
136. In both cases what the reviewing court examines is secondary evidence on the
issue under review - the record of the action below. The record contains the evidence
that was admitted below, but fails to indicate those phenomenal features bearing on
the credibility of the evidence that may account in large measure for the probative
weight that may or may not attach to it. Such features as demeanor, tone of voice,
age, and sex of witnesses, and a host of subtle variations in presentation all coalesce
to reinforce or diminish the probative value of the testimony in the mind of the trier of
fact. It is for this reason that the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence should be whether the record contains evidence from which the trier of fact
could reach the belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty.
137. This probability is, of course, different in kind from the sort of probability the
trier of fact is evaluating: He wants to know the probability, from the evidence, that
the accused is guilty. The task on appeal is determining the probability from the
record that the jurors relied on the erroneous matter in reaching the verdict.
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rather the effect of error on the judgment, the indirect quality of the material
being examined, as well as the differences in the object of the inquiry, are
structural and logical reasons why so exacting a standard is both
unworkable and unnecessary.
As for the distinction between constitutional and other types of error,
the Dorsey court correctly observed that from the defendant's standpoint the
label attached to the error makes little difference. 138 Whether his conviction
is based upon a violation of state rules of procedure or on a violation of a
specific constitutional guarantee, he should be granted a new trial. However,
it does not follow that state procedural and evidentiary rules afford the
defendant his primary protection against an unfair trial in the same sense
as constitutional guarantees are considered to protect defendants. In most
instances, a trial error that results in a fundamentally unfair proceeding
would violate some constitutionally protected interest if no more than the
due process right.139
Furthermore, in analyzing the difference between the two types of error,
the policies furthered by constitutional guarantees must be seen to involve
larger societal interests than simply preventing error at a particular trial.
Constitutional guarantees and the prophylactic measures required to
implement them are designed to prevent prosecutorial and police misconduct
which violates the rights not only of the actual defendant but of potential
defendants as well. Since constitutional protections are so fundamentally
important to maintaining the integrity of our system of justice, there is a
strong commitment to discouraging their violation. Anything less than a
stringent harmless error standard would weaken the ability to encourage
conscientious adherence to constitutional requirements by courts, prosecu-
tors, and law enforcement officers. 140
State procedural and evidentiary rules, on the other hand, do not involve
the same policy considerations. While an error-free trial is ideal, it is not a
necessary concommitant to a fair trial. 14' Where a trial is basically fair -
i.e., free from constitutional error - a violation of a state rule does not
involve the prophylactic concerns that are involved where constitutional
error is shown. First, in our adversary system these errors will always occur.
138. 276 Md. at 657-58, 350 A.2d at 677.
139. For example, prejudicial hearsay may violate both due process and the
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1365,
1395-1400 (3d. ed. 1940).
140. Moreover, the Supreme Court's justification for the stringency of the
Chapman test did not involve a "defendant's rights" analysis. Rather, the concern
was to formulate a standard, not too far removed from automatic reversal, that could
be easily monitored and enforced in the event that state courts attempted to
undermine constitutional guarantees. See notes 33 to 45 and accompanying text
supra. No such considerations obtain for state created rules and procedures. In a
single jurisdiction the monitoring and enforcing task is more straightforward,
involves fewer lower courts, and is not concerned with courts that may be hostile to
the pronouncements of the highest court.
141. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953) (defendant entitled to
fair trial, not a perfect one); State v. Babb, 258 Md. 547, 552, 267 A.2d 190, 193 (1970).
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Second, the issue on appeal is concerned solely with the possible harm
caused to the particular defendant rather than the protection of fundamen-
tal societal interests. Hence, as regards violations of state evidentiary and
procedural rules, a harmless error standard more stringent than that
required by basic due process considerations is not necessary.
While not necessary to ensure a fundamentally fair proceeding in 'the
constitutional sense, a strict review standard for violations of state rules and
procedures reflects the Dorsey court's commitment to discourage these
errors. As the court noted, these rules signify state policy with respect to
judicial fairness, and their violation is bound to disrupt the decisional
process and affect trial strategy.142 Hence, it is the Court of Appeal's proper
function to decide what degree of protection should be afforded criminal
defendants against their violation. In Dorsey, the court decided that the
Chapman standard afforded the best degree of protection against a
defendant being convicted as the result of nonconstitutional trial error.
Adopting the Chapman standard at once increased the degree of protection
and rationalized the reviewing process by providing for a uniform approach
to error.
Still, by forcing the assessing process to stop where a "reasonable
possibility" exists that the verdict was affected, the Chapman standard may
prevent the reviewing court from carefully marshalling the facts before it
and forming a judgment whether the error in fact played a part in the trier
of fact's decision. 143 Often the inability to attain the necessary level of
certainty may stem not so much from the nature of the error as from the
realities of the reviewing process. The record may well be incomplete. It may
be difficult to judge with any certainty the probative force of testimony or
the impact of cross-examination. Forced, as the appellate court is, to deal in
the realm of probabilities, conscientious application of the Chapman
standard may well result in some reversals where the court in fact believes
the errors were insignificant.
In light of these institutional problems in applying so strict a test, the
Chapman standard invites a practice of discounting. Simply stated, where
the court believes the error harmless but lacks sufficient grounds for meeting
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" requirement, it may be tempted to apply a
"reasonable probability" test while paying lip service to the Chapman
formula. 144 Consequently, the appeal process may gain in intellectual
forthrightness, as well as in flexibility, by adoption of a test mandating
affirmance only if the court believes it highly probable that the jurors were
not influenced by the error. This is the test advocated by Justice Traynor 145
142. 276 Md. at 657-58, 350 A.2d at 677.
143. For this very reason, Justice Traynor argues that embracing the Chapman
test exhibits "a deficiency of will to confront an appellate judge's most difficult task."
R. TRAYNOR, supra note 25, at 36.
144. Justice Traynor feels strongly that the stringency of the Chapman test
inevitably leads to the standard being discounted, and that a less stringent "highly
probable" test would eschew intellectual dishonesty while encouraging more
searching analysis of the record. See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 25, at 44.
145. Id. at 44-45.
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in place of the Chapman standard. Such a test responds to the institutional
dilemma of having to decide, from an inherently incomplete record, the
probabilities that an error had a certain weight in the mind of a fact finder
whose motivation is beyond direct inquiry by the reviewer.
The nature of judicial review is also the primary reason why burdens
and presumptions are unsuited to an examination of error. The Dorsey court
noted with approval that the constitutional standard placed the burden of
persuasion on the state rather than on the defendant. 146 Yet, in its holding,
the court stated that "unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent
review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed
'harmless'."''1 7 The court thus recognized that regardless of the burdens on
the parties, the task of a reviewing court is to make an independent
assessment of the record to ascertain the effect of error.
Presumptions and burdens are ordinarily procedural devices for keeping
a trial on a forward course. Allocated according to logic, social policy or
expediency, they are designed to expedite the process of recreating the facts
that led to litigation. 14 Once the appellate court has been persuaded that
error occurred at the trial level, and the task is limited to evaluating the
effect of that error, it is too late for new evidence or presumptions in lieu of
evidence. The attorney's task is one of advocacy and no longer one of
sustaining burdens. 149 Consequently, while the shift of the burden from the
defendant to the state may be significant in terms of Maryland's past
practice, in future appeals the state's ostensible burden is unlikely to alter
the responsibility of the appellate court to reach its decision from an
independent assessment of the record. Likewise, it is equally improbable
that such a burden would materially affect the performance of the attorneys
for each side.
PosT-Dorsey MARYLAND CASES: APPLICATION OF
THE UNIFORM STANDARD
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the test adopted by the Dorsey
court is so stringent that it may well invite discounting. However, it appears
from the case law since Dorsey that the Court of Appeals so far intends to
apply the Dorsey test strictly. Ross v. State'50 and Brafman v. State'51 were
decided a few days after Dorsey. In Ross, Judge Levine, writing for the
majority, held that the admission into evidence of testimony relating to prior
146. 276 Md. at 653, 350 A.2d at 674-75.
147. Id. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678 (emphasis added).
148. For a discussion of the nature of burdens and presumptions at trials and their
unsuitability to appellate settings, see R. TRAYNOR, supra note 25, at 25-26.
149. While Professor Saltzburg argues that the Chapman standard should apply to
all errors, he agrees with Justice Traynor, see note 148 supra, that burdens and
presumptions confuse rather than aid analysis at the reviewing level. Saltzburg,
supra note 24, at 1018.
150. 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976).
151. 276 Md. 676, 349 A.2d 632 (1976).
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crimes constituted reversible error.152 Responding to a prosecution question
concerning his prior contacts with the defendant charged with possession of
heroin, an informant testified that the two had worked together selling
narcotics. 153 Characterizing the question as a thinly veiled effort to elicit the
very answer given, the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge erred in
allowing the question under the mistaken notion that it was relevant to the
conspiracy charge.15 4 Having found error, the court observed that, under
Dorsey, reversal
is required unless, the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error did not contribute to the conviction. The essence of this test is
the determination whether the cumulative effect of the properly
admitted evidence so outweighs the prejudicial nature of the evidence
erroneously admitted that there is no reasonable possibility that the
decision of the finder of fact would have been different had the tainted
evidence been excluded. 155
Applying this test, the court concluded that the absence of a cautionary
instruction increased the likelihood that the error contributed to the
verdict. 56 Notwithstanding the testimony of the police detective who had
actually observed the heroin transaction and had, in fact, confiscated the
heroin, the Ross court concluded that "there is at least a reasonable
possibility that the improper testimony of prior criminal conduct contributed
to the conviction."' 157
In Brafman, the state conceded that the trial court erred in admitting a
hearsay statement by the defendant's father that his son had committed
the rape with which he had been charged. In assessing whether the error
was harmless, the court pointed out that under the Dorsey test it is
irrelevant whether the error violated the accused's sixth amendment right of
confrontation.' 5 8 Emphasizing that the reviewing court's judgment must be
based on an independent examination of the record,' 59 the court observed
that once the jury was informed that the accused's father believed his son to
be the rapist, it was "much less difficult for the jury to follow suit."' 16
152. 276 Md. at 674, 350 A.2d at 687. The dispute between the majority and the
dissent concerned a preliminary problem of waiver. The defense objected to the
question that elicited the inadmissible testimony, but failed to move either to strike
the testimony or for a mistrial. Id. at 672-73, 350 A.2d at 685-86. The majority held
that the question itself was improper and, hence, the objection was. preserved. Id. at
672, 350 A.2d at 686. The dissent felt the question was facially neutral and, therefore,
the objection was waived by failure to move to strike. Id. at 675-76, 350 A.2d at
687-88.
153. Id. at 667, 350 A.2d at 683.
154. Id. at 672-73, 350 A.2d at 686.
155. Id. at 674, 350 A.2d at 686-87.
156. Id., 350 A.2d at 687.
157. Id.
158. 276 Md. at 679, 349 A.2d at 633.
159. Id. at 680, 349 A.2d at 634.
160. Id. at 679, 349 A.2d at 634.
(VOL. 37
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Consequently, despite the lack of any showing that the jury had, in fact,
been influenced by the statement, Judge Digges, writing for a unanimous
court, was "unable to say beyond a reasonable doubt that 'the jury was in no
way influenced by the bad [evidence] .... "161
The stringency of the test was again illustrated two months later in
Dempsey v. State.16 2 At Dempsey's trial on charges of breaking and entering
and grand larceny, the trial court allowed Dempsey's alleged confession into
evidence over objection that it was involuntary because the defendant had
been intoxicated when the statement was taken. In submitting the
confession to the jury, the judge advised the jurors that he had indepen-
dently found the confession voluntary in every regard, but that it was their
function to decide whether the confession was in fact voluntary. 6 3 Although
there was no objection to the instruction, the Court of Appeals granted
certiorari to consider whether that portion of the instruction concerning the
trial court's finding of voluntariness was reversible error.164 The state urged
that the error was not so blatant as to trigger the plain error doctrine, 165 that
Dempsey's failure to object therefore constituted waiver of the objection, and
that the error was harmless in the factual context of the case.
166
The court held first that because the state's objection to invoking the
plain error doctrine had not been raised in the Court of Special Appeals, the
state was foreclosed from raising it before the Court of Appeals.'6 7 In
considering the effect of the error, the Court of Special Appeals had found
the error harmless on the ground that the record contained no credible
evidence contradicting the testimony that the confession was voluntary.'68
The Court of Appeals disagreed. Noting that Dempsey had been drinking
prior to the taking of his statement, the court believed that the jury might
have concluded that his confession was involuntary.' 69 Consequently,
applying the Dorsey standard, the court was unable to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the judge's statement that the confession was
voluntary in no way influenced the jury in its determination of voluntari-
ness. 70
In Dillon v. State'7' the issue was again improper jury instructions.
Dillon had been convicted of the use of a handgun in the commission of
161. Id.
162. 277 Md. 134, 355 A.2d 455 (1976).
163. Id. at 137, 355 A.2d at 457.
164. Id. at 136, 140, 355 A.2d at 456, 458.
165. Id. at 142, 355 A.2d at 459. See Dimery v. State, 274 Md. 661, 338 A.2d 56
(1975); Berman v. Warden, 232 Md. 642, 193 A.2d 551 (1963).
166. See 277 Md. at 142, 355 A.2d at 459.
167. Id. at 142-43, 355 A.2d at 459-60.
168. Id. at 150-51, 355 A.2d at 464.
169. See id. at 153-54, 355 A.2d at 465.
170. Id. at 154, 355 A.2d at 465. For a contrary result under the pre-Dorsey
standard, see Robinson v. State, 249 Md. 200, 215-17, 238 A.2d 875, 884-85 (1968),
where the court grounded its affirmance on the likelihood that the jury would have
reached the same verdict absent communication of the court's belief that the
confession was voluntary.
171. 277 Md. 571, 357 A.2d 360 (1976).
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armed robbery. In his charge to the jury the trial judge had read the
preamble 172 to the statute under which the defendant was charged. The
defendant objected and moved for a mistrial on the ground that the
preamble was not part of the statute. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the conviction, finding no error. 173
The Dillon majority held there was no error in reading the preamble to
the jury because it was within the discretion of the trial court to advise the
jury of the legislative intent behind the statute as an aid to their
deliberations. 174 Moreover, the only ground for error was irrelevancy;
because the only question for the jury was the identity of the perpetrator,
and the alleged error did not go to that issue, any error would have been
harmless under Dorsey.175
Judge Smith agreed with the majority that the error was harmless under
Dorsey but agreed with the dissent that the trial judge's action was error. 76
Judge Levine, in a dissenting opinion in which Judge Eldridge concurred, 77
argued that the preamble was not only irrelevant to the issues of the case,
but also "had a pronounced tendency to inflame the jury" by stating that
the goals of the statute were to preserve the peace by stemming the increase
in violent crime. 78 Consequently, the dissent found a clear possibility of
prejudice, sufficient under Dorsey to mandate reversal. 79
These decisions show that the Court of Appeals is prepared to
conscientiously apply the exacting criteria mandated by Dorsey. In each
case the court engaged in a thorough, independent inquiry into the record
and grounded its conclusions not so much on the likelihood that the error
affected the verdict, as on whether the court was able, from the record, to
dispel every reasonable doubt that the error possibly influenced the jury.
The absence of discussion whether the state had met its burden and the
stress placed upon the reviewing court's responsibility to reach its
conclusions independently are significant. The court's analysis suggests
that shifting the burden of persuasion to the state serves more to underscore
the Dorsey requirement that reversal is mandated unless the court is able
independently to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was
harmless than to place the state in the position of losing an appeal by
failing to actively sustain its burden.
172. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 36 B (1976 Repl. Vol.).
173. 27 Md. App. 579, 587-90, 342 A.2d 677, 682-83 (1975).
174. 277 Md. at 584-85, 357 A.2d at 368-69. The Court of Appeals noted that at
trial the accused had not contested that a handgun had been used in the robberies, but
rather had based his defense upon an alibi for the times in question. Id. at 572, 357
A.2d at 362.
175. Id. at 585-86, 357 A.2d at 369-70. For a similar result under the pre-Dorsey
standard, see Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 559, 171 A.2d 699, 708 (1961), where the
court held that an advisory instruction, even if erroneously given, was harmless
absent a showing of prejudice.
176. 277 Md. at 594, 357 A.2d at 374.
177. Id. at 588-94, 357 A.2d at 370-74.
178. Id. at 589-90, 357 A.2d at 371.
179. Id. at 590, 357 A.2d at 371.
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The Ross, Brafman, and Dempsey decisions, grounded as they are on
the court's inability to reach the requisite degree of certainty, indicate that
the court is prepared to reverse on the basis that the record fails to indicate
that the jury did not rely on an error that might have influenced their
decision. Clearly, if the court adheres to this approach, the instances of
reversal can only increase. Moreover, a number of such reversals will result
solely from the stringency of requiring that the court believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the error could
have influenced the verdict. Since a reviewing court can deal only with
probabilities, this degree of certitude will be impossible to achieve in many
settings, if for no other reason than the reviewer's inability to second guess,
(on the basis of a record that is inherently an incomplete documentation of
what took place at trial) what a juror might think of the evidence.
Dillon, however, may exhibit a cleavage in the court over whether, in a
borderline situation, doubts should be dispelled in favor of upholding the
verdict or in favor of reversal. The Dillon majority's view that reading the
preamble was irrelevant to the issue of identity and, therefore, harmless
under Dorsey fails to consider the possible inflammatory effect of reading
the preamble. Rather than reversing unless the state proved harmlessness,
the dicta in Dillon seemed to place the burden on the defendant to show that
the trial court's action was prejudicial with regard to the identity issue.
On the other hand, in view of the Dillon majority's finding that no error
had in fact occurred, its dicta concerning the effect of the preamble on the
issue of identity may not have resulted from the same searching inquiry as
is reflected in the other decisions. Consequently, it would be premature to
suggest that the Court of Appeals is prepared to discount the strictness of
the approach mandated by Dorsey. On the contrary, Ross, Brafman, and
Dempsey illustrate the court's willingness to rigorously apply the Dorsey
test's demand for an independent scrutiny of the record and for affirmance
only if the court is able to reach the requisite degree of certainty.
Any harmless error rule balances the right to an error free trial with the
conservation of judicial resources.1 8° By extending the Chapman test to
nonconstitutional errors, the Dorsey court struck that balance in favor of
expanding the number of retrials at increased cost to the judicial system. In
so far as granting a retrial stems from the reviewing court's judgment that
the error so affected the trial below that the defendant merits a new trial, the
increased burden on limited judicial resources may be justified. However,
because the stringency of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard will in
many situations outstrip the reviewing court's resources for forming the
necessary judgment, a significant number of retrials may result, not from
the view that the defendant merits a new trial, but from the court's inability,
from the record below, to declare the belief that the error could not possibly
have influenced the verdict. Hence, the initial appeal and reversal may often
be based on the stringency of the reviewing standard rather than on
reasoned judgment that the error in fact was prejudicial. Unless tempered by
180. See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 25, at 14; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 183 (2d ed.
1972).
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the reviewing court's careful analysis of the record, such an approach could
herald a return to the practice of sowing error to ensure reversal. Where a
motion to strike or a request for a cautionary instruction may make the
difference between affirmance or reversal on appeal, a defense attorney may
be unlikely to act so as to render the error harmless.
IV. TORTS
1. ADOPTION OF STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT- Phipps v. General
Motors Corp.' - In Phipps, the Court of Appeals for the first time was
presented squarely with the question whether to adopt the theory of strict
liability in tort for defective products. The plaintiff, James D. Phipps, was
injured when the late model automobile he was test-driving for his employer
left the highway and crashed.2 In a complaint filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland against General Motors Corpora-
tion, Phipps alleged that the accident resulted from a stuck accelerator that
caused the automobile to accelerate suddenly and go out of control. Alleging
latent defects in the accelerator mechanism, carburetor, and motor mounts,
Phipps sought recovery under several theories, among them strict liability
in tort.3 He asserted that General Motors had placed on the market a prod-
uct which was in a defective condition that rendered it not reasonably safe.
General Motors moved to dismiss the counts based on the theory of strict
liability in tort, arguing that no such cause of action was recognized in
Maryland. 4 Finding no controlling precedents, the district court certified5 to
the Maryland Court of Appeals the question whether plaintiffs claim based
on strict liability stated a cause of action under Maryland law.6 In an
1. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). Phipps is discussed in Digges, Maryland's
Most Recent Assault On The Citadel, MD. B.J., Spring 1977, at 20.
2. The automobile had been delivered to Phipps' employer, an automobile dealer,
for servicing. 278 Md. at 338-39, 363 A.2d at 956.
3. The complaint contained six counts. The first three sought recovery in
negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, and strict liability. The last
three counts, in which Phipps was joined by his wife, each sought recovery for loss of
consortium based on the same three theories. Id. at 339, 363 A.2d at 956.
4. Id. at 339-40, 363 A.2d at 956. General Motors also filed a motion to dismiss
the count seeking damages for loss of consortium caused by the alleged breach of
warranties. Id. at 339, 363 A.2d at 956.
5. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 12-601 (1974). Since Phipps, the
Court of Appeals has applied strict liability to a case arising through the state court
system. Eaton Corporation v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977). In Wright, the
plaintiff was injured when a valve in a new propane fuel canister released propane
gas causing an explosion. The court held that evidence "that a propane canister, used
immediately after purchase according to instructions on the label, which continues to
allow gas to be released after an appliance has been removed" presented a prima facie
case in strict liability. Id. at 89, 375 A.2d at 1127. Nothing more was required to show
that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous.
6. 278 Md. at 340, 363 A.2d at 956-57. The Court of Appeals was also asked
whether a claim alleging injury to a marital relationship caused by the breach of
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opinion written by Judge Eldridge, the Court of Appeals answered
unanimously in the affirmative, holding the doctrine of strict products
liability as stated in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts7 to be
applicable in Maryland 8
express and implied warranties stated a cause of action under Maryland law. The
court rejected General Motors' argument that MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-318
(1975), which grants a right of recovery to "any natural person ... who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty," does not apply to an action for loss of consortium.
General Motors contended that loss of consortium is an action for injury to the
marriage entity and such entity is not a "natural person" who is "injured in person"
under that statute. The court, however, held that loss of consortium represents a
personal injury to both spouses and is compensable under the warranty provisions of
the Code. The court found General Motors' reliance on Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247
Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967), misplaced. 278 Md. at 353-56, 363 A.2d at 963-65.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
8. 278 Md. at 353, 363 A.2d at 963. Maryland thus joined the majority of
jurisdictions that have adopted some form of strict liability in tort for defective
products. See Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969); O.S.
Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Hiigel v. General
Motors Corp., 34 Colo. App. 145, 544 P.2d 983 (1976); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn.
284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976);
Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970); Stewart v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Robinson v. Williamsen Idaho
Equip. Co., 94 Idaho 819, 498 P.2d 1292 (1972); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d
612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Prods., Inc., 147 Ind. App. 46,
258 N.E.2d 652 (1970); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672
(Iowa 1970); Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966);
Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971); McCormick v.
Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges,
189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo.
1969); Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Shoshone Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966); Buttrick v. Arthur
Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730,
497 P.2d 732 (1972); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974);
Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424,
220 A.2d 853 (1966); Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 126, 283 A.2d 255 (1971);
Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v.
Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
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Reviewing prior cases in which the adoption of strict liability had been
urged unsuccessfully, the Court of Appeals found that the doctrine had
never been rejected in Maryland. Rather, in none of these cases had it been
necessary to reach the issue.9 In Telak v. Maszczenski'0 the evidence
revealed that plaintiffs injuries were caused by his misuse of the product;
since section 402A does not apply to cases of misuse,1 there was no occasion
to adopt the section. 12 The Court of Appeals avoided the issue whether to
adopt section 402A in a similar fashion in Myers v. Montgomery Ward &
Co.1 3 In Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young 4 and Frericks v. General
Motors Corp.'5 the court declined to adopt section 402A for an entirely
different reason.' 6 Both cases involved so-called automobile "second
collision" design defects.' 7 In Young the driver's seat of an automobile
separated from the floor when the car collided with another car, aggravating
the driver's injuries.'" The Young court found that in such circumstances the
question of whether the design of a product was defective depended upon
a balancing of the utility of the design and other factors against the
magnitude of the risk involved.' 9 Since there was "no- practical difference"
between the application of strict liability principles to second collision
design defects and a traditional negligence analysis, there was no need to
adopt section 402A. 20 Frericks reiterated this position. 2' In Phipps, on the
other hand, the court concluded that the alleged defect was "clearly of a
different character" from the asserted design defects in Young and
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969);
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
Two states have adopted section 402A by statute. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14,
§ 221 (Cum. Supp. 1976-77); S.C. CODE § 66-371 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
9. 278 Md. at 346-48, 363 A.2d at 960-61.
10. 248 Md. 476, 237 A.2d 434 (1968).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1965).
12. 248 Md. at 488-89, 237 A.2d at 440-41.
13. 253 Md. 282, 297, 252 A.2d 855, 864 (1969).
14. 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
15. 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
16. Telak, Myers, Young, and Frericks were the only cases discussed by the court.
However, the court also declined to adopt section 402A in Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69,
285 A.2d 607 (1972), holding section 402A inapplicable to lessors.
17. A second collision design defect exists when the design of an automobile
causes enhanced injuries from a collision "within the automobile between an
occupant and some part of the automobile, as opposed to the initial collision between
the automobile and some other object." 36 MD. L. REV. 479, 479 n.2 (1976); see
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 207, 321 A.2d 737, 740 (1974). For
a general discussion of the Young and Frericks cases, see Note, The Young and
Frericks Cases: Re-Examining Traditional Theories of Manufacturer Liability for
Product Defects, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 117 (1975); 36 MD. L. REV. 479 (1976).
18. 272 Md. at 205-06, 321 A.2d at 739.
19. Id. at 221, 321 A.2d at 747.
20. Id., 321 A.2d at 747-48.
21. 274 Md. at 298-99, 336 A.2d at 124. In Frericks, a passenger's seat suddenly
declined backward when the automobile left the road and overturned, causing the
passenger to be injured when the roof collapsed. Id. at 291-92, 336 A.2d at 120-21.
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Frericks;22 therefore, the case presented a proper occasion to consider
applying section 402A.
The Court of Appeals rejected three arguments advanced by General
Motors against judicial adoption of section 402A. General Motors argued
that strict products liability was unnecessary because the liberal warranty
provisions of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code 23 protect substanti-
ally the same consumer interests as strict liability. The court observed,
however, that several limitations and requirements imposed on recovery in
warranty are not applicable to strict liability in tort.24 The court also rejected
the contention that there had been legislative preemption of the field of
products liability, finding no indication that the General Assembly intended
to limit judicial development of strict products liability by the enactment of
the warranty provisions of the Commercial Code. 25 Finally, the court found
no merit in the argument that adoption of section 402A would change
existing consumer-seller rights so radically that the policy considerations
involved in adopting such a standard should properly be left to the
legislature; because section 402A effectively constitutes a form of negligence
per se, its adoption would not be a significant departure from the traditional
judicial function of establishing tort principles.26
22. 278 Md. at 348, 363 A.2d at 961. Although the Phipps court purported to leave
Young and Frericks unchanged, the analysis of those cases represents a retreat from
an earlier position. According to the Phipps court, Young and Frericks stand for the
proposition that in some design defect cases whether a design is defective depends
upon the degree of care exercised by the manufacturer. Id. Yet dicta in Young and
Frericks clearly indicate that design defects in automobiles are not within the scope of
§ 402A. See 274 Md. at 299, 336 A.2d at 124; 272 Md. at 220-21, 321 A.2d at 747. It
appears, therefore, that Phipps limits Young and Frericks. However, this modification
of prior cases portends a treacherous judicial distinction between those design defects
that will trigger an examination of the manufacturer's exercise of care and those that
will not. See text accompanying notes 50 to 56 infra.
23. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 2-313 to -318 (1975).
24. 278 Md. at 349-50, 363 A.2d at 961-62. Under the Code a seller is permitted to
exclude warranties on goods that are not "consumer goods" as defined in § 9-109. MD.
COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 2-316 to -316.1 (1975). Strict products liability, however,
operates irrespective of warranty exclusions. For example, an injured operator of
business equipment purchased without warranty would recover under strict liability.
See Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132 (1976). Section 2-607(3) of
the Commercial Code requires a buyer to give notice of a breach of warranty. Failure
to give such notice will bar recovery in warranty but not in strict liability. See
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962). There is also a significant difference between warranty and strict liability in
computing the running of statutes of limitations. In warranty the statute runs from
the time of delivery, MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 2-725 (1975), but in strict liability in
tort it runs from the time of injury or later. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101
(1974).
But see Dooms v. Stewart Bolling & Co., 68 Mich. App. 5, 10-16, 241 N.W.2d
738, 741-43 (1976).
25. 278 Md. at 350, 363 A.2d at 962.
26. Id. at 351-52, 363 A.2d at 962-63; see Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
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The Court of Appeals found persuasive several major policy considera-
tions for the adoption of strict liability.2 As between consumer and seller,
the seller is in the better position to "take precautions and protect against
the defect." 28 The seller is also in a better position to bear the cost of injuries;
those costs can be treated as costs of production, and liability insurance can
be obtained.29 Furthermore, consumers ought to be able to rely upon the
safety of goods and to anticipate that reputable sellers will stand behind
their products. These expectations are better fulfilled by holding sellers to a
standard of strict liability than by relying solely on theories of negligence
and warranty. 3° Otherwise, an injured consumer without the protections
afforded by strict liability must satisfy the proof requirements of negligence
or the procedural requirements and limitations of warranty in order to
recover. 3' Significantly, the court chose to adopt the Restatement's
formulation of strict products liability rather than rely on a case by case
approach 32 or develop its own formulation of strict products liability
theory.33 Although the Restatement offers a tested rule that gives immediate
guidance to lower courts and the bar, alternatives to section 402A appear to
offer more judicial flexibility, without the precedential and definitional gloss
placed on that formulation by other courts. 34 It is not surprising, however,
that the court did not consider alternative approaches, since it had already
indicated that section 402A was the proper articulation of strict products
liability theory.35
27. 278 Md. at 352-53, 363 A.2d at 963; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
§ 402A, Comment c (1965).
28. 278 Md. at 352-53, 363 A.2d at 963. See Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The
Meaning of "Defect" In The Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 559, 560-61 (1969); McNichols, The Kirkland v. General Motors Manufacturers'
Products Liability Doctrine - What's In A Name?, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 347, 352 (1974);
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products & Strict Liability, 32 TENN.
L. REV. 363, 366 (1965); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 826 (1973).
29. 278 Md. at 343, 352, 363 A.2d at 958, 963. See Keeton, supra note 28, at 561;
McNichols, supra note 28, at 352; Wade, supra note 28, at 826.
30. 278 Md. at 343, 352, 363 A.2d at 958, 963. See Keeton, supra note 28, at 561;
McNichols, supra note 28, at 352-53.
31. 278 Md. at 343, 353, 363 A.2d at 958, 963. See McNichols, supra note 28, at 353;
Wade, supra note 28, at 826.
32. California has developed strict liability through a case by case approach. See,
e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962).
33. See Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). For a
discussion of the Kirkland doctrine and its distinction from the Restatement, see
McNichols, supra note 28.
34. For a discussion of some of the definitional problems raised by § 402A, see text
accompanying notes 37 to 53 & 83 to 93 infra.
35. See Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975);
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Myers v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969); Telak v. Maszczenski, 248
Md. 476, 237 A.2d 434 (1968).
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The Court of Appeals set out the four elements that must be established
for recovery under section 402A. The plaintiff must prove:
(1) [that] the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left
the possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause of the
injuries, and (4) that the product was expected to and did reach the
consumer without substantial change in its condition.3 6
Leaving the other elements and terms undiscussed,37 the court accepted the
Restatement's definitions of "defective condition" and "unreasonably
dangerous." A product is in a "defective condition" when "'the product is
...in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him."38 A product is "unreasonably dangerous"
if it is "'dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics.'- 39 Although the Court
of Appeals did not elaborate on these definitions, the experience of most
courts indicates that they are not easy to apply. Consequently, the concepts
have "spawned an avalanche of analysis, comment and criticism," 40 and
many courts have modified or abandoned both the wording and definitions
of section 402A. Some jurisdictions have simply modified the definitions.
Thus, a product has been considered to be in an unreasonably dangerous
defective condition if it fails to meet the reasonable expectations of the
ordinary user as to safety,41 or if it is not reasonably fit for the ordinary
36. 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958. The court omitted the element in § 402A
requiring that the seller be engaged in the business of selling a product. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(a) & Comment f (1965). However, this
omission appears inadvertent and of no significance because the court clearly stated:
"[W]e adopt the theory of strict liability as expressed in § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts." 278 Md. at 353, 363 A.2d at 963.
37. For a brief discussion of the meanings of "product" and "seller," see text
accompanying notes 83-93 infra.
38. 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs
§ 402A, Comment g (1965)).
39. 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS
§ 402A, Comment i (1965)).
40. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 151, 542 P.2d 774, 777
(1975). See generally Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Keeton, supra note 28; Traynor, supra note 28; Wade, supra note
28.
41. Burton v. LO. Smith Foundry Prods. Co., 529 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir. 1976);
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975);
Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 230
N.W.2d 794, 798 (1975). As the Supreme Court of Washington stated in Tabert:
"[U]nreasonably dangerous implies a higher and different standard than what we
conceive to be the intended thrust of section 402A strict liability. The emphasis is
upon the consumer's reasonable expectation of buying a product which is reasonably
safe." 86 Wash. 2d at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
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purposes for which it was sold or manufactured and expected to be used,42 or
if the manufacturer would have been negligent had he known of the risks of
harm in the defect but nevertheless marketed the product.4 3 Other courts
have rejected either "unreasonably dangerous" or "defective condition" as a
part of their strict liability theory, observing that a close examination of the
Restatement's definition reveals that "defective condition" has no meaning
independent of "unreasonably dangerous." 44 Finally, some courts have
abandoned completely the requirement that a defective condition be
unreasonably dangerous; because "unreasonably dangerous" improperly
"rings of negligence" in the minds of juries, such a requirement is
incompatible with the justifications for strict products liability45
Since the inception of the doctrine of strict products liability, courts and
commentators have distinguished between manufacturing defects46 and
design defects. 47 Although this distinction has been criticized, 48 it was
apparently accepted by the Phipps court. The Court of Appeals observed
that the defectiveness test of section 402A is "more difficult" to apply in
cases of design defects than in instances of manufacturing defects. 49 The
court also noted that some authorities have suggested that the theory of
strict liability in tort is not applicable in design defect cases; since
defectiveness under section 402A requires an unreasonable danger, design
defects should presumably be evaluated by a negligence test, the utility of
the design being weighed against the magnitude of its inherent risks.50
42. See Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 89-91, 179 N.W.2d 64,68-70
(1970).
43. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974);
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974).
44. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding the two
terms are synonymous); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d
774, 779 (1975).
-45. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-35, 501 P.2d 1153,
1161-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441-43 (1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super.
599, 602-03, 304 A.2d 562, 564 (1973).
46. A manufacturing defect exists when the manufacturing process results in a
product that is in a condition not intended by the seller. 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at
959.
47. A design defect results from a deficiency in the design process; the product,
even though defective, is in the condition intended by the manufacturer. Id. at 344-45,
363 A.2d at 959.
48. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972), the California Supreme Court rejected the distinction as specious and
irrelevant to a strict liability inquiry. Since "a defect may emerge from the mind of the
designer as well as from the hand of the workman," the court perceived no reason
why a mental mistake should invoke a different analysis or receive more protection
than a mistake of the hand or a machine. Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162-63, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 442-43.
49. 278 Md. at 344-45, 363 A.2d at 959; accord, Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co.,
269 Or. 485, 494, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974).
50. 278 Md. at 345, 363 A.2d at 959 (citing Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753,
759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Balido v. Improved Mach.,
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Thus, it is argued, section 402A's requirement of unreasonable danger gives
rise, in design defect cases, to essentially a negligence test of reasonable
care. In view of this analysis, some courts have questioned whether the
requirement of an unreasonable danger advances the policies behind strict
products liability if the outcome in design defect cases rarely differs from
that which would have been reached under a negligence analysis51 Other
authorities, however, contend that the strict liability theory of section 402A
is not the same as negligence in design defect cases, although both may
employ a weighing technique; negligence examines a manufacturer's
actions, but strict liability uniquely focuses on a product.5 2 A strict liability
inquiry may consider the usefulness and desirability of the product, the
availability of other products that meet the same need but are safe, the
gravity and probability of harm, public expectation of the danger of the
product, and the cost of eliminating the danger.5 3
The Phipps court did not consider itself required to decide which general
approach it would adopt in design defect cases.5 4 Rather, the court held that
"there are those types of conditions which, whether caused by design or
manufacture, can never be said to involve a reasonable risk."55 For example,
the accelerator of a new automobile should not stick; such a condition is
"defective and unreasonably dangerous without the necessity of weighing
and balancing the various factors involved."5 6 Unfortunately, the court was
unable to define clearly which defects "can never be said to involve a
reasonable risk," thereby invoking strict liability as a matter of law. Thus,
Phipps stands only for the proposition that certain kinds of defects may be
considered so unexpected, so unacceptable, that liability will be imposed
Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1973); Wade, supra note 28); accord,
Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976).
51. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972).
52. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 494-96, 525 P.2d 1033,
1037-38 (1974). Even courts that have rejected parts of the Restatement have adopted
a weighing test. For example, in Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145,
154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975), the Washington Supreme Court held that strict liability
based on reasonable consumer expectations must involve a similar weighing of the
cost of the product, gravity of harm, and cost of minimizing the risk.
53. However, the court's holdings in Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272
Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974), and Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336
A.2d 118 (1975), suggest that a negligence test will be applied in second collision
design defects cases. See notes 13 to 21 and accompanying text supra.
54. Wade, supra note 26, at 17, quoted in Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md.
337, 351, 363 A.2d 953, 962-63 (1976).
55. 278 Md. at 345, 363 A.2d at 959.
56. Id. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959. Giving additional examples, the court observed
that the steering mechanism of a new automobile should not cause the car to swerve
off the road (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960)); the drive shaft of a new automobile should not separate when driven in a
normal manner (citing Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84,
75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969)); and the brakes of a new automobile should not suddenly fail
(citing Sharp v. Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968)). 278 Md. at 345,
363 A.2d at 959.
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without further analysis. Although the court's reluctance to establish a rule
applicable to all design defects is understandable, its failure to provide a
principled definition of which defects will be subject to strict liability poses
serious difficulties in determining the applicability of strict liability in future
design defect cases.
The Phipps court noted the availability of several defenses against a
strict products liability action. 57 A plaintiff cannot recover if he used an
otherwise safe product in an unsafe manner or was injured after altering a
previously safe product.5 8 Similarly, a manufacturer is not liable if the
plaintiff has disregarded warnings or instructions on a product which would
have been safe if used in accordance with those warnings59 Furthermore,
section 402A does not apply when injury has resulted from abnormal
handling or use of a product.60 Although the court did not define abnormal
use, the generally accepted test considers whether the plaintiffs use of the
product is one that the manufacturer intended, anticipated, or should have
anticipated. 61 In cases of abnormal use, the injury is regarded as caused by
that abnormal use rather than by a defect in the product.62 These defenses
may be raised in rebutting plaintiffs proof of a defective condition or in
determining whether the condition was the proximate cause of the injury.6 3
They can be justified on the policy ground that certain conduct by a
consumer makes him no longer a "helpless victim" of modern marketing
whose loss should be shifted to the supplier.64
These defenses should be distinguished from the defense that the
plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care in the use of the product - the
traditional defense of contributory negligence.65 The Court of Appeals did
not expressly mention contributory negligence, but it may be inferred from
the court's reference to "defenses [as] set forth and explained in the official
57. 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959-60 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
§ 402A, Comments g, h, j & n (1965)); see Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 41111. App. 3d 483,
490, 355 N.E.2d 145,152 (1976); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory
Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972).
58. 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 960 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, Comment g (1965)).59. 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 960 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, Comment j (1965)).
60. 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 960 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, Comment h (1965)); see Noel, supra note 57, at 95.
Labels abound in the area of defenses to strict liability, the two most
frequently used being "misuse" and "abnormal use." For examples of the rather free
use of such labels, see Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169 (Miss. 1974); Fields
v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 56-57 (Okla. 1976); Noel, supra note 57.
61. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309 (1970);
Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 56 (Okla. 1976); Noel, supra note
57, at 96.
62. Noel, supra note 57, at 104.
63. See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 431, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970).
64. McNichols, supra note 28, at 383.
65. See Menish v. Polinger Co., 277 Md. 553, 558-59, 356 A.2d 233, 236 (1976).
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comments following [section] 402A"66 that contributory negligence will not
be a defense to strict products liability actions in Maryland.67 Although
there is a split of authority, such a position would be in accord with the
majority of jurisdictions. 68 Contributory negligence, however, has frequently
been confused with causation and the defense of abnormal use.6 9 A
plaintiffs negligent actions may be relevant to the issue of causation. 70
Moreover, a plaintiffs actions may indicate that his use of the product was
not reasonably foreseeable - that it was an abnormal use. 1 However, if the
plaintiffs actions were not the sole cause of his injuries and his use of the
product was reasonably foreseeable, recovery should not be barred
regardless of how careless the actions were. 72 As a matter of policy, a
manufacturer should foresee careless uses of his products. 7 3 According to the
theory of strict liability, the consumer, even though acting wrongfully,
should not have to bear the burden of an injury that can be assumed by the
manufacturer as a cost of production. Furthermore, the doctrine of
contributory negligence is not congruous with the notion of consumer
reliance on marketplace representations.
7 4
Another available defense is assumption of the risk.75 Traditionally, the
doctrine required two elements: (1) general knowledge and appreciation of
the existence of a danger from which injury might reasonably be
66. 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 960.
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
68. See Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169, 175 (Miss. 1974); McNichols,
supra note 28, at 384-88. Compare Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261
N.E.2d 305 (1970) with Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461 (1973).
69. McNichols, supra note 28, at 393-99.
70. See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 431,261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970);
Noel, supra note 57, at 105. For an example of how causation can be confused with
abnormal use, see Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, by driving after drinking, had
abnormally used and misused her automobile, which contained a defective seat latch
that caused the seat to fall backward while she was driving. Id. at 1367. It appears,
however, that the court used the term abnormal use to indicate that plaintiffs
drinking was the sole cause of the accident. Id. at 1366.
71. See text accompanying notes 60 to 61 supra.
72. See Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169, 175 (Miss. 1974); Fields v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 57 (Okla. 1976).
73. Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169, 174-75 (Miss. 1974); Fields v.
Volkswagen of American, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 56-57 (Okla. 1976).
74. See Noel, supra note 57, at 108-09; cf. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d
418, 426, 261 N.E.2d 305, 310 (1970) (policy considerations that led to the adoption of
strict liability require that contributory negligence not be a defense).
75. 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 960 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, Comment n (1965)).
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anticipated,76 and (2) voluntary exposure to that danger. 7 Assumption of
the risk in strict products liability, however, has been held to differ
significantly from the traditional defense in two respects. First, the plaintiff
must have actually known and appreciated the particular risk of danger
created by the defect.7 8 Secondly, and more importantly, the decision to
assume voluntarily the risk after plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger
must have been unreasonable.7 9 The determination whether the plaintiff
knew and appreciated the risk created by the defect should, of course,
consider the plaintiffs age, intelligence, and experience.80 Whether the
plaintiffs decision was unreasonable depends upon the circumstances as
well as the relative probability and gravity of the risk incurred.8' As with
the other defenses, deciding which circumstances militate for or against
barring a plaintiffs recovery should be made with a view toward the
underlying policy reasons for the application of strict liability.
8 2
Application of section 402A has raised numerous definitional questions
aside from the meanings of "unreasonably dangerous" and "defective
condition." The definitions of "seller" and "product" have been particularly
troublesome.8 3 Bailors, lessors and licensors have raised the question by
claiming that they are not sellers and that they do not supply a product
within the meaning of section 402A.14 Housing developers, although sellers,
76. Full knowledge is measured either subjectively or by the objective test of
whether any person of normal intelligence must have known of the risk. Maryland
State Fair & Agr. Soc'y, Inc. v. Ridgely, 29 Md. App. 374, 380, 348 A.2d 44, 49 (1975).
However, under the rubric of contributory negligence a plaintiff may be barred from
recovery for voluntary exposure to a danger of which he should have been aware had
he exercised reasonable care. Menish v. Polinger Co., 277 Md. 553, 356 A.2d 233, 237
(1976). Thus, contributory negligence may yield a more favorable test for defendants.
77. Hooper v. Mougin, 263 Md. 630, 633, 284 A.2d 236, 238 (1971).
78. Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, -, 547 P.2d 132, 138 (1976).
79. Id. For a suggestion that the defense of assumption of risk may not be
available if the plaintiff exercised reasonable care in assuming the risk, see Maryland
State Fair & Agr. Soc'y, Inc. v. Ridgely, 29 Md. App. 374, 381, 348 A.2d 44, 50 (1975)
(dictum).
80. 274 Or. at - n.8, 547 P.2d at 139 n.8.
81. Id. at -, 547 P.2d at 140.
82. See notes 27 to 31 and accompanying text supra.
83. See generally, Note, What Is or Is Not a Product Within the Meaning of
Section 402A, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 625 (1974); Note, Strict Liability of the Bailor, Lessor
and Licensor, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 111 (1974).
84. See Note, What Is or Is Not a Product Within the Meaning of Section 402A, 57
MARQ. L. REV. 625, 631 (1974). See also Note, Strict Liability of the Bailor, Lessor and
Licensor, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 111, 132-33 (1974). Compare Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal.
3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970) (lessor strictly liable if he, as part of a
continuous course of business, leased a defective product) and Martin v. Ryder Truck
Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976) (bailment-lease of a motor vehicle, entered into in
the regular course of a truck rental business, governed by strict tort liability), and
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965)
("bailor-for-hire" strictly liable in tort) with Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 275
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have contended that homes are not products8 5 When a transaction involves
both a service and a product, such as a physician giving an innoculation or
a beautician using a lotion, the question arises whether strict liability
should be imposed because of the possible inhibitory effects on the rendering
of services.8 6 Sellers of used products have asserted that section 402A does
not contemplate the coverage of used goods.8 7 Finally, component part
manufacturers have argued that they cannot be held strictly liable under
section 402A because they have not sold a product for general use or
consumption.88 A related problem is whether a manufacturer who gives
F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 402 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968) (§ 402A not applicable to
lessors).
Although the mass lessor has been held subject to § 402A by a majority of the
jurisdictions that have decided the question, Maryland may not follow that position.
In Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 77, 285 A.2d 607, 611 (1972), the Court of Appeals held
§ 402A inapplicable to a lessor. But in Gardenvillage Realty Corp. v. Russo, 34 Md.
App. 25, 366 A.2d 101 (1976), the Court of Special Appeals implied that the Phipps
holding should extend to lessors.
Courts have split on whether licensors are liable under § 402A. Compare
Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970) (laundromat operator
strictly liable for defective washing machine) with Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz.
App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969) (hotel operator not strictly liable for defective bath mat).
Whereas mass lessors are held strictly liable because of the extent of their business,
the liability of licensors depends upon whether the nature of the licensor's business is
principally that of supplying the defective product. Garcia and Wagner have been
reconciled on this basis.
85. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (mass
developer liable).
86. See Note, What Is or Is Not a Product Within the Meaning of Section 402A, 57
MARQ. L. REv. 625, 635-43 (1974). The operative rule in this area appears to be that a
transaction involving a professional is not subject to § 402A, but commercial
transactions that essentially relate to the article in question are subject to § 402A.
Further, there is an implicit assumption that all nonprofessional transactions relate
to the product. The professional exemption is permitted on the theory that
professional services are so necessary to the general welfare that professionals should
not be burdened with the spectre of strict liability. Compare Newmark v. Gimbel's,
Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (dictum) (beautician strictly liable in tort) with
Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971) (hospital
is a professional service and not subject to strict liability in tort).
87. Compare Realmut:rv. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974)
(used car dealer strictly liable in tort for defective work, repairs, or replacements done
or made before sale) and Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973)
(recapped tire retailer strictly liable) and Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975) (retailer of defective used bricks strictly liable) with Rix v. Reeves, 23
Ariz. App. 243, 532 P.2d 185 (1975) (automobile salvage yard operator not strictly
liable) and Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975)
(used automobile dealer not strictly liable). The Hovenden case is noted at 8 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 196 (1976).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Caveat (3) & Comment g (1965);
McNichols, supra note 28, at 362 n.65. Compare Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) (refusing to extend strict
liability to manufacturer of airplane parts) with Burbage v. Boiler Eng. & Supply Co.,
Inc., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969) (allowing recovery in strict liability from maker
of boiler part).
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away a product is a seller within the meaning of section 402A. The language
of section 402A suggests that a sale is required,89 but courts have rejected
the argument that a sale is a prerequisite for the application of section 402A.
Employing a "stream of commerce" approach, courts have held that if a
manufacturer places a defective product in the marketplace knowing that it
will be used without inspection, he will be strictly liable if injury results 0
All these issues must be considered in light of the policy justifications for
strict liability. 9' Whether a party should be considered a seller of a product
within the meaning of section 402A depends upon which party to the
transaction is in the better position to either control the risk or to effect an
equitable distribution of losses that may occur. 92 This policy demands that a
technical sale requirement not be permitted to impose the burden of loss on
the consuming public.9 3
Several nondefinitional questions have arisen concerning the scope of
strict liability. An intriguing problem is whether the traditional negligence
requirement of foreseeability should be applicable to strict liability. A few
courts have contended that in strict liability actions all persons are
foreseeable. Under negligence principles liability is imposed for those
consequences which by reason of their foreseeability make an actor's
conduct unreasonable; strict liability, however, is imposed not because of
conduct, but because of the condition of a product. Since conduct is thus
irrelevant in strict liability, it has been held that foreseeability of the injured
party should be irrelevant as well.94 Other questions concern whether
section 402A should protect bystanders, 95 whether commercial loss is
compensable under the section, 96 and whether strict products liability
89. See note 7 supra.
90. See, e.g., Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258
N.E.2d 681 (1970).
91. See notes 27 to 31 and accompanying test supra.
92. See Note, What Is or Is Not a Product Within the Meaning of Section 402A, 57
MARQ. L. REV. 625, 627 (1974).
93. See Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 114, 258
N.E.2d 681, 686 (1970).
94. See Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 781 (N.D. Ind. 1969);
Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 110, 517 P.2d
406, 413 (1973); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893, 900
(1975) (Jones, C.J., with one judge concurring, five judges concurring in the result).
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Caveat (1) & Comment o (1965);
Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976); Codling v. Paglia, 32
N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973) (strict liability extends to
bystanders), noted in Codling v. Paglia - New York Stands By The Innocent
Bystander, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 390 (1973).
96. The actual wording of § 402A imposes liability for "physical harm."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1) (1965). The two leading cases in the
economic loss area are Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17 (1965) (Traynor, C.J.) (rejecting recovery under strict tort liability for
economic loss); and Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965) (permitting recovery for economic loss). A majority of jurisdictions appear to
have followed Seely. For an excellent discussion of authority and policy, see Morrow
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disclaimers are effective. 97 The answers to these questions must also be
reached in view of the purposes and policies of strict liability.9 Those
policies that were the primary impetus for the adoption of strict products
liability should determine how far the doctrine is extended beyond
traditional negligence recovery. 99
The area of strict products liability is so new1 °i that few questions are
well settled. The Phipps decision answered the essential question; the
Restatement's formulation of strict products liability is now recognized as a
cause of action in Maryland. Numerous issues await resolution in future
decisions.
2. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BOULEVARD RULE; EXPANDED
LIABILITY FOR THE FAVORED DRIVER - Kopitzki v. Boyd,' Taylor v.
Armiger.2 - The relative rights of drivers approaching intersections
controlled by stop or yield signs are governed in Maryland by the boulevard
rule. By statute, a driver entering a highway must yield the right-of-way to
any vehicle already traveling on the highway.3 The boulevard rule
v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alas. 1976) (refusing to allow economic loss
recovery).
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965); McNichols,
Who Says That Strict Tort Disclaimers Can Never Be Effective? The Courts Cannot
Agree, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 494 (1975).
98. See notes 27 to 31 and accompanying text supra.
99. See McNichols, supra note 28, at 352.
100. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962), is generally recognized as.the leading case expressly recognizing a strict
products liability in tort. The American Law Institute's formulation of strict liability
in § 402A was not officially adopted until 1965.
1. 277 Md. 491, 355 A.2d 471 (1976).
2. 277 Md. 638, 358 A.2d 883 (1976).
3. The boulevard rule extends generally to situations in which vehicles are
entering a thoroughfare. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 21-401 to 405 (1977)
(amending MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, §§ 11-401 to 405 (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1976)).
Section 21-403 provides:
Vehicle entering stop or yield intersection or through highway.
(a) Signs authorized. - Preferential right-of-way at an intersection may
be indicated by stop signs or yield signs placed in accordance with the
Maryland Vehicle Law.
(b) Stopping at entrance to through highway. - If the driver of a vehicle
approaches a through highway, the driver shall:
(1) Stop at the entrance to the through highway; and
(2) Yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle approaching on the
through highway.
(c) Stopping in obedience to stop signs. - If a stop sign is placed at the
entrance to an intersecting highway, even if the intersecting highway is not
part of a through highway, the driver of a vehicle approaching the
intersecting highway shall:
(1) Stop in obedience to the stop signs; and
(2) Yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle approaching on the
intersecting highway.
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encourages compliance with this statutory rule by requiring a trial court to
find that the driver whose duty it was to stop or yield the right-of-way is
negligent as a matter of law in any litigation arising from an accident at a
controlled intersection.' The stated policy consideration for this rule is easily
understood: its purpose is "to accelerate the flow of traffic over through
highways by permitting travellers thereon to proceed within lawful speed
limits without interruption." As a further aid to this policy, the Maryland
courts have generally held that the relative rights of drivers are not to
depend upon "nice" calculations of speed, time, and distance.6 Without this
guarantee, the protection afforded a vehicle already traveling on the
highway might be diminished; its driver might feel obligated to slow down
to approach every intersection carefully. 7 A special terminology has
(d) Approaching intersection marked by yield sign. - If a "yield" sign
facing the driver of a vehicle is placed on the approach to an intersection, the
driver shall:
(1) Approach the intersection with caution;
(2) Yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle approaching on the other
highway; and
(3) If necessary, stop in order to yield this right-of-way.
The present text of the boulevard rule was enacted in 1977. The changes in
language from the previous version were not intended to be substantive in nature. See
MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-401 to 405 (1977) (Revisor's Notes).
A recent opinion of the Court of Appeals, Covington v. Gernert, 280 Md. 322,
373 A.2d 624 (1977), indicates that § 1-175 (current version at MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 21-101(o) (1977)), which defines right-of-way, may also affect application of the
boulevard rule. Section 1-175 defines right-of-way as "the right of one vehicle. . . to
proceed in a lawful manner on a highway in preference to another . . .vehicle."
Covington held the boulevard rule inapplicable where a vehicle was traveling the
wrong way on a one-way street; the driver of that vehicle did not enjoy the right-of-
way because he was not proceeding lawfully. Applying this analysis, it has
subsequently been held that a driver proceeding on the wrong side of the road does
not enjoy the right-of-way. Gazvoda v. McCaslin, 36 Md. App. 604, 375 A.2d 570
(1977).
4. See, e.g., Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218, 233-35, 46 A.2d 349, 356-57
(1946); Madge v. Fabrizio, 179 Md. 517, 520, 20 A.2d 172, 174 (1941).
It should be noted that the boulevard rule is not mandated by the statute from
which it is derived. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-403 (1977) (amending MD. ANN.
-CODE art. 661/2, § 11-403 (1970)). Rather, the judiciary has interpreted the statute so as
to establish a set of presumptions that determine civil liability - in effect,
determining standards of conduct by implying remedies from the statute. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965).
The position of the Court of Appeals has been that "[d]ecisions of this Court
construing the statute become part of the statute and continue to be so unless and
until changed by statute." Sonnenburg v. Monumental Motor Tours, Inc., 198 Md. 227,
233, 81 A.2d 617, 620 (1951).
5. Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 125, 8 A.2d 888, 892 (1939) (Offutt, J.).
Greenfeld, one of the oldest of the boulevard rule cases, has been generally cited by
subsequent cases for this proposition.
6. Id. at 126, 8 A.2d at 893.
7. "If the duty of stopping and of yielding right of way is positive and inflexible,
the inhibited traveller may know that he violates it at his risk, while the traveller on
the favored highway may know that he may safely exercise the privilege of
uninterrupted travel thereon, which the statute gives." Id. at 126, 8 A.2d at 892-93.
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developed in boulevard rule cases. The driver on the through street, the
"boulevard,"8 is known as the "favored" driver, while the driver entering the
boulevard is termed the "unfavored" driver. Similarly, the vehicles 9 are
described as either "favored" or "unfavored" vehicles.
The operation of the boulevard rule may produce harsh results because
the favored driver enjoys a virtual immunity against actions brought by the
unfavored driver. 0 The unfavored driver is deemed contributorily negligent
as a matter of law;" only the doctrine of last clear chance, which is applied
8. See Webb, Bothersome Boulevards, 26 MD. L. REV. 111, 115 (1966): "The test,
therefore, of when a 'boulevard' exists is entirely dependent on whether either driver
on intersecting roads (public or private) is required to stop and yield [the] right of way
to the other."
9. "The rule applies to more than four-wheeled motor vehicles. It has been
applied to motorcycles, bicycles, a horse and wagon and a tractor-drawn farm rig."
Webb, supra note 8, at 112 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Simco Sales Serv. v.
Schweigman, 237 Md. 180, 205 A.2d 245 (1964) (motorcycle); Kane v. Williams, 229 Md.
59, 181 A.2d 651 (1962) (bicycle); Fowler v. DeFontes, 211 Md. 568, 128 A.2d 395 (1957)
(horse and wagon); Shriner v. Mullhausen, 210 Md. 104, 122 A.2d 570 (1956) (tractor-
drawn farm rig).
10. If an accident is caused by a breach of the unfavored driver's duty, it does not
matter that the favored and unfavored vehicles do not collide. Dunnill v. Bloomberg,
228 Md. 230, 235, 179 A.2d 371, 374 (1962); accord, Thompson v. Terry, 245 Md. 480,
226 A.2d 540 (1967).
A particularly harsh result following from strict adherence to the rule
occurred in Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426, 330 A.2d 196 (1974). The unfavored
vehicle was struck by a speeding favored vehicle that was traveling in a rural area
without headlights on a clear but moonless night. Although the unfavored vehicle
apparently proceeded with great care, the unfavored driver did not see the favored
vehicle until shortly before the collision. In applying the boulevard rule, the Court of
Appeals held that the unfavored driver, who was paralyzed from the neck down as a
result of the accident, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and, therefore,
could not recover from the driver of the favored vehicle. See also Johnson v. Dortch,
27 Md. App. 605, 342 A.2d 326 (1975) (unfavored driver barred from recovery by virtue
of the boulevard rule despite evidence that favored driver: 1) was intoxicated; 2) was
exceeding the speed laws; 3) was driving at night without headlights; and 4) was
driving on the wrong side of the road).
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals casts doubt on the Hensel analysis.
In Covington v. Gernert, 280 Md. 322, 373 A.2d 624 (1977), the court denied the
benefits of the boulevard rule to a driver who was proceeding the wrong way on a one-
way street. In view of art. 661/2, § 1-175 (current version at MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 21-101(o) (1977) (stylistic changes only)), which defines right-of-way as the right to
proceed in a lawful manner, see note 3 supra, the court determined that a driver who
disregarded traffic directions did not possess the right-of-way and hence could not
qualify as a favored driver. Driving at night without headlights, the conduct alleged
in Hensel, is arguably the sort of illegal action that might deprive a driver of the
right-of-way. Johnson is equally vulnerable to the Covington analysis. See Gazvoda v.
McCaslin, 36 Md. App. 604, 375 A.2d 570 (1977).
11. See, e.g., Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 245, 297 A.2d 235, 239 (1972). In
Creaser the Court of Appeals reversed a decision of the Court of Special Appeals that
concluded that an unfavored driver was not always contributorily negligent as a
matter of law when involved in an accident with a favored driver at a boulevard
intersection. Creaser indicates the court's disinclination to allow exceptions to the
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infrequently, can avoid this result.' 2 Similarly, the unfavored driver as
defendant is considered negligent as a matter of law; he will always be liable
unless the issue of the favored driver's contributory negligence is properly
submitted to the jury.' 3 The issue of the favored driver's negligence may also
arise in actions brought by passengers of the favored or unfavored driver.'
4
In such cases, the jury must determine not only that the favored driver was
negligent, but that the accident could have been avoided by the favored
driver's exercise of due care. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has consistently
insisted that the evidence submitted be such that the jury can assess the
favored driver's conduct without resort to the nice calculations of speed,
time, and distance.15
boulevard rule; the unfavored driver will be deemed negligent whenever the boulevard
rule applies.
12. Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218, 235, 46 A.2d 349, 357 (1946). The last clear
chance doctrine was first applied in a Maryland boulevard rule case in Greenfeld v.
Hook, 177 Md. 116, 133-34, 8 A.2d 888, 896 (1939). Last clear chance appears only
rarely in boulevard rule cases because the action of the unfavored driver, entering the
intersection and proceeding to a position of danger, has been held to constitute
continuing negligence. The doctrine of last clear chance requires that the favored
driver have an opportunity to avoid the accident in the absence of any continuing
negligence by the unfavored driver. Therefore, when the unfavored driver's negligence
is continuous, he is contributorily negligent as a matter of law and cannot rely on the
doctrine. See Fowler v. DeFontes, 211 Md. 568,128 A.2d 395 (1957); Oddis v. Greene, 11
Md. App. 153, 158-59, 273 A.2d 232, 236 (1971). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 66 (4th ed. 1971). Since the concept of continuing negligence was not
considered by the court in Greenfeld, perhaps the last clear chance doctrine should not
have been applied to the facts of that case. The unfavored driver in Greenfeld was
struck while turning onto a boulevard. The driver's negligence clearly continued
throughout her passage across the boulevard, making her contributorily negligent as
a matter of law in a suit against the favored driver.
13. Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 245, 297 A.2d 235, 239 (1972). See cases cited in
note 16 infra.
14. In a suit against the favored driver by a passenger in either vehicle, the
boulevard rule is applied no differently than when both parties are motorists. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Terry, 245 Md. 480, 487, 226 A.2d 540, 544 (1967) (passenger in favored
vehicle); Tippett v. Quade, 19 Md. App. 49, 59, 309 A.2d 481, 488 (1973) (passenger in
unfavored vehicle). Since a passenger is not ordinarily contributorily negligent, he is
not always barred from recovery against a favored driver. However, the passenger, as
plaintiff, must satisfy the same standard of proof as an unfavored driver in order to
have the issue of the favored driver's negligence submitted to the jury.
15. See, e.g., Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 495-96, 204 A.2d 526, 530 (1964); Dunnill
v. Bloomberg, 228 Md. 230, 236, 179 A.2d 371, 374 (1962); Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24,
31, 169 A.2d 661, 663 (1961); Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1, 11, 81 A.2d 47, 52 (1951).
Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 126, 8 A.2d 888, 893 (1939), elaborates the
policy behind this proscription against nice calculations:
If, however, the relative rights of travellers on the two types of highway
are held to depend upon nice calculations of speed, time, and distance, the rule
would encourage recklessness and the privilege of uninterrupted travel would
mean little more than the privilege of having a jury guess in the event of a
collision whose guess was wrong. If the traveller on a stop street were required
to slow down and bring-his car into control at every intersection there would
be no perceptible difference between such a street and any other street on
which traffic is controlled by the general rules of the road.
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Despite the numerous instances of boulevard rule cases, the issue of the
favored driver's negligence has seldom been submitted to the jury;
consequently, when such a case occurs, boulevard rule terminology labels it
a "rare" case. 16 Although evidence of any negligence of the favored driver,
not dependent on nice calculations, can be submitted to the jury, in the rare
cases decided prior to the 1975 Term of the Court of Appeals, the court's
language invariably focused on evidence of the favored driver's inattention,
i.e., his failure to keep a proper lookout. In the two earliest rare cases,'7 there
was positive evidence of inattention showing that the favored driver had
failed to maintain a proper lookout. In Sun Cab Co. v. Hall,'5 a passenger in
a taxicab, the favored vehicle, was permitted to submit to the jury positive
evidence of the taxicab driver's inattention. The court held that because the
driver had turned his head from the road to talk to another passenger, he
was not excused from liability to the plaintiff when he failed to observe an
impending collision. 19 Harper v..Higgs2O involved similar circumstances. A
passenger in an unfavored vehicle that had stalled in an intersection was
injured in a collision with a favored vehicle. The passenger recovered from
the favored driver after presenting evidence that the favored driver had been
talking to a passenger in her car and, therefore, had failed to see the
unfavored vehicle stalled in the intersection ahead.
In each of the next two rare cases, 21 the favored vehicle struck a tractor-
trailer as the latter turned onto a boulevard. Proof of positive inattention
was not required; instead, the question submitted to the jury was whether
the favored driver must have been inattentive, because a large, slow-moving
vehicle like a tractor-trailer would have been clearly visible to a driver
maintaining a proper lookout. These cases have been characterized as
16. Prior to the September Term, 1975, the Court of Appeals had decided eight
rare cases: Sun Cab Co. v. Hall, 199 Md. 461, 86 A.2d 914 (1952); Harper v. Higgs, 225
Md. 24, 169 A.2d 661 (1961); Green v. Zile, 225 Md. 339, 170 A.2d 753 (1961); Brown v.
Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 204 A.2d 526 (1964); Racine v. Wheeler, 245 Md. 139, 225 A.2d 444
(1967); Cornias v. Bradley, 254 Md. 479, 255 A.2d 431 (1969). Also considered rare
cases are Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 8 A.2d 888 (1939), which was submitted to
the jury on the issue of last clear chance, see note 12 supra, and Pinchbeck v.
Baltimore Tank Lines, Inc., 258 Md. 211, 265 A.2d 238 (1970), in which the evidence of
the favored driver's negligence was uncontroverted and so extreme that the trial judge
directed a verdict for the defendant unfavored driver, see note 23 infra. See also Carter
v. Correa, 28 Md. App. 397, 346 A.2d 481 (1975).
The term "rare," as used in the rare boulevard rule cases, denotes only that
few cases exist in which the favored driver's negligence may properly be submitted to
the jury. The reason for so few cases is probably that favored drivers who are grossly
negligent seldom sue the unfavored driver. For an example of such a case, see
Pinchbeck, discussed supra.
17. Although Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 8 A.2d 888 (1939), is generally
considered the first rare case, its outcome is questionable in view of the concept of
continuing negligence. See note 12 supra.
18. 199 Md. 461, 86 A.2d 914 (1952).
19. Id. at 467, 86 A.2d at 917.
20. 225 Md. 24, 169 A.2d 661 (1961).
21. Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 204 A.2d 526 (1964); Green v. Zile, 225 Md. 339,
170 A.2d 753 (1961).
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instances involving deductive, rather than positive, evidence of inattention
since the jury was allowed to deduce the existence of the favored driver's
inattention from the circumstances of the collision. 22 Deductive inattention
was the basis for finding contributory negligence in subsequent rare cases
as well.
23
The Court of Appeals decided a significant rare case, Kopitzki v. Boyd,
24
in the September Term, 1975. The trial judge in Kopitzki had allowed the
jury to consider evidence of the favored driver's negligence and to then
determine whether that negligence had been a proximate cause of the
collision. In keeping with prior cases, the Court of Appeals discussed the
favored driver's negligence in terms of inattention. Nevertheless, the facts of
the case suggest that evidence of other forms of negligence, including
excessive speed, determined the outcome of the decision. The case thus
raised questions concerning the standard to be applied in deciding whether
to submit the issue of the favored driver's negligence to the jury. These
questions have been partially resolved by the court's recent decision in Dean
v. Redmiles,25 which appears to have abandoned the tendency to describe
the favored driver's negligence solely in terms of inattention, but uncertain-
ties remain with regard to the treatment of future rare cases.
Wilma Boyd was a passenger in an automobile travelling north on a
divided four lane highway. The vehicle, driven by defendant Frederick
Kopitzki,26 collided with a van that had entered the boulevard from a road
22. Webb, supra note 8, at 123.
23. The favored driver's negligence was held properly submitted to a jury in
Racine v. Wheeler, 245 Md. 139, 225 A.2d 444 (1967). The favored vehicle struck the
rear end of an unfavored vehicle that had stopped in a median strip opening but had
extended a few inches into the fast lane of traffic on the boulevard. In concluding that
the favored driver could have avoided the collision by the exercise of due care, the
court referred to evidence that the favored driver had a clear view of the intersection
for six hundred feet, that his speed was thirty-five to forty miles per hour (in a forty
mile per hour zone), and that he was following a car that safely avoided the unfavored
vehicle. Id. at 146, 225 A.2d at 448. Curiously, the Court of Appeals never identified
the negligent acts of the favored driver; it merely stated that there was adequate
evidence from which the jury could find the favored driver contributorily negligent.
In Pinchbeck v. Baltimore Tank Lines, Inc., 258 Md. 211, 265 A.2d 238 (1970),
the Court of Appeals affirmed a directed verdict against the favored driver-plaintiff in
circumstances where there was no evidence to contradict the inference that he was
negligent and it was clear that his negligence had been a proximate cause of the
accident. The court noted that the favored driver had been drinking, had been
traveling in excess of the legal speed, and had ignored signs reducing the speed limit.
The collision occurred as the unfavored vehicle, a fifty-five foot tractor-trailer
displaying a number of lights and large reflectors, was turning onto the boulevard at
a well illuminated intersection. Given these facts, the court concluded that the favored
driver must have been negligent; the court supported this conclusion with the
observation that to avoid striking the trailer, the favored driver had but to turn onto
the grassy median. Id. at 216, 265 A.2d at 241.
24. 277 Md. 491, 355 A.2d 471 (1976).
25. 280 Md. 137, 374 A.2d 329 (1977). See text accompanying notes 58 to 68 infra.
26. Boyd owned the vehicle Kopitzki was driving. Questions of Kopitzki's agency
and Boyd's control, although raised below, were not pursued on appeal. 277 Md. at 493
n.1, 355 A.2d at 472 n.1. If any agency relationship had existed, Kopitzki's negligence
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controlled by a stop sign. The driver of the van intended to cross the
northbound lanes of the highway so that he could proceed through the
median and then south on the boulevard.2 7 Approximately two hundred feet
before reaching the site of the collision, Kopitzki, driving in the right-hand
(outside) lane, passed a vehicle traveling in the left-hand (inside) lane. John
Doyle, the driver of this vehicle and a witness to the accident, testified that
he was exceeding the posted fifty mile per hour speed limit when Kopitzki
passed him at an estimated seventy to ninety miles per hour.28
Boyd brought suit against both Kopitzki and the driver of the van to
recover for personal injuries suffered in the accident, alleging that both
drivers had been negligent. Kopitzki was granted a directed verdict on a
cross-claim made by the van's driver; the negligence of the unfavored driver
operated to bar his claim as a matter of law. 29 However, since Boyd, a
passenger, was not similarly barred,30 Kopitzki's motion for a directed
verdict against her was denied. After the case was submitted to the jury,
verdicts against both drivers were returned in favor of Boyd.31 In affirming
the verdict for Boyd against Kopitzki, Judge Singley, writing for a majority
of the Court of Appeals, declared this to be one of the rare cases in which the
jury was properly allowed to determine whether the negligence of the
favored driver was a proximate cause of the collision.32
The majority's determination that evidence of the favored driver's
negligence was properly submitted to the jury was based upon two factors:
Kopitzki's excessive speed and Doyle's testimony. Although the majority
acknowledged that the excessive speed of a favored driver would not
ordinarily be considered a contributing cause of an accident, 33 consideration
of Kopitzki's excessive speed was nevertheless essential to its analysis.
Since testimony indicated that Kopitzki was driving at seventy to ninety
could have been imputed to Boyd in the latter's suit against the driver of the van. She
would then have been considered contributorily negligent and would therefore have
been unsuccessful in litigation against the van's driver. In the action between
Kopitzki and Boyd, the imputed negligence concept was not applicable. Record at
53-54; Brief for Petitioner at E-35-36; see Williams v. Knapp, 248 Md. 506, 237 A.2d
450 (1968).
27. Kopitzki's car was the favored vehicle and the van was the unfavored vehicle.
See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
28. 277 Md. at 493, 355 A.2d at 472.
29. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
30. Since Kopitzki's negligence was not imputed to Boyd, her action against the
driver of the van was successful. See note 4 supra. The verdict in her favor against the
van's driver was not appealed. 277 Md. at 494 n.2, 355 A.2d at 473 n.2.
31. 277 Md. at 494, 355 A.2d at 473.
32. 277 Md. at 496-97, 355 A.2d at 474. Chief Judge Murphy dissented from the
majority opinion. See notes 40 to 44 and accompanying text infra. Certiorari was
granted to the Court of Special Appeals before disposition in that court. 277 Md. at
492, 355 A.2d at 471. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-201 (Cum. Supp.
1976), which authorizes the grant of certiorari by the Court of Appeals before decision
or hearing by the Court of Special Appeals.
33. 277 Md. at 495, 355 A.2d at 474. See, e.g., Thompson v. Terry, 245 Md. 480, 487,
226 A.2d 540, 544 (1967); Zeamer v. Reeves, 225 Md. 526, 533, 171 A.2d 488, 492 (1961);
Sun Cab Co. v. Faulkner, 163 Md. 477, 479, 163 A. 194, 194-95 (1932).
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miles per hour, almost twice the posted limit,34 the court concluded that this
case was "not typical of the cases. . . involving 'nice [calculations] of speed,
time and distance . . . . ,-3 The court also relied upon the testimony of the
witness Doyle, noting that even though both he and Kopitzki had been
proceeding in excess of the speed limit, Doyle easily avoided the van.36
Although the court did not articulate the next step in its reasoning, it
intimated that Kopitzki had the same opportunity to avoid the accident as
Doyle. Because Kopitzki was unable to avoid the collision with the
unfavored vehicle, the court determined that "the jury could have found that
it was Kopitzki's inattention that was a proximate cause of the accident. '37
Thus, the court apparently held Kopitzki to a standard of -attentiveness
derived from Doyle's conduct.38 However, it does not necessarily follow that
Doyle was attentive merely because he was able to avoid the collision - it is
not clear how he escaped harm.39 Holding Kopitzki to a standard of
attentiveness set by Doyle is, therefore, questionable.
34. 277 Md. at 497, 355 A.2d at 474. The posted speed limit was either forty-five or
fifty miles per hour. Id. at 493-94, 355 A.2d at 473.
35. 277 Md. at 497, 355 A.2d at 474 (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 497, 355 A.2d at 474-75.
37. Id. at 497, 355 A.2d at 474 (emphasis added).
38. Assessing the driver's conduct by reference to another driver's conduct in the
same series of events finds a striking parallel in Yellow Cab Co. v. Bonds, 245 Md. 86,
225 A.2d 41 (1966). A taxicab was second in a line of several moving vehicles when a
car pulled out in front of the first vehicle, forcing it to decelerate. The taxicab could
not brake in time to avoid a collision with the lead car. Noting that all other drivers in
the line of traffic were able to avoid the collision, the court held it proper to allow the
jury to consider whether the taxicab driver's negligence, in concurrence with that of
the motorist who had pulled into the boulevard, was a proximate cause of the
collision. The court, in effect, held the driver to a standard of attentiveness measured
by the other drivers; their success in avoiding a collision indicated that he had failed
to maintain a proper distance between himself and the vehicle ahead of him.
Similarly, the ability of one boulevard driver to avoid an unfavored vehicle
stopped in a median was cited as a factor in holding that the issue of the negligence of
another boulevard driver, following closely behind the first, was properly submitted to
the jury. See Racine v. Wheeler, 245 Md. 139, 225 A.2d 444 (1967).
39. The facts of Kopitzki discussed in the text are taken from the opinion of the
Court of Appeals. Examination of the trial record discloses that Doyle testified he was
about twice as far from the intersection as Kopitzki when the van began to pull out. If
so, it is hardly surprising that he had a better opportunity to stop before reaching the
intersection. Record at 30 & 33-34; Brief for Petitioner at E-20 & E-22.
Reliance on another driver's avoidance of a collision to establish a standard
of care for the reasonably prudent driver may allow a court to submit evidence of a
favored driver's negligence to a jury, although the calculations of speed, time, and
distance may be "nice." When two vehicles have collided with no other drivers present
it may be difficult to show, without resorting to nice calculations, that a favored
driver exercising due care could have avoided the collision. The evidence in such a
case would be based entirely on abstract mathematical calculations. However, if
another favored driver, traveling alongside or just ahead of the driver who was
involved in a boulevard collision, was able to avoid the collision, his success may be
evidence that the first driver also could have avoided the collision had he been
exercising due care. Although this latter situation may require calculations quite
similar to those made where a second favored driver is not present, the introduction of
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In a strongly worded dissent, Chief Judge Murphy disputed the
majority's findings that there was evidence of inattention and that Kopitzki
could have avoided the collision. 40 He noted that Doyle had testified at trial
that "once [the van] pulled out onto the highway, 'an accident was
inevitable' because 'they couldn't get out of each others' way.' ",41 Given this
testimony, Judge Murphy concluded that the only possible explanation for
the collision was not Kopitzki's inattention but his high rate of speed prior
to the time that the van entered the boulevard.42 Previous boulevard rule
decisions, however, had established that the issue of the favored driver's
speed should not ordinarily be submitted to the jury as evidence of
negligence constituting a proximate cause of the collision. 43 Chief Judge
Murphy therefore concluded that "the only way a jury could have found that
Kopitzki's excessive speed constituted a concurring cause of the accident
was to indulge in the [forbidden] 'nice calculations of time, speed and
distance .... ' "44
The majority, while not specifically addressing the dissent's criticism,
emphasized that not all calculations are "nice" and that the prohibition on
making calculations pertains only to those that are close, or "hair-splitting."
The court did not actually rule that Kopitzki's speed was the factor that
prevented him from avoiding the collision, but it relied on the excessive
nature of his speed to demonstrate that the case was not typical of those
involving nice calculations. 45 The court thus held it permissible for the jury
evidence showing that another driver avoided the collision may convince a court that
the calculations are no longer too "nice." Racine v. Wheeler, 245 Md. 139, 146, 225
A.2d 444, 448 (1967), and perhaps Dean v. Redmiles, 280 Md. 137, 374 A.2d 329 (1977),
see text at page 226 infra, illustrate the possible influence of this proposition.
40. 277 Md. at 501, 355 A.2d at 477.
41. Id.
42. This position is implicit in the entire dissenting opinion. It is particularly
suggested by the following passage: "While there was evidence that Kopitzki was
speeding and had one alcoholic drink shortly prior to the accident, there was no
evidence that he was inattentive to his driving or failed to maintain a proper lookout.
There was no evidence to indicate that Kopitzki could have avoided the collision." 277
Md. at 501, 355 A.2d at 477.
43. To support this proposition, the dissenting opinion quoted from Sun Cab Co.
v. Faulkner, 163 Md. 477, 479, 163 A. 194, 194 (1932): "If negligence is found in the rate
of speed at which the [favored vehicle] was being driven, that fact alone does not, of
course, answer the question of liability." See cases cited in note 33 supra.
44. 277 Md. at 501, 355 A.2d at 477.
45. Id. at 497, 355 A.2d at 474-75. The court relied on Judge Northrop's decision
in Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle Co., 206 F. Supp. 120 (D. Md. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963), for the proposition:
The prohibition against making nice calculations does not prevent a jury and
judge from making all calculations of every nature; the prohibition pertains
only to those close, hair-splitting calculations which cannot be expected of a
reasonably prudent favored driver when immediately confronted by an
intrusion upon his right of way. Where the times and distances are great, the
calculations are no longer "nice" and the prohibition is inapplicable.
Id. at 127 (emphasis in original). Goosman, however, is of questionable precedential
value. In purporting to apply Maryland law on the boulevard rule, the question of the
unfavored driver's primary negligence was submitted to the jury. Yet this result is not
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to find a nexus between Kopitzki's excessive speed and Doyle's avoidance of
the accident and Kopitzki's possible inattention.
The majority's analysis in Kopitzki was not wholly inconsistent with
that used in prior rare cases. In those cases, the evidence of the favored
driver's negligence held properly submitted to the jury consistently
suggested that the favored driver had been inattentive - that is, he had
failed to keep a proper lookout. 46 Nevertheless, although the holdings in the
rare cases were expressly grounded on the existence of either positive or
deductive inattention, the rule stated by the court to be the general rule
focused not on inattention, but on whether the favored driver had exercised
due care at the time of the accident. Perhaps the most widely followed
version of this general standard appeared in Shedlock v. Marshall:47
"[Wihen [the unfavored driver] is made a defendant in an action for
damages resulting from the collision, he can always show that the other
party was also guilty of negligence contributing to the accident, and if he
succeeds in this, no verdict can be obtained against him." 48 Subsequent rare
possible under the Court of Appeals' application of the rule. See text accompanying
note 11 supra; Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 497, 204 A.2d 526, 531 (1964): "[T]o the
extent, if any, that the opinion herein conflicts [with Goosman], we respectfully
decline to follow it." This passage in Goosman might be read, however, to address the
issue whether the favored driver's negligence was a concurrent proximate cause of the
accident. It would then be proper authority for the majority's holding in Kopitzki.
46. Excluding Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 8 A.2d 888 (1939), see notes 12 & 16
supra, and Cornias v. Bradley, 254 Md. 479, 255 A.2d 431 (1969), see note 16 supra, six
rare cases were decided prior to the 1975 Term. Two cases presented positive evidence
of the favored driver's inattention. Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 36, 169 A.2d 661, 666
(1961) ("completely inattentive"); Sun Cab Co. v. Hall, 199 Md. 461, 467, 86 A.2d 914,
917 (1952) ("did not look"). See text accompanying notes 17 to 20 supra. In three of the
other four cases, evidence from which the jury could deduce that the favored driver
must have been inattentive was held properly submitted. In Green v. Zile, 225 Md.
339, 347, 170 A.2d 753, 757 (1961), the court concluded that the issue whether the
favored driver's "failure to observe" the unfavored tractor-trailer was a proximate
cause of the accident had been properly submitted to the jury. See notes 21 to 23 and
accompanying text supra. Similarly, in Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 496-97, 204 A.2d
526, 530 (1961), the jury was allowed to consider whether the favored driver had kept a
"proper lookout." See notes 21 & 22 and accompanying text supra. In Racine v.
Wheeler, 245 Md. 139, 146, 225 A.2d 444, 448 (1967), there was no evidence that the
favored driver was speeding; instead, the evidence from which the court allowed the
jury to infer the favored driver's negligence focused on the distance from which the
unfavored vehicle could have been perceived and the ease with which the favored
driver could have avoided the collision. The court did not express the obvious
inference that the favored driver had not been attentive to the road ahead. See note 23
supra.
In the last of the rare cases, a verdict was directed against the favored driver
on the issue of contributory negligence: there was evidence from which it could be
inferred that the favored driver should have been able to see the unfavored tractor-
trailer and avoid the collision. Pinchbeck v. Baltimore Tank Lines, Inc., 258 Md. 211,
216, 265 A.2d 238, 241 (1970). See note 23 supra.
47. 186 Md. 218, 46 A.2d 349 (1946).
48. Id. at 235, 46 A.2d at 357 (emphasis added) (in the original text "negligence"
was printed as "negligent" - the correction made herein is consonant with
quotations of this passage appearing in later cases).
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cases, though adopting this standard, 49 always discussed the favored
driver's negligence in terms of inattention. ° Indeed, judicial treatment of the
rare cases at times appeared to indicate that attentiveness was itself the
standard of conduct that the favored driver had to satisfy, rather than
inattention representing merely one variety of negligence.51
The focus on inattention in the rare cases can be easily explained.
Where speed only slightly in excess of the posted limit is involved,
inattention of the favored driver, as a form of negligence, can be more easily
shown to be a proximate cause of an accident than can other types of
negligence because there is no need to rely on nice calculations. The early
cases illustrate this concept: although proof of any negligence of the favored
driver as being a concurrent cause of the accident could be submitted to the
jury, pre-Kopitzki courts generally excluded evidence of the favored driver's
speed. 52 This position reflected a fear that proof of speed as contributory
Language to the same effect appears in Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116,
130-31, 8 A.2d 888, 895 (1939): "[W]here a traveller on a favored highway knows or
should know that his progress will endanger a traveller entering the same from a
restricted highway, he must exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring him."
49. See, e.g., Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 245, 297 A.2d 235, 239 (1972); Brown
v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 495, 204 A.2d 526, 529 (1964); Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 32-33,
169 A.2d 661, 664 (1961).
50. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. But see Carter v. Correa, 28 Md.
App. 397, 404, 346 A.2d 481, 486 (1975) (Eldridge, J., specially assigned).
51. See, e.g., Kopitzki v. Boyd, 277 Md. 491, 501, 355 A.2d 471, 477 (1976) (Murphy,
C.J., dissenting) ("I, therefore, see no distinction between this case and our prior
decisions where speeding or drinking or both were held to be insufficient, without
positive evidence of inattention, to establish favored driver liability."); Redmiles v.
Muller, 29 Md. App. 304, 311, 348 A.2d 291, 295 (1975), rev'd sub nom. Dean v.
Redmiles, 280 Md. 137, 374 A.2d 329 (1977) ("[I]n order to find that the favored driver
was negligent there must be positive evidence of inattention or lack of due care
."). See generally note 46 supra.
52. See text accompanying note 15 supra. Cases excluding consideration of the
excessive rate of speed of the favored vehicle as a proximate cause of the accident
generally involved instances of city driving where there was a relatively low speed
limit and where the speed of the favored vehicle, in absolute terms, was not greatly
above the posted limit. See Dunnill v. Bloomberg, 228 Md. 230, 232, 179 A.2d 371, 372
(1962) (speed limit thirty miles per hour, speed of the favored driver twenty-five to
thirty-seven miles per hour); Sun Cab Co. v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354, 358-59,121 A.2d 188,
190 (1956) (speed limit apparently twenty-five miles per hour, inference from skid
marks that the favored vehicle was travelling faster); Belle Island Cab Co. v. Pruitt,
187 Md. 174, 176, 180, 49 A.2d 537, 537, 539 (1946) (speed limit not stated in opinion;
however, the favored driver's speed of twenty to twenty-five miles per hour was not
considered excessive); Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77, 81, 83, 188 A. 31, 33, 34 (1936)
(speed limit not stated in opinion; favored driver proceeding at from twenty to thirty-
five miles per hour; the court noted that even if speed were unlawful, no proximate
cause was demonstrated).
With the advent of speed limits of fifty and fifty-five miles per hour and the
capacity of vehicles to travel at even higher speeds, it is possible to demonstrate,
without using nice calculations, that a favored driver's excessive speed proximately
caused a boulevard collision. For example, it is clear that a favored driver's
proceeding one hundred miles per hour in a fifty mile per hour zone could be easily
demonstrated to be a contributing cause without resort to nice calculations. See
Kopitzki v. Boyd, 277 Md. 491, 493-94, 355 A.2d 471, 472-73 (1976) (speed limit was
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negligence might require the jury to indulge in the proscribed nice
calculations.5 3 In contrast, if the evidence suggested that the favored driver
was not keeping a proper lookout, such evidence, especially positive evidence
of inattention, would not ordinarily require the jury to make nice
calculations in order to find the favored driver's negligence a proximate
cause of the accident. Other situations where proof of the favored driver's
negligence would clearly not require a nice calculation, or perhaps any
calculations at all, might include driving on the wrong side of the road or
driving without headlights at night.5 4
The Kopitzki majority avoided a holding that would have allowed
evidence of the favored driver's negligence, other than inattention, to be
submitted to the jury. But despite the majority's holding, which Judge
Singley explicitly based on evidence of Kopitzki's possible inattention, the
court devoted considerable discussion to evidence of other forms of
negligence.55 Crucial to its examination of the evidence was the majority's
acceptance of the notion that not all calculations regarding speed are nice;
this discussion suggests that the holding was based on the conclusion that
the excessive nature of Kopitzki's speed, rather than any type of inattention,
was a proximate cause of the accident. Indeed, the actual holding of the
majority might be read merely to indicate that the jury could have found
Kopitzki inattentive by, in effect, inferring the possibility of inattention
from the other evidence of negligence - Kopitzki's excessive speed and the
forty-five or fifty miles per hour, the favored driver, proceeding at from seventy to
ninety miles per hour, was found contributorily negligent, although speed was not the
sole factor for this finding). Cf. Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1, 7, 81 A.2d 47, 50 (1951)
(speed limit on divided highway was fifty-five miles per hour, no evidence of excessive
speed).
The issue of the favored driver's negligence was not addressed in State ex rel.
Frizzell v. Gosnell, 197 Md. 381, 79 A.2d 530 (1951), in which the unfavored driver was
held to be contributorily negligent when he pulled out from a side road and was struck
by a drag racer. Had the court been presented with the issue of whether the favored
drag racer's speed could be submitted to the jury as a contributory cause of the
accident, it is possible the court would have ruled the calculations involved therein
were not nice.
53. See notes 33 to 35 & 43 and accompanying text supra.
54. The Court of Special Appeals has referred to these two examples of a favored
driver's negligence. See Sun Cab Co. v. Carter, 14 Md. App. 395, 400, 405, 287 A.2d 73,
76, 79 (1972) (dicta).
55. The court itself framed the issue of the case as "whether Kopitzki's negligence
was a proximate cause of Mrs. Boyd's injury." 277 Md. at 497, 355 A.2d at 474.
Moreover, the court cited with approval the following passage from Webb, supra note
8 at 125: "[I]f it can be shown that the favored driver could have avoided the accident
if he had been operating lawfully and with due care, then the negligence of the
favored driver should be an issue for the jury .... [I]t can be argued that this is the
present trend."
A similar preoccupation with the notion of inattention is evident in Schwier v.
Gray, 277 Md. 631, 357 A.2d 100 (1976), a case decided the same term as Kopitzki. In
Schwier, the court insisted on framing the issue of the favored driver's negligence in
terms of inattention despite evidence of intoxication, excessive speed, and reckless-
ness. 277 Md. at 636, 357 A.2d at 103.
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fact that the driver of the vehicle next to him was able to avoid the
accident.56 But, as the dissent noted, these facts alone were not sufficient
evidence, at least not in view of prior rare cases, to prove that Kopitzki was
inattentive to his driving or failed to maintain a proper lookout.5 7
Although it is thus arguable that the Court of Appeals in Kopitzki
concluded that excessive speed, as well as other forms of a favored driver's
negligence, could constitute a proximate cause of a collision, the court
nevertheless refused to break from the prior line of rare cases in which the
favored driver's contributory negligence was described solely in terms of
inattention. Given the Kopitzki court's apparent willingness to sanction
rather tenuous inferences of inattention, this continued adherence to the
ritual of invoking the notion of inattention lacked substantive significance.
Nevertheless, couching the holding in terms of inattention obscured the
precise role that excessive speed was to play in future rare cases. After
Kopitzki, litigants in a boulevard rule case knew that excessive speed was
relevant to the favored driver's negligence, but it was not clear whether
evidence of speed had to be somehow linked to proof of inattention.
Moreover, consideration of excessive speed raised new problems regarding
the proscription on nice calculations.
The court returned to the issue of the proper standards for submitting a
favored driver's negligence to the jury in Dean v. Redmiles.58 The facts in
Redmiles resembled those of Kopitzki to a striking degree. Douglas
Redmiles, the driver of the favored vehicle, was proceeding south on a four
lane highway, accompanied by Terry Moore. William Welte, a companion of
Redmiles and Moore that evening, was driving nearly parallel to the
Redmiles vehicle in the same southerly direction. As the two vehicles cleared
the crest of a hill, they came upon the auto of Robert Dean, the unfavored
vehicle, which had stalled in one of the southbound lanes after backing out
of a restaurant parking lot. The Welte vehicle managed to avoid a collision
by veering across the northbound lane, but the Redmiles vehicle could not
dodge the stalled vehicle. In the ensuing collision, both Redmiles and Moore
were killed. Welte later told the police that Redmiles had been driving at
sixty-five to seventy miles per hour, though at trial he asserted that he could
not accurately estimate his speed. 59
The parents of Terry Moore brought suit against Redmiles' estate and
Dean, and obtained jury verdicts against both defendants. On appeal, the
Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment against the Redmiles estate,
holding that there was insufficient evidence that the favored driver's
conduct was a proximate cause of the collision to submit the issue to the
jury.60 Consideration of Redmiles' excessive speed was improper because it
would entail indulging in the proscribed nice calculations. The Court of
56. See text at notes 34 to 39 supra.
57. See 277 Md. at 501, 355 A.2d at 477.
58. 280 Md. 137, 374 A.2d 329 (1977).
59. Id. at 142, 374 A.2d at 333.
60. Redmiles v. Muller, 29 Md. App. 304, 348 A.2d 291 (1975), rev'd sub nom. Dean
v. Redmiles, 280 Md. 137, 374 A.2d 329 (1977).
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Appeals granted certiorari and reversed, with Judge Smith writing for a six
judge majority.
The court used Redmiles as an opportunity to make two general
observations about the boulevard rule. First, it noted that the boulevard rule
was never intended to absolve favored drivers from responsibility to other
persons, including passengers: "the boulevard rule does not relieve the
favored driver from the duty to use that degree of care for a passenger in his
vehicle which one expects a normally prudent driver to exercise on behalf of
his passenger." 61 Second, the court professed support for the soundness of
the policy against nice calculations, although it repeated the observation,
made in Kopitzki, that not every calculation involving time, speed, or
distance is nice.6 2 Combining these two ideas, the court concluded that "the
fact that the favored driver is violating the speed law does not become a jury
question unless the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the
violation is a proximate cause of the injury concerning which the complaint
is made. ' '6 3 The court did not elaborate its views on the proper, standards for
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence regarding proximate cause, but
presumably the strictures against nice calculations still apply. Conspicu-
ously absent from this analysis is any discussion of the favored driver's
inattention.
With these principles in mind, the court turned to the facts of the
Redmiles collision. Finding this case virtually indistinguishable from
Kopitzki in that both cases involved evidence of excessive speed and a
companion driver who avoided the collision, the court determined that there
was sufficient evidence that Redmiles' speed was a proximate cause of the
accident. The issue of his negligence was therefore properly submitted to the
jury.6 4 Although the court did not discuss its prior fixation with the notion of
inattention,6 5 the clear implication of Redmiles is that the favored driver's
negligence need not be discussed in those terms.
61. 280 Md. at 148-49, 374 A.2d at 336. Thus the court reaffirmed the principle
that the favored driver's conduct is to be analyzed in terms of negligence. See notes 47
& 48 and accompanying text supra.
62. 280 Md. at 151, 374 A.2d at 337-38. The court deduced the validity of the
proscription on nice calculations from its observation: "it is only in a rare instance in
our cases involving the boulevard law where it may fairly be said that the speed of the
favored driver was a proximate cause of the accident in such manner that the
question should be considered by the jury." Id. at 150, 374 A.2d at 337.
63. Id. at 151-52, 374 A.2d at 338. Although violation of a statute may be evidence
of negligence, the actor will not be held liable unless there is proof that his breach
caused the injury. See Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 248, 213 A.2d 549, 555 (1965).
Thus, proof that a favored driver violated the speed laws will not subject him to
liability or render him contributorily negligent unless it can be established that this
conduct was a proximate cause of the accident.
64. 280 Md. at 161-62, 374 A.2d at 342-43.
65. The court. did make the enigmatic pronouncement that "[t]o the extent,
however, that any language in any of our prior cases is subject to a contrary
interpretation, those cases are overruled." 280 Md. at 162, 374 A.2d at 343. It is
impossible to determine whether this language refers to the inattention doctrine.
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That the Court of Appeals has abandoned its reliance on inattention is
further demonstrated by Chief Judge Murphy's Redmiles dissent. Chief
Judge Murphy read the majority opinion as a clear renunciation of the
inattention doctrine, and he criticized this development as a serious threat to
the continued viability of the boulevard rule. Moreover, he characterized the
court's disregard of the rule that excessive speed should not be considered a
proximate cause as an unfortunate abandonment of the nice calculations
formula. The dissent suffers, however, from internal inconsistency: Chief
Judge Murphy cites Kopitzki with approval, yet the facts of that case are
virtually identical to those of Redmiles.66
Chief Judge Murphy's expressions of regret for the presumed expiration
of the ban on nice calculations may have been premature. Although the
Redmiles court did not expressly include the caution against nice calcula-
tions in its holding, the opinion evinces continued support for that policy.6 7
Furthermore, the evidence of the favored driver's negligence in Redmiles, as
in Kopitzki, was not confined to his excessive speed; in each case another
driver, who was nearly parallel to the favored driver, managed to avoid the
collision. Arguably, neither case involved calculations concerning speed that
were too nice.
Viewed together, Kopitzki and Redmiles would seem to mark an
expansion of the category of rare cases, for there is no longer any
compulsion to discuss the favored driver's negligence solely in terms of
inattention. Evidence of excessive speed, without more, may be sufficient.
Nevertheless, since this analysis permits speed to be shown to be a
proximate cause of an accident, but maintains the prohibition on making
nice calculations, a potential difficulty for future cases in using the Kopitzki-
Redmiles approach lies in distinguishing between permissible and imper-
missible calculations. This problem is most likely to arise in those cases
where the only evidence of negligence is the favored driver's excessive speed.
Where speed is truly extreme, there will be few problems in applying the
court's admonition that not all calculations are nice; where the excessive
66. In discussing the majority opinion, Chief Judge Murphy observed: 'The Court
concludes that the evidence that Redmiles was exceeding the posted speed limit by 20
miles per hour was evidence of negligence from which, without more, a jury could
properly conclude that such excessive speed was a contributing cause of the accident."
280 Md. at 170, 374 A.2d at 346 (emphasis added). This is a misstatement of the
majority's holding, for the evidence on which it relied consisted both of Redmiles'
excessive speed and of Welte's ability to avoid the collision. This evidence of an
attentive third driver enabled the'court to use Kopitzki as a controlling precedent. Cf.
note 38 supra.
67. The court held that the favored driver's negligence should not be submitted to
the jury unless there was sufficient evidence that his speed was a proximate cause of
the accident. 280 Md. at 161, 374 A.2d at 342. It might be argued that the words
"sufficient evidence" incorporate the nice calculations formula. But the court also
remarked that "if reasonable minds would differ as to whether 'such violation [of the
speed laws] causes or contributes to the injuries complained of,' a jury question would
be presented." Id. This language suggests that the favored driver will no longer be
shielded from the jury with regard to close questions of fact. Resolution of this
apparent conflict in the Redmiles opinion awaits future cases.
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speed is less extreme, however, the calculations become "nicer. '6 In such
cases the court will face the difficult task of identifying the point at which
the calculations become so nice that a jury should be precluded from
considering the favored driver's speed as a contributing cause of the
collision.
Having wrestled with defining the scope of protection to be afforded the
favored driver in Kopitzki, the Court of Appeals later decided Taylor v.
Armiger69 - a case with significant ramifications for the status of the
unfavored driver in litigation arising from boulevard collisions.70
The plaintiff, five year old Timothy Taylor,71 was struck by a vehicle
driven by Mrs. Neysa Armiger as he rode a tricycle 72 from a private
driveway onto a boulevard.73 The accident occurred in a residential
neighborhood "on a day and at an hour when one might expect children to
be playing outside of their homes." 74 Determining that the tricycle was a
"vehicle" under existing boulevard rule guidelines, 75 the trial judge applied
the rule's irrebuttable presumptions.76 Finding that Timothy was an
unfavored driver and thus contributorily negligent as a matter of law, he
directed a verdict against Timothy. The Court of Appeals 77 reversed this
judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, ruling that the jury should
68. See notes 15 & 52 supra.
69. 277 Md. 638, 358 A.2d 883 (1976).
70. An initial question presented to the court in Taylor was whether the
boulevard rule should be applied. Although the court expressly declined to decide
whether the rule was applicable, id. at 645, 358 A.2d at 887, its unwillingness to
consider this factual situation as controlled by the rule's presumptions nonetheless
affects the rule. See notes 110 to 114 and accompanying text infra.
71. Because Timothy was a minor, suit was instituted by his father, on behalf of
Timothy and on his own behalf, against Mr. and Mrs. Armiger. See MD. DIST. R. 205,
§d (1972).
72. The tricycle, made of plastic, was popularly known as a "Big Wheeler." The
court's opinion described it as being "'approximately twenty inches high, total, from
the ground to handlebar.' The diameter of its front wheel was about 16 inches and
that of its two rear wheels was about 9 inches. It had no brakes." 277 Md. at 641, 358
A.2d at 884.
73. The boulevard rule, with its source both in statutes and judicial construction
of those statutes, applies in situations in which vehicles are entering thoroughfares.
See notes 3 & 4 supra. When an accident occurs as a result of a vehicle entering a
highway from a private driveway, the boulevard rule is invoked by virtue of MD.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-404(a) (1977) (amending MD. ANN. CODE art. 66/2,
§ 11-404(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976)): "The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a
highway from a private road or driveway or from any other place that is not a
highway shall: (1) Stop; and (2) Yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle
approaching on the highway."
74. 277 Md. at 642, 358 A.2d at 885.
75. Id. at 644-45, 358 A.2d at 886-87. See notes 99 to 101 and accompanying text
infra.
76. See notes 11 to 15 and accompanying text supra.
77. Certiorari was granted prior to argument before the Court of Special Appeals.
See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-201 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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have been allowed to determine whether or not Timothy had been
contributorily negligent. 78
Judge Smith, writing for the court, first considered whether there was
sufficient evidence of Mrs. Armiger's negligence to warrant submission of
the case to the jury notwithstanding the trial judge's determination that the
child was contributorily negligent. 79 The court explained this inquiry by
referring to the proposition that "'even if [the circuit court] should be found
to have been in error in holding the plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence the action may still not be disturbed if there was no sufficient
evidence of the defendant's negligence to require submission to the jury.' ,s
In this discussion of the driver's primary negligence, the court viewed the
case as if it were a "dart out" case. 81 According to settled principles, a driver
will not be held liable in a dart out case if he is traveling at a reasonable rate
of speed, obeying the rules of the road, and operating his vehicle with due
care.8 2 Moreover, even if a driver has breached these standards, liability will
not be imposed in the absence of a finding of proximate causation. Excessive
speed alone, for example, is not ordinarily considered a proximate cause of
an accident8 3 unless there is proof that it directly contributed to the
accident.8 4 The Taylor court, considering expert testimony presented by the
plaintiffs,8 5 concluded that the evidence of the defendant's excessive speed
in a residential neighborhood was sufficient to warrant an inference of
Armiger's primary negligence.86
78. 277 Md. at 653, 358 A.2d at 891. Had the court determined that the accident
fell within the ambit of the boulevard rule, this result would not have been possible;
the rule's irrebuttable presumption would require that Timothy be deemed contributor-
ily negligent as a matter of law. See notes 11 & 12 and accompanying text supra.
79. See 277 Md. at 640, 358 A.2d at 884.
80. Id. (quoting Burkert v. Smith, 201 Md. 452, 454-55, 94 A.2d 460, 461 (1953)
(Sobeloff, C.J.)). Burkert, not a boulevard rule case, dealt with the application of
common law negligence and contributory negligence principles. Had the boulevard
rule been applied in Taylor, this analysis would not have been applicable because the
unfavored driver would have been contributorily negligent as a matter of law and
therefore barred from recovering from the favored driver. See note 11 and
accompanying text supra.
81. "Dart out" cases typically involve situations in which a young child leaves a
place of safety on the side of a roadway and places himself, suddenly and without
warning, in a position of peril from oncoming traffic. See, e.g., Alina v. Raschka, 254
Md. 413, 255 A.2d 76 (1969); Richardson v. Scott, 232 Md. 490, 194 A.2d 288 (1963);
Cocco v. Lissau, 202 Md. 196, 95 A.2d 857 (1953).
82. See, e.g., Alina v. Raschka, 254 Md. 413, 418, 255 A.2d 76, 78 (1969).
83. The excessive speed of a favored driver in a boulevard rule collision is treated
similarly to the speed of a driver in a dart out case. See cases cited in note 33 supra.
84. E.g., Miller v. Graff, 196 Md. 609, 618, 78 A.2d 220, 223 (1951); Ottenheimer v.
Molohan, 146 Md. 175, 184, 126 A. 97, 100 (1924).
85. An expert witness testified that Armiger's vehicle was travelling thirty-six
miles per hour when the accident occurred - in excess of the posted twenty-five mile
per hour limit. 277 Md. at 641, 358 A.2d at 884.
86. Id. at 642, 358 A.2d at 885. The court stated that it had no difficulty reaching
this conclusion under its prior cases. Id. (citing Alina v. Raschka, 254 Md. 413, 255
A.2d 76 (1969), and cases cited therein).
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The court then examined the issue of Timothy's contributory negligence.
Although the trial court had based its findings upon an application of the
boulevard rule,87 the Court of Appeals did "not find it necessary to decide
whether such a tricycle is or is not a vehicle."8 8 Instead, the court focused on
the degree of care to which Maryland law holds a young child. Ruling that a
five year old child cannot be contributorily negligent as a matter of law, it
determined that a young child, or infant, is
bound only to use that degree of care which ordinarily prudent children
of the same age, experience and intelligence are accustomed to use under
the same circumstances, and they assume the risk only of dangers, the
existence of which they know, or which, in the exercise of this degree of
care, they should have known.8 9
Although the court recognized that a child five years of age or older may be
contributorily negligent,90 it noted that a finding of such negligence must be
based on "evidence relative to the child's obedience, personality, and
87. See text accompanying notes 75 & 76 supra. The trial court relied primarily
upon Richards v. Goff, 26 Md. App. 344, 338 A.2d 80 (1975). The facts in Taylor closely
paralleled the facts in Richards, where the boulevard rule was applied to find the
plaintiff, a seven and one-half year old bicyclist, contributorily negligent as a matter
of law. The child had exited from a private driveway on his bicycle and collided with a
vehicle travelling on the road with which the driveway intersected. Accord, Quinn v.
Glackin, 31 Md. App. 247, 355 A.2d 523 (1976) (a twelve year old plaintiff found
contributorily negligent as a matter of law).
88. 277 Md. at 645, 358 A.2d at 887. See text accompanying notes 94 to 98 infra.
89. Id. at 645-46, 358 A.2d at 887 (quoting State ex rel. Taylor v. Barlly, 216 Md.
94, 102, 140 A.2d 173, 177 (1958)). See, e.g., Stein v. Overlook Joint Venture, 246 Md.
75, 82-83, 227 A.2d 226, 231 (1967); Zulver v. Roberts, 162 Md. 636, 641, 161 A. 9, 11
(1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 A (1965) ("[Tjhe standard of conduct to
which [a child] must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person
of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances."). Comment b to
section 283A contains further insight on this special standard for children:
The special standard to be applied in the case of children arises out of the
public interest in their welfare and protection, together with the fact that
there is a wide basis of community experience upon which it is possible, as a
practical matter, to determine what is to be expected of them.
90. 277 Md. at 649, 358 A.2d at 889. Although many states adopt the view that
children of very tender years, usually below seven years of age, are not capable of
contributory negligence, see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 at 155-56 (4th ed. 1971)
and Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 917 (1961), Maryland case law is not entirely clear as to the
precise age at which a child can be contributorily negligent. In Taylor the court stated
that it would adhere to a previous holding "'that a child, five years of age or over may
be guilty of contributory negligence .... .' 277 Md. at 649, 358 A.2d at 889 (quoting
State ex rel. Taylor v. Barlly, 216 Md. 94, 102, 140 A.2d 173, 177 (1958)). Other
Maryland cases have also viewed five years as the watershed for finding children
contributorily negligent. See, e.g., Macke Laundry Serv. Co. v. Weber, 267 Md. 426,
433, 298 A.2d 27, 31 (1972); Mulligan v. Pruitt, 244 Md. 338, 346, 223 A.2d 574, 579
(1966); Farley v. Yerman, 231 Md. 444, 450, 190 A.2d 773, 776 (1963). But see State ex
rel. Kolish v. Washington, Balto. & Annap. R.R., 149 Md. 443, 131 A. 822 (1926)
(contributory negligence of a child aged four years and two months held properly
submitted to the jury).
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intelligence." 9' In light of a trial court record devoid of any such evidence,92
the court reasoned that taking this case from the jury was tantamount to
finding that, as a matter of law, Timothy "failed to use the degree of care for
his own safety which should have been exercised by an adult. ' 93 Had the
jury been given the opportunity to evaluate the evidence, it might have
concluded that Timothy, because of his tender age and lack of capacity to
understand danger, was not contributorily negligent.
Given the court's general determination that a young child cannot be
held negligent as a matter of law, the opinion in Taylor can be criticized for
its failure to consider conflicting policies. The threshold issue presented in
the case was whether the tricycle was a vehicle. If the tricycle was not a
vehicle, the court could legitimately view the issues as it did - within the
framework of a dart out case. Under this assumption, because Timothy
could not have been contributorily negligent as a matter of law, his actions
should have been evaluated by a jury considering his youth, experience, and
intelligence.94 On the other hand, if the tricycle was within the contempla-
tion of the code's definition of a "vehicle," 95 the boulevard rule would govern
the relative rights of the parties. Unless the Court of Appeals was then
willing, for the first time, to create an exception to the rule,s 6 it would have
been required to find Timothy contributorily negligent as a matter of law.97
Despite the importance of this issue, the majority expressly refused to
resolve it.9s
In contrast, Chief Judge Murphy, concurring in the result reached by
the majority, did address the issue. He would have treated the tricycle as a
vehicle: "In the absence of an express provision or exception to the contrary,
the plain sense meaning of [the code section defining a vehicle] compels the
conclusion that the tricycle involved here was . . . a vehicle."99 Chief Judge
Murphy's view would appear to be correct in light of the code provision
91. 277 Md. at 651, 358 A.2d at 890. In using this language the court referred, with
approval, to Rosvold v. Johnson, 284 Minn. 162, 169 N.W.2d 598 (1969), which the
court interpreted as embodying the same theories as to a child's contributory
negligence found in State ex rel. Taylor v. Barlly, 216 Md. 94, 140 A.2d 173 (1958), and
Zulver v. Roberts, 162 Md. 636, 161 A. 9 (1932). See note 89 and accompanying text
supra.
92. "[W]e know nothing of the intelligence or the degree of maturity of this boy
nor do we know anything as to whether he was or was not normally an obedient
child." 277 Md. at 643, 358 A.2d at 886.
93. Id. at 652, 358 A.2d at 890.
94. See notes 89 to 91 and accompanying text supra.
95. See note 101 and accompanying text infra.
96. See note 4 supra. A statutory exception has long been recognized for
emergency vehicles. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-405 (1977) (amending MD. ANN.
CODE art. 66'/2, § 11-405 (1970)). The holding of Covington v. Gernert, 280 Md. 322,
373 A.2d 624 (1977) suggests that there are other circumstances in which the
boulevard rule would not govern driver's liabilities at an intersection collision. See
notes 115 to 119 and accompanying text infra.
97. See text accompanying notes 102 to 104 infra.
98. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
99. 277 Md. at 654, 358 A.2d at 891.
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which defined'00 a vehicle as "every device in, upon, or by which any person
or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway."' 01
Nevertheless, although Chief Judge Murphy contended that the court was
compelled to find that the tricycle involved in the accident was a vehicle, he
urged a result consistent with that of the majority. He did not expressly
recognize that his approach created an exception to the boulevard rule, yet
that conclusion is inescapable: because the tricycle was a vehicle, the
boulevard rule would be applicable; but because the unfavored driver was a
child of tender years, an exception to the rule would be created, allowing an
unfavored driver an opportunity to recover in litigation against the favored
driver.
The most plausible explanation for the majority's refusal to address this
issue is that it wished to avoid creating an exception to the boulevard rule.
The possibility that an unfavored driver might be free from contributory
negligence in some circumstances would contradict the Court of Appeals'
declarations that exceptions to the rule would not be recognized. In Creaser
v. Owens, 102 the court, in most explicit terms, stated that, except for the
doctrine of last clear chance, 10 3 the unfavored driver's claims against a
100. Although there was no exception in the code for a tricycle at the time of the
accident, the legislature later categorized a two or three wheeled vehicle (e.g., a
tricycle) "propelled only by human power" and not defined elsewhere in the code as a
"bicycle" as a "play vehicle." MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-101(h) (1977) (amending
MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 1- 104(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976)). As a play vehicle, a tricycle is
no longer subject to the boulevard rule. Because neither the 1976 nor 1977 version of
this statutory modification was in effect at the time of the accident, however, it could
not have been used to avoid the concurring opinion's conclusion that a tricycle was
included within the statute.
101. MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 1-209 (1970) (current version at MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 11-176 (1977) (stylistic changes only)). Bicycles have long been considered
vehicles, and their drivers are thus subject to the mandates of the boulevard rule. In
this context, children have been held contributorily negligent, as a matter of law, in
boulevard rule litigation. See Kane v. Williams, 229 Md. 59,481 A.2d 651 (1962) (eleven
years old); Richards v. Goff, 26 Md. App. 344, 338 A.2d 80 (1975) (seven and one-half
years old); Oddis v. Greene, 11 Md. App. 153, 273 A.2d 232 (1971) (eleven years old). Cf.
Moon v. Weeks, 25 Md. App. 322, 333, 333 A.2d 635, 641-42 (1975), cert. denied, No. 44
(Md. Ct. App. May 31, 1977), cert. denied on other grounds, - S. Ct. - (1977) (seven
years old) (holding it obvious that a child's sled is a vehicle since "it falls squarely
within the definition of 'vehicle' when a person is transported upon it upon a
highway.").
However, in Rodriguez v. Lynch, 246 Md. 623, 229 A.2d 83 (1967), the court
stopped short of holding that a nine year old bicyclist was subject to the mandatory
provisions of the rule. The child, who rode through a stop sign, was denied recovery
from the favored driver not because he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law
but because there was insufficient evidence of the favored driver's primary negligence.
Id. at 628, 229 A.2d at 86. Although the court recognized the applicability of the
boulevard rule it expressly stated that it was not necessary to reach the issue of the
child's contributory negligence. Id. Accord, Mumford v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 63
(D. Md. 1957).
102. 267 Md. 238, 297 A.2d 235 (1972).
103. See note 12 supra.
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driver on -the boulevard would always be barred as a matter of law.10 4 The
Creaser court rejected dictum 10 5 in Greenfeld v. Hook1 6 suggesting that
there might be accidents in which the unfavored driver would not be
negligent, although the boulevard rule would otherwise apply. 0 7 The view
expressed in Creaser has been reinforced in later cases: "Like the Rock of
Gibraltar we remain firm and will not allow the legislative mandates
contained in this right-of-way statute to be judicially either bypassed or
otherwise eroded through new waves of attack."' 0 8
In this light, Taylor may be viewed as a case confronting the court with
a conflict between two relatively established principles: the first, the
unfavored driver's contributory negligence as a matter of law in a boulevard
accident; the second, the Maryland courts' traditional solicitude for infants
who may lack the capacity to be contributorily negligent. In emphasizing
the latter principle while entirely avoiding the former, the court perhaps
recognized a need to make a limited retreat from the inflexible rule of
Creaser.0 9 The manner in which the opinion avoided deciding whether the
104. 267 Md. at 239-41, 297 A.2d at 236-37. See note 11 and accompanying text
supra.
105. 267 Md. at 248, 297 A.2d at 240.
106. 177 Md. 116, 8 A.2d 888 (1939).
107. In Greenfeld the court noted that:
[D]ense fog may make it impossible for ... [the unfavored driver] to discover
approaching cars, a child unexpectedly coming into the highway may cause
him to stop or go on, or some defect in the motor, the brakes, or the steering
gear of his automobile may prevent his controlling it, or curves or grades may
prevent him from seeing approaching traffic.
Id. at 130, 8 A.2d at 894-95.
108. Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426, 427, 330 A.2d 196, 197 (1974). Hensel
reversed a Court of Special Appeals decision that had attempted to distinguish
Creaser. Beckward v. Hensel, 20 Md. App. 544, 316 A.2d 309 (1974). See note 10 supra.
With the advent of the Court of Appeals' opinion in Covington v. Gernert, 280 Md.
322, 373 A.2d 624 (1977), see notes 115 to 119 and accompanying text infra, it has been
observed that, "Firm as we thought it was, the Rock of Gibraltar has now crumbled
into the sea." Gazvoda v. McCaslin, 36 Md. App. 604, 611, 375 A.2d 570, 574 (1977).
109. The majority rule in cases involving a violation of a statute by a child is that
special consideration should be given to the child's age, intelligence, experience, and
capacity and that the question of his negligence is a question of fact to be determined
by the jury. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Rudes, 315 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958),
and cases cited therein; see also Annot. 174 A.L.R. 1170 (1948). The emphasis in these
cases has been the protection of minors: "We would not be satisfied to relieve
motorists and others of the obligation of ordinary care to avoid injuries to minors on
the streets, even though such minors were themselves violating the law." Williams v.
Black, 247 S.W. 95, 96 (Tenn. 1923).
Maryland courts have not specifically resolved the policy conflict that occurs
when a child violates a statute. For example, in the dart out cases the court addressed
only the issue of the standard of care to which a child was to be held - the child's act
was not viewed as a violation of statute. See cases cited in note 81 supra. The practical
result of this approach, however, is that Maryland courts reach the same resolution as
would a majority rule jurisdiction.
A minority rule has recently gained wide acceptance where a child engages in
an adult activity. For example, when a minor operates a motor vehicle, some
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tricycle was a vehicle was particularly revealing, for the court noted only
that it did not find it necessary to decide the issue "for the purposes of this
case."'1 0 This language indicates that regardless of the court's ultimate
resolution of this definitional issue, the disposition of the case would be the
same: the young child would be entitled to have the issue of his contributory
negligence submitted to the jury. Thus, although the court did not expressly
create an exception to the boulevard rule, the outcome in Taylor leaves the
court vulnerable to the very dangers it had attempted to avoid. In future
cases the court may again be asked to sacrifice boulevard rule considera-
tions in favor of conflicting policies.
The ramifications of this result reach far beyond the particular
circumstances in Taylor. Decisions in future cases might well revolve on
whether the unfavored driver is legally accountable for his vehicle's
entrance into the boulevard despite a technical violation of the rule. These
cases might raise such issues as whether the unfavored driver moved onto
the boulevard because of circumstances beyond his control, or whether he
lacked the capacity to understand the action of obstructing the right-of-way
of favored traffic. One situation in which an unfavored driver might not be
legally accountable for a violation of the rule was posed by Judge Powers of
the Court of Special Appeals: where "the unfavored driver, stopped and
dutifully waiting for favored traffic to pass, is struck from the rear and
propelled into the path of a favored vehicle . . . ,,. A medical emergency
jurisdictions hold him to the adult standard of a reasonable person. See, e.g., Neudeck
v. Bransten, 233 Cal. App. 2d 17, 43 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1965); Perricone v. DiBartolo, 14
Ill. App. 3d 514, 302 N.E.2d 637 (1973); Betzold v. Erickson, 35 Ill. App. 2d 203, 182
N.E.2d 342 (1962); Wilson v. Shumate, 296 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1956); Powell v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1966); 33 TENN. L. REv. 533, 535 (1966). The
policy underlying this minority position has been stated to be that:
While minors are entitled to be judged by standards commensurate with age,
experience, and wisdom when engaged in activities appropriate to their age,
experience, and wisdom, it would be unfair to the public to permit a minor in
the operation of a motor vehicle to observe any other standards of care and
conduct than those expected of all others.. [O]ne cannot know whether the
operator of an approaching automobile ... is a minor or an adult, and
usually cannot protect himself against youthful imprudence even if warned.
Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 459, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863 (1961) (operation of a
powerboat). Under this rule, however, a bicyclist who is a minor will not be held to an
adult standard of care when he has violated a statute. See, e.g., Williams v. Gilbert,
239 Ark. 935, 395 S.W.2d 333 (1965); Davis v. Bushnell, 93 Idaho 528, 465 P.2d 652
(1970); LaNoux v. Hagar, 308 N.E.2d 873 (Ink. Ct. App. 1974); but see Patrican v.
Garvey, 287 Mass. 62, 190 N.E. 9 (1934) (plaintiff's youth will not excuse him from
contributory negligence when he is in violation of a statute).
In some jurisdictions violation of a statute raises only a rebuttable
presumption of contributory negligence - even an adult is not negligent per se when
he has violated a statute. Williams and LaNoux were decided in such jurisdictions. In
contrast, under the boulevard rule the unfavored driver is always contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. See notes 11 & 12 supra.
110. 277 Md. at 645, 358 A.2d at 887. See text accompanying notes 94 to 98 supra.
111. Beckward v. Hensel, 20 Md. App. 544, 560, 316 A.2d 309, 318 (1974) (Powers, J.,
concurring).
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suffered by the unfavored driver, such as a heart attack or epileptic seizure,
presents another instance in which the court might conclude that a
competing policy should supplant the operation of the boulevard rule. In
such cases the court might determine that the unfavored driver was
incapacitated during the medical emergency and was thus not in control of
his vehicle as it moved into the intersection.' 1 2 Regardless of whether the
court creates an exception to the boulevard rule, or merely ignores it, the
practical effect is the same.
The fundamental difficulty presented by Taylor and its ramifications is
a significant undermining of the policy upon which the boulevard rule has
been justified: the favored driver loses his right to enjoy unimpeded travel
while on the boulevard' 13 if he may be liable to an unfavored driver who has
obstructed his right-of-way and caused an accident. The Court of Appeals
has consistently announced its adherence to the principles embodied in the
boulevard rule in the absence of legislative action. 114 Yet in Taylor, the
court, confronted with a difficult policy decision, effectively altered the well-
settled rule mandating the unfavored driver's contributory negligence
without any explanatory discussion. If the expressed purpose of the
boulevard rule is truly valid, the court's ready deviation from its previously
consistent, albeit sometimes harsh, application of the rule is surprising.
Furthermore, even if the favored driver's liability is to be subject to a jury
determination, the court offered no explanation why that inquiry should
depend on the identity of the unfavored driver. When the favored driver is
faced with an unexpected obstruction of his right-of-way, the boulevard
rule's policy is not furthered by making that driver's liability depend on the
identity of the driver of the unfavored vehicle or even the type of unfavored
vehicle that obstructs the boulevard. From the favored driver's perspective
the collision is equally avoidable or unavoidable regardless of the identity of
the unfavored vehicle.
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals, Covington v. Gernert,' 5
presents an alternative approach by which a favored driver may be held
liable without the creation of an exception to the rule. Walter Covington
stopped at a stop sign at an intersection with a one-way street. After
ascertaining that the one-way street was free of oncoming traffic from the
specified direction, he entered the intersection. Covington was then struck
by Norman Gernert, who was proceeding in the wrong direction on the one-
way street. Covington obtained a judgment against Gernert in the district
112. Cf. Shirks Motor Express v. Oxenham, 204 Md. 626, 106 A.2d 46 (1954), a non-
boulevard rule case, in which a truck driver had a convulsive seizure either before, or
just after, colliding with parked cars. The court stated: "We assume, without deciding,
that if, without contradiction or effective challenge, there had been shown that the
driver's sudden illness preceded the accident, the verdict should have been directed for
[the defendant truck driver]." Id. at 634, 106 A.2d at 49. See also Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d
12, 35 (1953).
113. See note 7 supra.
114. See note 4 and text accompanying note 108 supra.
115. 280 Md. 322, 373 A.2d 624 (1977).
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court, but the Baltimore City Court reversed on appeal because the
boulevard rule rendered Covington contributorily negligent as a matter of
law. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision.
Judge Smith, writing for a unanimous court, reasoned that the facts of
this case did not present a proper occasion for application of the boulevard
rule. Gernert could not be considered a favored driver because he did not
possess the right-of-way. Crucial to this determination were the 1970
amendments to the motor vehicle laws. 116 Prior to amendment, article 661/2,
section 2(a)(45) defined right-of-way as "[tihe privilege of the immediate use
of the highway.""17 This definition was supplanted in 1970 by section 1-175,
which defines right-of-way as "the right of one vehicle.. . to proceed in a
lawful manner on a highway in preference to another vehicle ... ,"118 The
court found this change to be significant, for it requires that a driver be
proceeding lawfully in order to attain favored status. Application of this
principle to the facts of Covington was simple: since Gernert was driving the
wrong way on a one-way street, he "was not 'proceeding in a lawful manner'
and thus his vehicle was not entitled to preference over that of Coving-
ton."
119
Interjection of section 1-175 into boulevard rule analysis would seem to
provide an effective device for avoiding harsh results where the conduct of
the favored driver is particularly egregious. 120 By focusing on the conduct of
the favored driver, this approach ensures that the policy favoring the free
flow of traffic will be advanced except where other considerations of proper
vehicle operation override that objective. Indeed, encouraging drivers to
observe traffic directions should promote the orderly movement of traffic.
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether Covington would apply to a case such
as Taylor, where the only evidence of unlawful conduct by the favored driver
is violation of the speed laws. Both Kopitzki and Redmiles involved
excessive speed by a favored driver, yet there is no intimation in those cases
that violation of the speed laws deprived the favored driver of the right-of-
way and hence the protection of the boulevard rule. Thus, while Covington
certainly expands the possibility of recovery by an unfavored driver, its
scope is uncertain. If the right-of-way statute were broadly read to
encompass any illegality in the favored driver's manner of operation, the
practical effect would be to drastically restrict the boulevard rule. As of this
stage in the boulevard rule's evolution, however, it is impossible to foresee
116. Curiously, an earlier decision by the court had indicated that the 1970
amendments did not affect the boulevard rule. Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 240 n.4,
297 A.2d 235, 236 n.4 (1972).
117. MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 2(a) (45) (1957) (amended 1970). The current
version of this code provision is found at MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21- 101(o) (1977)
(stylistic changes only).
118. MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 1-175 (1970). This provision became effective on
January 1, 1971. The current version of this code provision is found at MD. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 21-101(o) (1977) (stylistic changes only).
119. 280 Md. at 325, 373 A.2d at 625.
120. See note 10 supra.
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whether the Court of Appeals intended to accomplish a change of this
magnitude in so cursory an opinion as Covington. If this decision does
indeed portend a change in the court's approach to the rule, Covington may
yet provide the basis for unfavored drivers to escape the mandatory
provisions of the rule in virtually all intersection collisions.
Viewed together, Taylor and Covington suggest that the Court of
Appeals has become less inclined to insist on rigid application of the
boulevard rule. This trend is laudable because it may avoid the unduly
harsh results that occasionally prevailed in past cases. Nevertheless, the
cases suffer from a lack of clarity which impairs their precedential value.
Indeed, the Taylor court did not even address the issue of the boulevard rule
although it was clearly presented. And the use of the right-of-way statute in
Covington poses something of an enigma, for only future cases can reveal
whether the statute will be read literally. Given the murkiness of the current
state of the case law, a comprehensive examination of the boulevard rule
would seem to be in order for future cases. This examination should consider
whether the policies that prompted judicial adoption of the rule continue to
be valid, and, if so, whether there are competing policies that merit the
recognition of exceptions. A thorough airing of these various considerations
might make the boulevard rule a little "less bothersome.' 121
3. LIABILITY OF LANDLORD TO TENANT FOR CRIMINAL ACTS
OF THIRD PERSONS - Scott v. Watson.' - On the evening of July 12,
1973, James Aubrey Scott, Jr., a tenant at the Sutton Place Apartments in
Baltimore, Maryland, was killed by a shotgun blast in the building's
underground parking garage. 2 Evelyn Ann Scott, both as the surviving child
of the decedent 3 and in her capacity as personal representative of his estate,
brought suit against the owners of the Sutton Place Apartments in the
Superior Court of Baltimore City. The defendants caused the action to be
removed to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. 4
121. See Dean v. Redmiles, 280 Md. at 139 n.1, 374 A.2d at 331 n.1 (1977), see also
Webb, Bothersome Boulevards, 26 MD. L. REV. 111 (1966).
1. 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976).
2. Id. at 162, 359 A.2d at 550. To date, the only person tried for Scott's murder
has been acquitted. See Dobson v. State, 24 Md. App. 644, 645, 335 A.2d 124, 125
(1975). Scott, a member of the Maryland House of Delegates, had been facing trial on
a multi-count indictment charging him with conspiracy to distribute heroin. United
States v. Scott, Crim. No. 73-0289 (D. Md., filed May 17, 1973) (order dismissing
indictment filed April 15, 1974).
Scott's murder was apparently related to his drug activities. "The police report
indicates that there were scattered in the general area of Scott's body numerous sheets
of paper with printed slogans stating 'Dope dealers are traitors, dope dealers must
die."' 278 Md. at 162, 359 A.2d at 550.
3. The provisions of the Maryland Code relating to a "wrongful death" action
are codified at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§3-901 to 904 (1974 & Cum. Supp.
1976).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)(1970) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
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In her complaint Miss Scott alleged that her father's death had been the
actual and proximate result of the defendant's negligent security mainte-
nance at Sutton Place, and that there had been a breach of an implied
warranty of habitability.5 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed the defendants
were negligent in that certain television scanning devices in the under-
ground garage had not been working for approximately one month
preceding Scott's murder; that a guard normally stationed in the building's
lobby had not been present on the evening of Scott's death; and that, in
general, Sutton Place security was below the level of other luxury
apartments in Baltimore.6
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending.
The district court was vested with original jurisdiction in the action through 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1)(1970) (diversity of citizenship in which the amount in controversy exceeds
$10,000).
5. Upon the defendants' motion to dismiss, the count alleging a breach of an
implied warranty of habitability was stricken from the complaint without leave to
amend. Scott v. Watson, No. H-74-930 (D. Md., March 7,1975) (transcript of oral
opinion, at 5) (case settled, settlement order filed May 26, 1977). See Amended
Complaint at 2-4, Scott v. Watson, No. H-74-930 (D. Md., April 7, 1975) (case settled,
settlement order filed May 26, 1977).
6. In an oral opinion, Judge Harvey, responding to the defendants' motion to
dismiss, granted the motion but allowed the plaintiff leave to amend her negligence
count to state a cause of action. He concluded from a reading of Maryland cases that
it would be possible to state a cause of action on the facts for negligence, but that the
duty imposed on the landlord would probably be the same as "the law generally
imposes on owners and occupiers of land who permit or invite others to use the land
for a particular purpose, namely to keep it safe for those using it within the scope of
the invitation." Scott v. Watson, No. H-74-930 (D. Md., March 7, 1975) (transcript of
oral opinion, at 3) (case settled, settlement order filed May 26, 1977).
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 7, 1975. In addition to the
negligence count, the plaintiffs amended complaint alleged that Sutton Place had
breached an express warranty of protection owed to Scott. This express warranty did
not arise from a term in Scott's lease since there was no written lease between the
parties. Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment by Defendants at 9-10, Scott
v. Watson, No. H-74-930 (case settled, settlement order filed May 26, 1977). Rather,
the plaintiff claimed that the defendants, through various oral and written
representations made to the Sutton Place tenants' association, had obligated
themselves to provide more and better security than that which existed when Scott
was murdered. Amended Complaint, Count III, Scott v. Watson, No. H-74-930 (D.
Md., April 7, 1975) (case settled, settlement order filed May 26, 1977). This contention
apparently formed the basis for the District Court's third certified question. See text
accompanying notes 64-72 infra.
The measure of damages which a plaintiff might recover under the alternative
theories of tort negligence and contract liability may be different. Damages for breach
of a contractual term are generally limited to those "such as may fairly and
reasonably be considered . . . arising naturally . . . from such breach of contract
itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of
both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach
of it." Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Exch. 1854). Damages for breach
of a duty arising in tort encompass all injuries which are the natural consequence of
the defendant's negligence, and "the only limitations are those of 'proximate cause,'
and the policy which denies recovery to certain types of interests themselves." W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 620 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
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Considering this a case of first impression, Judge Harvey certified three
questions of law to the Maryland Court of Appeals:
7
(1) Does Maryland law impose upon the landlord of an urban
apartment complex a duty to tenants to protect them from the criminal
acts of third parties committed in common areas within the landlord's
control and, if so, what is the extent of such duty?
(2) If no such duty exists generally, would such a duty be imposed if
the landlord has knowledge of increasing criminal activity on the
premises or in the immediate neighborhood?
(3) Would such a duty be imposed upon a landlord if such landlord has
undertaken specific measures to protect his tenants from the criminal
acts of third parties?8
The Court of Appeals' response to these questions was: a landlord has
no duty to exercise more than reasonable care for its tenants' safety;9
increasing criminal activity in the vicinity of the landlord's building is not
generally sufficient to create any duty for the landlord to eliminate
conditions leading to potential crimes within its building;10 and improper
performance of any security measures assumed voluntarily might constitute
a breach of duty, in keeping with traditional tort principles relative to
misfeasance."
In addressing the first certified question, Chief Judge Murphy, speaking
for a unanimous court, declined to hold that mere ownership of an
apartment building would render a landlord liable to its tenants for ciimes
perpetrated by third parties within the building. "[T]o do so would place [the
landlord] perilously close to the position of insurer of his tenants' safety.' 12
Rather, a landlord's sole responsibility is to exercise reasonable care for its
tenants' safety, "and traditional principles of negligence regarding proxi-
mate or intervening causation will determine whether the landlord is liable
for an injury resulting from a breach of this duty, including an injury caused
by criminal acts of third parties."' 3
The court explained its answer to the first question by reference to
generally accepted tort principles. At common law a person was under no
duty to protect another from the intentionally tortious or criminal acts of a
third person in the absence of a statute or a special relationship. This rule
was based on the premise that "the actor may reasonably proceed upon the
7. This was done in accord with the Maryland Uniform Certification of
Questions of Law Act, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to 609 (1974 &
Cum. Supp. 1976).
8. 278 Md. at 161-62, 359 A.2d at 550.
9. Id. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553; see notes 12-55 and accompanying text infra.
10. 278 Md. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554; see notes 56-58 and accompanying text infra.
11. 278 Md. at 171, 359 A.2d at 555; see notes 64-72 and accompanying text infra.
12. 278 Md. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553.
13. Id. Since the certified question was addressed solely to the existence of a duty,
the court did not determine whether reasonable care had indeed been exercised.
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assumption that others will obey the ... law."'1 4 Whether couched in terms
of no duty or lack of proximate causation, the actor was generally held not
accountable. 15
The rigidity of the general no duty rule has been mollified by several
jurisdictions where courts have ruled that inaction in the face of foreseeable
peril to another is not always permissible. Courts have developed the notion
that certain "special relationships" existing between the actor and another
place an "enhanced duty" of protection on the former where otherwise no
duty or only a reasonable care duty would exist.16 These relationships,
founded largely upon implied contractual terms and the relative positions of
the parties, obligate the superior party to take all reasonably necessary
measures to identify and alleviate potential dangers to the other. 17
The only special relationship recognized by Maryland courts to date is
that between a common carrier and its passengers.' 8 The relationship
14. PROSSER, supra note 6, at § 33.
15. This view is embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965):
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes
a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
16. Courts have perceived special relationships in a variety of situations: Lillie v.
Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 462-63 (1947) (employer-employee): "[The employer] was
aware of conditions which created a likelihood that [the employee] . . .would sufferjust such an injury as was in fact inflicted upon her. That the foreseeable danger was
from intentional or criminal misconduct is irrelevant; [the employer] nonetheless had
a duty to make reasonable provision against it."; Williams v. Essex Amusement Corp.,
133 N.J.L. 218, 219, 43 A.2d 828, 829 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (invitor-invitee); McLeod v. Grant
County School Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316, 320, 255 P.2d 360, 362 (1953) (school
district-pupil): "[Tihe duty of a school district.., is to anticipate dangers which may
reasonably be anticipated, and to then take precautions to protect the pupils in its
custody from such dangers." See PROSSER, supra note 6, § 33, at 174-75.
17. See PROSSER, supra note 6, at §33.
18. In Pennsylvania R.R. v. Cook, 180 Md. 633, 26 A.2d 384 (1942), upon a
complaint charging the defendant railroad with negligently causing its passenger to
fall from a train, the Court of Appeals stated:
A carrier is liable for acts of misconduct or improper conduct on the part of its
passengers or strangers resulting in injuries to a fellow passenger only in the
event that the employees of the carrier knew, or in the exercise of due care, should
have known of the imminency of the tort and failed to prevent the occurrence
after a sufficient opportunity to do so.
Id. at 636, 26 A.2d at 386 (quoting 10 Am. Jur. Carriers § 1441 (1932). See United Rys.
& Elec. Co. v. State ex rel. Deane, 93 Md. 619, 49 A. 923 (1901); Tall v. Baltimore Steam
Packet Co., 90 Md. 248, 44 A. 1007 (1899).
Maryland law relative to the innkeeper-guest relationship, a body of law
analogous to that of landlord-tenant and from which Scott might most naturally have
drawn its principles, was discussed in Roueche v. Hotel Braddock, Inc., 164 Md. 620,
165 A. 891 (1933). There the court stated the common law doctrine: "an innkeeper is
liable absolutely or as insurer, for all goods of a guest lost in the inn, unless the loss
happens by an act of God or a public enemy or negligence of the guest himself." Id. at
623, 165 A. at 893, (quoting 32 C.J. 548-49 (1923)) (emphasis added). The Roueche
court formulated the rule that when a person shows that he has suffered a loss while a
guest at a hotel or inn, he has then made out a prima facie case of innkeeper liability.
This shifts the burden of proof to the innkeeper to show that, even though he
exercised "the extraordinary care and diligence which the innkeeper's business
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between the common carrier and its passengers requires carriers to exercise
the utmost care, as opposed to a reasonable care standard, in providing for
their passengers' safety. This enhanced duty, which exists even if the carrier
has no knowledge of impending harm to its passengers, 19 is nevertheless
subject to issues of proximate causation. Thus, even where a special
relationship creates an enhanced duty of protection, the unforeseeability of a
third party's intervening conduct may supersede the protector's liability. 2°
The common law's refusal to impose a general duty to protect one's
fellow man has, therefore, given way in some jurisdictions in limited special
relationship situations to an enhanced duty of protection. However, there
exists a competing body of common law doctrine which governs the rights
and liabilities of owners and occupiers of land. This body of law imposes
upon a landowner the duty to use reasonable care for the protection of those
who are lawfully upon his premises. This duty is recognized despite the
landowner's right to use his property for personal benefit on the theory that
his activities must be tempered by "a due regard for the interests of others
who may be affected [by them]."'21
demands," id. at 627, 165 A. at 894, the guest's loss resulted from one of the three
common law exceptions to an innkeeper's absolute liability noted above or such other
occurrence which the innkeeper's high degree of care could not have prevented. Id. at
628, 165 A. at 894.
The Scott court did not mention this case in its decision. Roueche clearly
places more than a duty of reasonable care on innkeepers, at least for the protection of
their guests' personal belongings. Even were Scott to have extended this language to
include the physical well-being of tenants in the landlord-tenant situation, however, it
is not clear that the Scott murder would fit within its scope. If "public enemy" refers
to criminals generally, landlord liability would be severed by an act such as murder.
At least one court, on the other hand, has interpreted "public enemy" as used in the
rule of Roueche to mean "the forces of a nation engaged in a hostile war with that of
the innkeeper." Russell v. Fagan, 12 Del. 389, 394, 8 A. 258, 261 (1886).
19. While the carrier is held liable "only in the event that the employees of the
carrier knew or, in the exercise of due care, should have known of the imminency of
the tort," Pennsylvania R.R. v. Cook, 180 Md. at 636, 26 A.2d at 386, the duty to
provide a safe journey exists independently of this knowledge.
20, The early Maryland cases in this area, while making it clear that "[a] carrier
is not an insurer of the absolute safety of his passengers," Tall v. Baltimore Steam
Packet Co., 90 Md. at 253, 44 A. at 1008, distinguish between the "reasonable man"
standard of care and the enhanced duty that a railroad must exhibit towards its
passengers. "[The carrier's] undertaking, as to [its passengers] went no further than
this, that as far as human care and foresight could go, he would provide for their safe
conveyance." Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Worthington, 21 Md. 275, 284 (1863) (quoting
Christie v. Griggs, 170 Eng. Rep. 1088, 1088-89 (C.P. 1809)). See Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
State ex rel. Hauer, 60 Md. 449 (1883); Bannon v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 24 Md. 108
(1866); State ex rel. Coughlan v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 24 Md. 84 (1866).
The policy for imposing this enhanced duty upon carriers apparently rests on
two factors: an implied contractual term arising from the passenger's ticket, and the
inherently dangerous nature of the business. "[Liability ... springs from a contract
express or implied, and upheld by an adequate consideration .... State ex rel.
Coughlan v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 24 Md. at 103. "[A]nd as [the carrier's] employment
involves the safety of the lives and limbs of their passengers, the law requires the
highest degree of care which is consistent with the nature of their undertaking."
Baltimore & O.RR. v. State ex rel. Hauer, 60 Md. at 462.
21. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 57, at 351.
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In Maryland this duty of protection has been thoroughly examined in
cases dealing with the invitor-invitee relationship. These cases, 22 adhering
to traditional principles applicable to owners and occupiers of land who
invite others upon their premises for business purposes, have required
invitors to exercise reasonable care; efforts to impose a more stringent duty
on invitors have been unsuccessful. In Nigido v. First National Bank,
23
relied upon in Scott,2 4 the Court of Appeals refused to hold a bank liable for
injuries to a customer incurred during the course of an armed robbery. The
court specifically declined to accept the notion that the bank owed its
customers "a special duty" to protect them against robbers: "[W]e think
[Nigido] was an invitee to whom was owed the same duty a shopkeeper owes
his customer, i.e., to use reasonable care for his protection." 25 Since the
complaint did not allege facts sufficient to support a claim that the duty of
reasonable care was breached, the court affirmed the trial judge's sustaining
of the defendant's demurrer. 26 It is this reasonable care standard which the
Scott court adopted as the standard of protection a landlord owes its
tenants.
27
In considering the issue of landlord liability for criminal assaults on
their tenants in factual situations similar to Scott, other jurisdictions have
generally refused to hold that a landlord owes a duty of protection toward
his tenants. 28 This judicial reluctance to depart from the no-duty rule in the
landlord-tenant field reflects several concerns: the vagueness of the
standard that the landlord must meet;29 the economic consequences of the
22. See, e.g., Macke Laundry Serv. Co. v. Weber, 267 Md. 426, 298 A.2d 27 (1972);
Nigido v. First Nat. Bank, 264 Md. 702, 288 A.2d 127 (1972); Gast, Inc., v. Kitchner,
247 Md. 677, 234 A.2d 127 (1967); Honolulu Ltd. v. Cain, 244 Md. 590, 244 A.2d 433
(1966); State ex rel. Birckhead v. Sammon, 171 Md. 178, 189 A. 265 (1936); Eyerly v.
Baker, 168 Md. 599, 178 A. 691 (1935); Litz v. Hutzler Bros. Co., 20 Md. App. 115, 314
A.2d 693 (1974).
23. 264 Md. 702, 288 A.2d 127 (1972).
24. 278 Md. at 166, 359 A.2d at 552.
25. 264 Md. at 704, 288 A.2d at 128. The court also noted that the plaintiff's
allegations that the security cameras were not functioning, that the bank's premises
were not properly guarded, and that there was a history of robberies at the location
did not constitute such facts as to conclude the defendants were negligent, since they
were mere "conclusion[s] of the pleader." Id. at 704-06, 288 A.2d at 128-29.
26. Id. at 711, 288 A.2d at 131.
27. See text accompanying notes 48-50 infra.
28. See, e.g., Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969); Trice v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace
Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975); Bass v. New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d
801 (1969), rev'd, 388 App. Div. 2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 894,
300 N.E.2d 154, 346 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1973).
29, See, e.g., Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 589-90, 186 A.2d 291, 297
(1962). Therein the court stated:
Fairness ordinarily requires that a man be able to ascertain in advance of a jury's
verdict whether the duty is his and whether he has performed it .... How ...
can [the landlord] know what is enough to protect the tenants in their persons
and property? . . .We assume that advocates of liability do not intend an
absolute obligation to prevent all crime, but rather have in mind some
unarticulated level of effectiveness short of that goal. Whatever may be that
degree of safety, is there any standard of performance to which the owner may
look for guidance? We know of none ....
See note 38 and accompanying text infra.
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imposition of the duty;30 the idea that the criminal conduct of a third person
is a superseding cause of the harm to the tenant, thereby severing landlord
liability;31 the notion, sometimes imposed by statute, that private persons
should not be responsible for providing police protection; 32 and the universal
belief that a landlord should not be the insurer of his tenants' safety.
33
One case which counters the general notion that a landlord owes no
duty of protection to his tenants is Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue
Apartment Corp.34 In Kline a tenant was criminally assaulted and robbed in
the common hallway outside her apartment. She alleged, and the defense
conceded, that the landlord had been put on notice of an increasing number
of assaults, larcenies and robberies perpetrated against the tenants in and
from the common areas of the apartment building.35 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that given these facts
36
and the landlord's ability to take preventive action, "it does not seem unfair
to place upon the landlord a duty to take those steps which are within his
power to minimize the predictable risk to his tenants.
'37
30. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 590, 186 A.2d 291, 297 (1962).
"If the owner must provide [protection], every insurance carrier will insist that he do
it. The bill will be paid, not by the owner, but by the tenants. And if, as we apprehend,
the incidence of crime is greatest in the areas in which the poor must live, they, and
they alone, will be singled out to pay for their own police protection." But see text
accompanying note 39 infra.
31. See, e.g., Johnston v. Harris, 30 Mich. App. 627, 186 N.W.2d 752 (1971);
Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). But see text
accompanying notes 73-85 infra.
32. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 588-92, 186 A.2d 291, 298-99
(1962).
33. See, e.g., De Foe v. W. & J. Sloane, 99 A.2d 639 (D.C. 1953); cases cited in note
28 supra.
34. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
35. Id. at 478-80.
36. Although a consideration of increasing crime in the neighborhood properly
relates to the substance of the second certified question in Scott, it should be noted
that Kline did not base its decision to impose a duty of protection on landlords on
these facts alone. Rather, Kline held that regardless of the facts in a particular case
the duty of protection exists and the standard of care is the same. "Although in many
cases the language speaks as if the standard of care itself varies, in the last analysis
the standard of care is the same - reasonable care in all the circumstances." Id. at
485. This duty exists because "the rationale of [the no duty rule] falters when it is
applied to the conditions of modern day urban apartment living .... " Id. at 481.
Although not relying on the facts of the case before it to justify the imposition
of the duty, the Kline court focused on the landlord's power, and the tenant's lack of
power, to control criminal activity within the common areas as the key to the duty's
creation. "The duty is the landlord's because by his control of the areas of common
use and common danger he is the only party who has the power to make the
necessary repairs or to provide the necessary protection." Id. at 481; see notes 51 & 52
and accompanying text infra.
37. 439 F.2d at 481. Kline also found that a landlord has an implied contractual
obligation to provide adequate security, since he is "the party to the lease contract
who has the effective capacity to perform these necessary acts." Id. at 482.
Judge MacKinnon dissented from the majority opinion by Judge Wilkey,
stressing two points: the majority overstated "the facts which might be construed as
being favorable to appellant," id. at 488 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting); and landlords,
"being incapable of assured compliance" with the majority's "vague" standards,
would be forced "in their own self interest ... [to contract] for exculpatory provisions
in leases. Thus tenants will get less instead of more protection and the panel opinion
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In imposing this duty, the Kline court addressed many of the objections
commonly raised against holding a landlord responsible for criminal
intrusions within his building. Regarding the alleged vagueness of the
standard, the court held the landlord to a duty of protection consisting of
"reasonable care in all the circumstances. '38 Regarding the economic
consequences of imposing the duty, the court stated:
Granted, the discharge of this duty of protection by landlords will cause,
in many instances, the expenditure of large sums for additional
equipment and services, and granted, the cost will be ultimately passed
on to the tenant in the form of increased rents. This prospect, in itself,
however, is no deterrent to our acknowledging and giving force to the
duty, since without protection the tenant already pays in losses from
thefts, physical assault and increased insurance premiums. 39
The court acknowledged that the landlord need not be an insurer of his
tenants' safety, 40 but noted that "he is certainly no bystander.
'41
The Scott court expressly refused to follow the holding in Kline.
42
However, while declining "to impose a special duty on a landlord to protect
his tenants from criminal activity,"43 the Court of Appeals developed a rule
by imposing an unreasonable standard in this case is not rendering any real service
to reasonable landlord-tenant relations." Id. at 493 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
Judge MacKinnon's reference to the "vague" standards of the majority is
apparently directed at the majority's statement that:
[t]he specific measures to achieve [the standard of reasonable care for the tenants'
protection] vary with the individual circumstances. It may be impossible to
describe in detail for all situations of landlord-tenant relationships, and evidence
of custom amongst landlords of the same class of building may play a significant
role in determining if the standard has been met.
Id. at 486. The validity of this criticism is discussed at note 38 and accompanying text
infra.
The dissent's fear that tenants will be forced to sign leases with exculpatory
provisions is a real one: the District of Columbia Code does not forbid such provisions
in residential leases. However, twenty-one states have proscribed or severely limited
these lease clauses. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Statutory Note § 17.3
(1977). In Maryland, such exculpatory lease provisions are forbidden by statute. MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-105 (1974).
38. 439 F.2d at 485. Kline, however, specifically determined that the standard of
care to be used in deciding whether the landlord has met his duty of protection is the
reasonable man standard. That the factors comprising this standard may vary
according to the customs of a particular trade or class within that trade is not new to
tort law. See Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147 (1942).
39. 439 F.2d at 488. There is a serious question whether tenants ought to pay for
this "mandatory insurance." The parties to a lease, as with all contractual
undertakings, should be left free to bargain for the terms which they consider
desirable. But bargaining is virtually nonexistent in the landlord-tenant situation;
most leases are executed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with the tenant being the party
in the decidedly inferior position from which to haggle. Therefore, any arguable loss
of free bargaining power by the tenant is not consonant with reality. Any system that
might provide individual tenants with an optional security clause in their lease would
be impracticable and open to landlord abuse.
40. Id. at 487. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
41. 439 F.2d at 481.
42. 278 Md. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
of liability which cannot easily be distinguished from that formulated in
Kline. This confusion results principally from the Scott court's misstatement
of the Kline holding. The Scott court read Kline as a special relationship
case, which imposed an enhanced duty of protection on landlords. 44 But
Kline did not place an enhanced duty on landlords. Rather, the Kline court
adopted a reasonable care duty of protection. 45 There is an apparent
difference in the principles of common law applied by the Maryland and the
District of Columbia courts, and it is this difference that created the
misunderstanding. In Maryland, two competing common law concepts exist:
according to one theory, there is no general duty of protection, although
there may be an enhanced duty of protection in special relationship
situations, while the other theory imposes a reasonable care standard on
landowners who invite persons onto their premises for business reasons.
Thus, the common law as applied in Maryland produces a three-tiered
standard of care: no duty, a duty of reasonable care, and an enhanced duty.
In the District of Columbia, however, the common law apparently does not
recognize special relationships. The Kline court therefore dealt with only two
levels of care: either there is no duty of protection, or there is an obligation to
use reasonable care for another's safety. 46 Kline does not speak in terms of a
special relationship creating an enhanced duty, but rather says that the
nature of the relationship which does exist between landlords and their
tenants imposes upon landlords a duty to use reasonable care for their
tenants' protection.
47
Thus Scott, though refusing to recognize a special relationship in the
landlord-tenant situation with a concomittant enhanced duty of protection,
holds landlords to the same reasonable care standard which Maryland
courts impose upon landowners generally. As a result Maryland has become
more liberal in its approach to this problem than other jurisdictions, some of
which refuse to recognize any duty of protection. 48 Kline, not structured
within a three-tiered standard of care system and not recognizing the special
relationship concept, also concluded that landlords must provide reasonable
security measures in fulfilling the duty of protection which they owe their
tenants.49 The standard to be applied in determining whether a landlord has
breached his duty of care is the same in both cases: reasonable care.5° While
expressing dissimilar views on the nature and existence of a duty generally,
Scott and Kline have arrived at strikingly similar results.
Despite this similarity, however, Scott's seeming attempt to distinguish
Kline and restrict landlord liability is disturbing. A premise in Kline,
although largely unarticulated, is that a court will impose a duty of
protection on one party to a relationship where it is equitable to do so.
44. Id.
45. 439 F.2d at 485. See note 36 supra.
46. 439 F.2d at 485 n.21; see Blumenthal v. Cairo Hotel Corp., 256 A.2d 400 (D.C.,
1969).
47. Id. at 481-82, 484.
48. See notes 28-33 and cases cited therein supra.
49. 439 F.2d at 484.
50. 439 F.2d at 485; 278 Md. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553.
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Generally, in such situations one party is somehow dependent on the other;
the superior party may be in a better position to protect the dependent party
from harm; or the superior party may hold himself out as, among other
things, one who provides a measure of security. In view of the realities of
modern, urban apartment-complex dwelling, these considerations militate in
favor of requiring landlords to provide a high measure of security for their
tenants.53 The tenant residing in an urban building is certainly in a position
of dependency on his landlord, particularly with regard to security in
common areas exclusively within the landlord's control. In those areas, the
landlord has both a legal duty52 and the financial wherewithal5 3 to provide
for his tenants' safety. The landlord's interest in these common areas and
his superior financial position dictate that the duty of protection falls to
him. Additionally, as Kline properly noted:
[T]he value of the lease to the modem apartment dweller is that it gives
him a well known package of goods and services - a package which
includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, lighting,
ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors,
proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.5 4
The value of a leasehold interest lies not only in the property itself but also
in those qualities of living which a modern apartment purports to provide.
Certainly, adequate security is as important as any of these. These ideas
were openly stated in Kline and clearly helped the court to reach its
conclusion.55 Similar concerns are neither expressly nor impliedly present in
the Scott opinion. Although the ultimate holding of the Maryland Court of
Appeals may reflect an implicit recognition of these factors, the court's
opinion properly should have discussed their importance. The landlord-
tenant relationship is not, in fact, identical to that which exists between an
owner of land and an invitee, and it is unfortunate that the court failed to
address this difference.
51. 439 F.2d at 483.
52. When different parts of a building, such as an office building or an apartment
house, are leased to several tenants, the approaches and common passageways
normally do not pass to the tenant, but remain in the possession and control of
the landlord. The tenants are permitted to make use of them but do not occupy
them, and the responsibility for their condition remains upon the lessor.
PROSSER, supra note 6, § 63 (footnote omitted).
In addition to the landlord's responsibility for the condition of the common
areas which are retained under his control, Kline makes it clear that it is the landlord
alone who, by the very fact of that control, has the power to provide his tenants with
the necessary protection. 439 F.2d at 481.
53. While not all landlords are rich, they are in a unique position to assess and
distribute the costs of protection among their tenants. For a thorough treatment of the
problems in cost spreading, see G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS (1970).
54. 439 F.2d at 481 (emphasis added) (quoting Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.,
428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
55. 439 F.2d at 483-85.
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Dealing with the second certified question, Scott categorically rejected
any attempt by a plaintiff tenant to introduce evidence concerning the
criminal atmosphere surrounding the landlord's building:
Since the landlord can affect the risk only within his own premises,
ordinarily only criminal acts occurring on the landlord's premises, and
of which he knows or should have known (and not those occurring
generally in the surrounding neighborhood) constitute relevant factors
in determining, in the particular circumstances, the reasonable
measures which a landlord is under a duty to take to keep the premises
safe. 56
A landlord is therefore to be liable to his tenants for physical attacks upon
them only if he has failed to exercise reasonable care in light of the
"knowledge that any tenant or invitee [has] been the victim of a crime
involving physical harm (or threats) occurring in the common areas within
the apartment building."57 The court's resolution of this question restricts
the landlord's duty of reasonable care for his tenant's safety in an arbitrary
and artificial manner.
The effect of this holding is to insulate landlords who own buildings in
high-crime areas from the expense of providing their tenants with any
security measures whatsoever until the criminal world has invaded their
premises - and some tenant has suffered physical harm within the common
areas of the building. While it is true that a landlord can affect the
probability of attacks only within his building, the possibility of assaults
against tenants or their guests is necessarily enhanced when neighborhood
crime is increasing and security measures are nonexistent. Thus, although
the landlord may be cognizant of skyrocketing crime rates in the vicinity of
his building and of the increased danger which the situation poses to his
56. 278 Md. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554.
57. Id. at 170, 359 A.2d at 554.
Records of the Baltimore City Police Department indicate that fifty-six crimes
against property and sixteen crimes against persons occurred at or near Sutton Place
during the period January 4, 1972 to July 12, 1973, the night of Scott's murder. The
defendants learned in the spring of 1973 of five or six incidents involving illegal
entries into tenants' apartments. In addition, the following occurred during the three
months immediately preceding Scott's death: a car was stolen from either the
underground garage or the lobby level garage on April 22, 1973; two persons were
assaulted and robbed on a public street near Sutton Place by a person who had
followed the victims out of one of the ground level shops, on April 23, 1973; a tenant's
apartment was burglarized between June 9 and June 11, 1973; a vehicle owned by a
Sutton Place resident was stolen from a public street near the apartments on June 17,
1973, and several days later the owner was informed he could have his car back for a
price; a tenant's apartment was burglarized on June 24, 1973; and one of the ground
level stores open to the public was robbed and a store employee raped during the
afternoon of July 2, 1973. Id. at 163-64, 359 A.2d at 551.
Since the defendants purchased Sutton Place from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development on January 29, 1973, about five and one half months before
Scott's death, id. at 162, 359 A.2d at 550, they had notice of a number of crimes
against property occurring within the building's common areas, and a number of
crimes against persons occurring outside the building's common areas but nearby.
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tenants' well-being, Scott precludes consideration of the implications of this
knowledge by the trier of fact.58
Section 17.3 of the Restatement (Second) of Property contains an
alternative solution to the duty question:
A landlord who leases a part of his property and retains in his own
control any other part which the tenant is entitled to use as appurtenant
to the part leased to him, is subject to liability to his tenant and others
lawfully upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or a
subtenant for physical harm caused by a dangerous condition upon that
part of the leased property retained in the landlord's control, if the
landlord by the exercise of reasonable care could have:
(1) discovered the condition and the unreasonable risk involved
therein; and
(2) made the condition safe. 59
A comment to this section states that "the unreasonable risk of harm from
criminal intrusion constitutes a dangerous condition" for the purposes of
this section. 60 The Restatement position presents a balanced alternative to
the Scott court's answer to the second certified question, which inexplicably
withdraws a very important consideration from the trier of fact's determina-
tion of landlord liability.6' The Restatement of Property standard, like the
Scott standard, is one of reasonable care for the tenants' safety. But unlike
Scott, it makes no artificial distinction between crimes occurring within and
without the landlord's building as giving rise to this duty. The Restatement
leaves all relevant considerations to the trier of fact.62 It is for the jury to
58. The court's ruling on this question is an unusual one, which can lead to
absurd results. For example, the fact that a robbery and rape took place in one of
Sutton Place's ground level stores just ten days before Scott's death, see note 57 supra,
would necessarily be precluded from jury consideration because the ground floor of
the very same building is not within the "common area." Id. at 170, 359 A.2d at 554.
The "common areas" of a landlord's property generally include all those
places over which the landlord retains control and which the tenants, in common, are
entitled to use. The common areas may include such places as halls, stairs, elevators
and other approaches to the portions leased to the individual tenants. Common areas
also generally encompass portions of the landlord's property outside the building
which are set aside for the use of all the tenants, such as a roof or yard. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.3, Comment a (1977). See Macke Laundry Serv. Co. of Md.
v. Weber, 267 Md. 426, 429, 298 A.2d 27, 29 (1972); Elmar Gardens, Inc. v. Odell, 227
Md. 454, 457, 177 A.2d 263, 265 (1962).
Scott restricts this definition of common areas. The court's answer to the
second certified question imposes a duty of care on the landlord only if he is aware of
crimes committed within the common areas inside the building. 278 Md. at 164, 170,
359 A.2d at 551, 554.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §17.3 (1977).
60. Id., Comment l.
61. Yet Scott's approach is liberal compared with a line of cases finding no
proximate cause in this situation. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578,
186 A.2d 291 (1962); Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975); Gulf Reston,
Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841 (1974); Dwyer v. Erie Investment Co., 138
N.J. Super. 93, 350 A.2d 268 (1975); Smith v. ABC Realty Co., 71 Misc. 2d 384, 336
N.Y.S.2d 104 (1972); Knapp v. Wilson, 535 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1976).
62. While not expressly stated in the Restatement language, the comments and
illustrations following section 17.3 do convey this idea. Comment I specifies that a
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assess whether a reasonable landlord, under the particular circumstances of
each case, would have been alerted to the unreasonable risk to his tenants'
well-being created by a rising tide of neighborhood crime. Even then, a
landlord would be liable only if he "could have made the condition safe.163
He would not be the insurer of his tenants' safety but rather a reasonably
responsible provider therefore.
The court answered the third certified question in a brief sentence: "We
think it clear that even if no duty existed to employ the particular level of
security measures provided by the defendants, improper performance of
such a voluntary act could in particular circumstances constitute a breach of
duty. 16 4 While not discussing at length any cases in its consideration of this
question, 65 the court did refer to Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Yingling.6 6 In
that case judgment had been entered for the plaintiffs against a railroad on
a count charging the latter with negligence in failing to provide a night
watchman at a crossing. The plaintiff had been injured when, while
attempting to drive his truck through the crossing at four forty-five in the
afternoon, he was struck by a passing train. The railroad company had
posted a guard at the intersection from the hours of seven thirty in the
morning until three thirty in the afternoon. Noting that Maryland law did
not impose a duty on railroads to provide watchmen at crossings, the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court. By way of dictum, the court added:
If the accident, however, had taken place during the period of time when
the defendant had voluntarily assumed to safeguard the crossing by a
watchman or gateman, through the failure of the watchman or gateman
to discharge his duty by reason of his absence, failure to signal, or to
lower the gates, or of any other proximate default, there can be no
landlord is subject to liability where by the exercise of reasonable care he could have
discovered the unreasonable risk of criminal intrusion and could have made the
condition safe, but failed to take the necessary precautions. Illustration 18, which
accompanies this comment, is as follows:
L leases an apartment to T in an area of increasing crime, providing secure
common areas at the time of the lease. Subsequently L stops providing constant
doorman service, constant desk attendants, and frequently leaves an entrance to
the building unlocked at night. A criminal intruder assaults and robs T. L knows
of the unreasonable risk and has failed to exercise reasonable care in making the
common areas reasonably safe. L is subject to liability to T.
Although given these facts a landlord might be found to have breached a voluntarily
assumed duty of protection, see text accompanying notes 64-72 infra, the
Restatement section does not rely on this theory. Instead, it is the fact that there is an
unreasonable risk of harm caused by the increasing crime in the area of the landlord's
building, coupled with the landlord's knowledge of this fact and his failure to exercise
reasonable care in making the premises reasonably safe, which subjects the landlord
to liability for the harm caused by a criminal intruder. The Scott court's answer to the
second certified question, see text accompanying notes 46-58 supra, would impose no
duty of protection in this situation.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.3 (1977).
64. 278 Md. at 171, 359 A.2d at 555.
65. The court did discuss several cases dealing with the problems presented by
the third certified question in its treatment of the second certified question. Id. at
168-70, 359 A.2d at 553-54.
66. 148 Md. 169, 129 A. 36 (1925).
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question that the failure thus to discharge an obligation voluntarily
assumed would have been negligence on the part of the company ... .67
Thus, "[t]he undertaking to perform a voluntary act renders the party liable
if he performs it improperly, but not if he merely discontinues the act." 68
Under this theory of liability in the circumstances in Scott, a jury could find
that the Sutton Place management breached a duty owed to Scott.6 9
Courts confronted with situations where a landlord's defective perfor-
mance of voluntarily assumed protective measures led to tenant injuries
have treated the duty question similarly. In Kline, where various security
measures had been in effect at the beginning of the tenant's leasehold but
the landlord had allowed these precautions to lapse, the court held the
landlord to that standard of care which he himself had employed. The court
found an assumed tort duty and an implied contractual undertaking, both
obligating the landlord to provide "the same relative degree of security"
which "[tihe tenant was led to expect that she could rely upon." 70
A contractual undertaking has also been found to exist in a situation
where a landlord has agreed, although not expressly in the lease, to install
certain security devices for a monetary consideration. In Sherman v.
Concourse Realty Corp.,71 an order of the trial court dismissing the
plaintiffs complaint was reversed and a new trial ordered on the issue
whether the defendant landlord's negligence in failing to maintain the
security system in its residential building could be the legal cause of the
plaintiffs injuries. Addressing the question of the existence of a duty, the
court noted: "[flor a monetary consideration, i.e., increased rent, the landlord
assumed a limited duty of protection by the installation of the bell and
buzzer system which was permitted to fall into disrepair. ' 72 This duty,
67. Id. at 176-77, 129A. at 39.
68. Id. at 177, 129 A. at 39.
69. At the time the defendants purchased Sutton Place in January of 1973, the
following security devices and procedures were provided: two closed circuit television
cameras monitored the basement of the building and the rear of the retail stores on
the ground level; a guard was on duty nightly from 10:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. and
patrolled the premises four times each night, except that the outside grounds and the
garage area were patrolled only twice nightly; a switchboard operator in the lobby
monitored the television system and the main entrance to the building; and at the
main entrance was stationed a doorman who would park the car of any tenant
wishing this done for him. 278 Md. at 163, 359 A.2d at 550-51.
The plaintiff alleged in her amended complaint that the television scanning
device in the underground garage area had been broken for one month preceding
Scott's death, and that the guard was not present on that evening. See Amended
Complaint at 2-4, Scott v. Watson, No. H-74-930 (D. Md., April 7, 1975) (case settled,
settlement order filed May 26, 1977). Either of these circumstances alone might be
sufficient to show that the defendants improperly performed a self-imposed duty of
care.
70. 439 F.2d at 486. See Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969).
71. 47 App. Div. 2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1975).
72. Id. at 138, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 243. The landlord's building was located in New
York City. Prior to the assault upon the plaintiff in the lobby of the building, the
landlord had received permission from the City Rent and Rehabilitation Administra-
tion to increase rents, conditioned in part upon the landlord's installation of a
protective buzzer system. It was stipulated that this tenant's rent was increased to
pay for this protection. Id. at 135-36, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
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presumably limited in scope by the nature and extent of the obligation
assumed, was held breached by the landlord's failure to repair the defective
alarm system.
Thus, other jurisdictions have held a landlord liable for an assumed
undertaking under alternative theories - contractual, both express and
implied, and tort. It is likely that under the facts of Sherman or Kline, a
Maryland court would also recognize a duty on the part of the landlord
consistent with the Scott answer to the third certified question.
The Scott court concluded its opinion with remarks on the law relative to
proximate causation and its consequences in this unusual factual setting.
7 3
A "fair solution" 74 to the causation problem was gleaned from two cases
from other states75 and section 448 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a
superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the
actor's negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an
opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the
actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have
realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a
third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a
tort or crime.
76
The court explained that "[a] breach of duty by the defendant would result
in his liability in the third party criminal activity context only if the breach
enhanced the likelihood of the particular criminal activity which oc-
curred." 7
7
Because Scott constituted the first occasion for a Maryland tribunal to
deal with the proximate cause issue in this factual context, 78 it is
unfortunate that the court's dictum failed to discuss the problem more
extensively, particularly in view of the variety of formulations that have
73. 278 Md. at 171-73, 359 A.2d at 555-56. Considering the procedural posture of
this case, the court's observations on the proximate cause issue may be mere dicta.
The questions certified by the district court did not include an inquiry into this
problem. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
This raises an interesting question: whether the district court is bound by
these remarks or may choose to disregard them. Arguments exist for either position. It
may be that since the Maryland Court of Appeals has now issued a definitive ruling
in this area, the district court is bound under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). On the other hand, if the certification process properly limits the
Court of Appeals to a consideration of the particular questions certified, then the
proximate causation discussion is dictum and might possibly be ignored.
74. 278 Md. at 173, 359 A.2d at 556.
75. Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975); Johnston
v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972).
These cases dealt with the legal causation problem similarly. In Johnston, the
court asserted that the landlord's negligence had enhanced the likelihood that his
tenants would be exposed to criminal attacks. 387 Mich. at 573, 198 N.W.2d at 410.
The Braitman court held the landlord liable for acts of negligence which created an
enhanced risk of criminal conduct within its building. 68 N.J. at 383, 346 A.2d at 84.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
77. 278 Md. at 173, 359 A.2d at 556.
78. Id. at 171, 359 A.2d at 555.
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been offered by the American Law Institute. 79 The existence of proximate
causation, a necessary element in a cause of action for negligence, "is not a
question of science or legal knowledge . . . but one to be decided upon
common sense principles in light of the surrounding facts and circumstan-
ces of the case under consideration. . . ."80 A finding of proximate causation
involves a determination that the defendant's breach of duty in fact caused
the plaintiffs injuries, such determination being, as Scott properly noted,
"subject to considerations of fairness and social policy. . . ."' Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeals' selection of what it considered the appropriate
proximate cause standard is difficult to understand, for the court failed to
identify those "considerations of fairness and social policy"8 2 upon which it
79. One alternative is the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965):
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard
or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, intentionally tortious, or
criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.
Under this standard, the landlord in Scott might be held accountable for its tenant's
death. As Comment a to this section makes clear, "where the actor has undertaken
the obligation [to protect the other against such misconduct] . . .or his conduct has
created or increased the risk of harm through the misconduct," the actor "becomes
negligent." It may be argued that this section simply expounds on the duty concept
and does not address the proximate causation issue at all. However, the comment to
this section, id., while somewhat ambiguous, seems to indicate othewise. If by the
words "becomes negligent" the comment means only that the actor has breached a
duty, then this section does not speak to the causation issue. The better reading of
these words is that they indicate that the section imposes liability, complete with the
requisite proximate causation, where the actor's conduct creates or increases the risk
of harm to another. This latter interpretation seems especially plausible because
section 449 is located in the Restatement chapter entitled "Legal Cause."
The Restatement provides another section that the Scott court might have
considered with regard to landlord liability. Section 435 provides:
(1) If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to
another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the
extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from
being liable.
(2) The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another
where after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent
conduct, it apears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought
about the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965).
This section requires only negligent conduct by the actor that is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to another. "The fact that he neither realized nor
should have realized that it might cause harm to'another of the particular kind or in
the particular manner in which the harm has in fact occurred, is not of itself sufficient
to prevent him from being liable for the other's harm." Id., Comment a.
Section 435(2) operates to relieve the actor of liability where it appears to the
court highly extraordinary that the intervening conduct of some third person has
come into operation to cause the harm. This intervening conduct then becomes a
superseding cause which frees the actor from the consequences of his negligence. Id.,
Comment c. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442(b) (1965). Where the
likelihood that the intervening conduct will occur is one of the hazards which makes
the actor negligent, however, then such conduct, even if criminal, will not prevent the
actor from being liable for harm caused thereby. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 449 (1965).
80. Lashley v. Dawson, 162. Md. 549, 562-63, 160 A. 738, 743 (1932) (quoting
Baltimore v. Terio, 147 Md. 330, 335, 128 A. 353, 355 (1925)).
81. 278 Md. at 171, 359 A.2d at 555.
82. Id.
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based its decision. 83 Moreover, the court's "enhanced risk" theory, while
possibly appropriate in other situations, may undermine the principles
implicitly underlying the imposition of a duty of protection upon landlords.
Those principles, which served as the basis for the Kline court's holding but
were ignored in Scott,8 4 are not fostered by a theory of proximate causation
which serverly limits landlord liability. Thus, the measure of security which
the Court of Appeals appeared to give tenants by holding landlords to a
reasonable care duty of protection through its answer to the first certified
question has, in part, been eroded by the court's restrictive view of
proximate casuation.8 5
In its failure to allow jury consideration of the total picture concerning
criminal activities in the general vicinity of a landlord's building and its
unsolicited and lightly considered views on the proximate causation issue,
the Scott decision has effectively decided the case in favor of the defendant,
Sutton Place. Since there appear to have been no crimes involving physical
attacks (or threats) upon persons in the common areas within Sutton Place
at any time prior to the evening of Scott's death, 6 the defendants were not
under a duty to exercise reasonable care for Scott's protection on that night.
Alternatively, should the district court decide that the defendants did owe
Scott a duty of care because they voluntarily assumed a duty of protection
toward him through their installation of various security devices and
procedures, 87 the Scott court's statement that a landlord is liable only if a
breach of duty "enhanced the likelihood of the particular criminal activity
which occurred," 8 severely limits the plaintiffs chances for a favorable
verdict. Declining to grasp this opportunity to place the foreseeable and
preventable risks of tenant loss where they more reasonably belong, the
83. The court's sole statement in support of its adoption of § 448 of the
Restatement was that "[i]n the present state of modem society, this would seem to be
a fair solution of the causation problem in this context." 278 Md. at 173, 359 A.2d at
556.
84. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
85. The concepts of duty and proximate causation are sometimes merged into
neat formulations which do not require separate determinations of the existence of
each. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965), discussed at note 79
supra, and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.3 (1977), discussed at text
accompanying note 59 supra. These formulations establish criteria for the imposition
of liability where the defendant's conduct, coupled with the acts of a third person,
inflicts harm upon the plaintiff. Without employing the traditional terms "duty" and
"proximate causation," the defendant is deemed negligent if his activities fall within
the proscriptions of these rules.
Perhaps the Maryland Court of Appeals, while adhering to traditional
nomenclature, has actually developed its own formulation of a "liability" concept in
the factual context of Scott. The court's adoption of an "enhanced risk" theory of
proximate causation might then be viewed as part of a framework imposing landlord
liability rather than, as it appears in the Scott opinion, as a restricting factor which
narrows the duty concept expressed in Scott's answer to the first certified question.
For a decision equating the duty and proximate causation factors, see Cutlip v. Lucky
Stores, Inc., 22 Md. App. 673, 690, 325 A.2d 432, 441 (1974) (defining proximate cause
as "a causation in fact coupled with a duty.")
86. See notes 57 & 58 and accompanying text supra.
87. See note 69 supra.
88. 278 Md. at 173, 359 A.2d at 556; see text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
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court has virtually insulated a landlord from responsibility save in the
grossest instances of negligence - those in which his conduct appreciably
enhances the risk of danger to his tenants.8 9 Such a standard ignores the
realities of urban apartment dwelling and burdens those least able to
prevent future tortious conduct.
4. LOCALITY RULE FOR EXPERTS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CASES - Shilkret v. The Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association.' -
Mark Alan Shilkret was born on December 22, 1968, at the Anne Arundel
General Hospital. He has been institutionalized since that date because of
severe brain damage. Alleging that this injury resulted from intracranial
bleeding2 caused by negligence at delivery, the child's parents brought a
medical malpractice action 3 against the various attending physicians and
the hospital. 4 At the trial opposing counsel disagreed on the standards of
89. 278 Md. at 171-73, 359 A.2d at 555-56; see notes 75-77 and accompanying
text supra.
1. 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975).
2. Id. at 188-89, 349 A.2d at 246.
Intracranial bleeding (hemorrhaging) results when the head receives a violent
trauma causing rupture of the vessels that supply it with blood. These vessels are
contained within the middle and inner layers of the skull's three-layered structure,
and also within the tough membranous dura mater which lines the inner surface of
the skull. Rupture may cause pockets of blood (hematomas) to develop between the
skull and the enclosed brain, thereby producing great pressure on the soft brain
tissue. A rapidly enlarging hematoma in this intracranial cavity often causes
irreversible or fatal brain damage. Early detection is essential to proper treatment. L.
CHAPMAN, 8 COURTROOM MEDICINE § 31 (1976).
3. Suit was brought in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County by the infant
plaintiffs parents on the child's behalf. In Maryland, parents are given the statutory
capacity to sue alleged tortfeasors for wrongs committed against their infant children.
MD. DIST. R. 205, § d (Repl. Vol. 1972).
4. The Anne Arundel General Hospital is a member of the Annapolis Emergency
Hospital Association, the named party in this case. The physicians sued included
"two obstetricians who treated the mother throughout the prenatal stages and then
delivered the infant, an anesthesiologist in attendance at birth, and a pediatrician at
the hospital who allegedly examined the infant the day after his birth." 276 Md. at
189, 349 A.2d at 246.
The joinder of numerous defendants in a negligence action, any one or all of
whom might be responsible for the injuries sustained, presents considerable
difficulties for a plaintiff. In order to recover from any one of the defendants, the
general rule is that there must be proof of a specific act of negligence by that
defendant. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 39, at 221 (4th ed. 1971). This rule poses a
significant obstacle for the plaintiff in a malpractice action against multiple
defendants where all the defendants may have had some contact with the plaintiff
during a period when he was unconscious through the operation of a general
anesthesia. It is often impossible for such a plaintiff to prove which of the many
defendants committed a negligent act.
This problem with multiple defendants has been alleviated somewhat in those
jurisdictions which allow plaintiffs in such situations to prove their cases under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This expression, which means "the thing speaks for
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care applicable to physicians and hospitals in medical malpractice actions.
When the trial court ruled that it would apply "the strict locality rule,"'5 the
plaintiffs admitted their inability to prove their case under that standard.
However, the plaintiffs were granted leave to proffer the statements of two
experts, an obstetrician-gynecologist and a neurosurgeon, who "could meet
any other rule in medical negligence cases."'6 The proffers indicated that the
former was prepared to testify regarding a national standard7 in caring for
obstetrical patients, the latter about diagnosing and treating neurological
diseases of newborn infants. Both experts would also have testified
regarding the manner in which the several defendants' failure to meet these
national standards had caused plaintiff's injuries. Following these proffers,
a verdict was directed for each defendant.8 The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the judgment subsequently entered for the defendants. 9
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari "for the limited
purpose of deciding whether the Court of Special Appeals was correct in
holding 'that [in Maryland] the "Strict Locality Rule" must be applied' in
itself," relates to the proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence. To invoke the
doctrine, the plaintiff must show three things: a casualty of a sort which normally
does not occur in the absence of negligence; the casualty must be caused by an
instrumentality within the defendant's exclusive control; and the casualty must occur
under circumstances indicating that the plaintiff did not by any act or omission
contribute to his own injuries. Leikach v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 261 Md. 541,
547-48, 276 A.2d 81, 84 (1971); Willians v. McCrory Stores Corp., 203 Md. 598, 601-02,
102 A.2d 253, 255 (1954). There may also be a fourth requirement: the facts
surrounding the casualty must be more within the knowledge of the defendant than
within the knowledge of the plaintiff. Johnson v. Jackson, 245 Md. 589, 594-95, 226
A.2d 883, 886 (1967). The successful invocation of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine raises
an inference that the defendant was negligent. Munzert v. American Stores Co., 232
Md. 97, 103, 192 A.2d 59, 62 (1963).
In jurisdictions which apply res ipsa loquitur to malpractice actions, the
plaintiff is generally allowed to prove his case either through the use of expert medical
testimony or by showing that the injury that he has sustained is of a type which, as a
matter of common knowledge among laymen, would not have occurred unless the
person who treated him had been negligent. See, e.g., Gould v. Winokur, 98 N.J. Super.
554, 237 A.2d 916 (Law Div. 1968), aff'd, 104 N.J. Super. 329, 250 A.2d 38 (App. Div.
1969); Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438 P.2d 829 (1968). Several
jurisdictions have allowed recoveries where an unconscious patient has been injured
by the unspecified negligence of more than one defendant. See, e.g., Ybarra v.
Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Frost v. Des Moines Still College of
Osteopathy & Surgery, 248 Iowa 294, 79 N.W.2d 306 (1956); Anderson v. Somberg, 67
N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975); Beaudoin v. Watertown
Memorial Hosp., 32 Wis. 2d 132, 145 N.W.2d 166 (1966).
The Maryland courts do not apply res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice
cases. Hans v. Franklin Square Hosp., 29 Md. App. 329, 347 A.2d 905 (1975), cert.
denied, 276 Md. 744 (1976).
5. For a definition of this term, see note 17 infra.
6. 276 Md. at 189, 349 A.2d at 246.
7. For a definition of this term, see note 17 infra.
8. 276 Md. at 189-90, 349 A.2d at 247.
9. Shilkret v. The Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, No. 74-83 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App., Nov. 12, 1974).
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medical malpractice cases."' 10 The court determined that the proper standard
of care to be required is a national standard. In rejecting the continued
validity of the rationale underlying the strict locality rule, Judge Levine, for
a unanimous court, held that "[w]hatever may have justified the strict
locality rule fifty or a hundred years ago, it cannot be reconciled with the
realities of medical practice today."" Accordingly, the decision of the Court
of Special Appeals was reversed and the case was remanded for a new
trial.12
In medical malpractice, or professional negligence, as in all negligence
actions, some uniform standard of behavior must be determined by which
the defendant's conduct can be judged. 13 When the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant's activities did not correspond to an acceptable level of behavior,
courts generally apply the "reasonable man" standard; the defendant must
have conducted himself as would "a reasonable man under like circumstan-
ces."'14 But when a person possesses knowledge, skill or intelligence superior
to that of an ordinary man, the law demands of him conduct commensurate
with that superior ability. 15 In such cases, although the standard of care
demanded is still that of the "reasonable man," the actor's superior
attributes raise what is reasonable to a higher level. As a result, a
professional is held to the standard of the reasonably prudent professional
with the same abilities acting under like circumstances. 16 In applying this
standard to the medical profession, some courts have looked to an additional
factor - the geographic region in which the physician practices. Thus, a
physician would be held to use that degree of care and skill which the
reasonably prudent physician living in the same or similar community
10. 276 Md. at 188, 349 A.2d at 246.
11. Id. at 194, 349 A.2d at 249.
12. Id. at 203, 349 A.2d at 254.
13. There are four elements comprising a cause of action for negligence: duty,
breach, causation and injury. The plaintiff must prove that his injuries were the
natural and proximate result of a breach of a duty that the defendant owed him. The
existence of the breach is usually determined by comparing the defendant's actions
with some objective standard of behavior, modified by certain subjective considera-
tions:
The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard of behavior.
... The standard of conduct ... must be an external and objective one.. . . At
the same time, it must make proper allowance for the risk apparent to the actor,
for his capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances under which he must act.
W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 32, at 149-50.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 283 (1965).
15. Id. § 289; W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 32, at 161.
16. This rule has been applied to a variety of professions and skilled trades:
Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) (attorney); L.B. Laboratories v. Mitchell, 39
Cal. 2d 56, 244 P.2d 385 (1952) (accountant); Tremblay v. Kimball, 107 Me. 53, 77 A.
405 (1910) (pharmacist); Milliken v. Woodward, 64 N.J.L. 444, 45 A. 796 (1900)
(insurance agent); Weissman v. Prashker, 405 Pa. 226, 175 A.2d 63 (1961) (airplane
pilot); Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assoc's, 24 Utah 2d 172, 467 P.2d 610 (1970)
(architect); Crandall v. Ed Gardner Plumbing & Heating, 17 Utah 2d 138, 405 P.2d 611
(1965) (plumber).
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would use. This standard, which emphasizes the area where the doctor
practices, is termed the locality rule.
The locality rules'7 were products of the late nineteenth century
American courts."8 Under the strict locality rule, doctors were expected to
exercise that degree of care and skill ordinarily possessed by physicians
practicing in the same community. This standard was designed to protect
rural and small-town practitioners on the theory that "the country doctor,
due to a lack of efficient means of transportation and communication, could
not be expected to keep abreast of medical advances."' 19 The Shilkret court,
analyzing the historical justification for the strict locality rule, quoted from
an early Kansas case, Tefft v. Wilcox:20
In the smaller towns and country, those who practice medicine and
surgery, though often possessing a thorough theoretical knowledge of
the highest elements of the profession do not enjoy so great opportuni-
ties of daily observation and practical operations, where the elementary
studies are brought into every day use, as those have who reside in the
metropolitan towns, and though often just as well informed in the
elements and literature of their profession, they should not be expected
to exercise that high degree of skill and practical knowledge possessed
by those having greater facilities for performing and witnessing
operations, and who are, or may be constantly observing the various
accidents and forms of disease .... 21
17. There are five generally accepted rules relating to the medical standard of
care: strict locality, similar locality, medical locality, national standard for specialists,
and national standard for all physicians.
The first three standards in medical malpractice cases rely on the defendant's
locality. The strict locality rule holds physicians to the standard of care observed by
practitioners of ordinary care and skill practicing in the physician's locality. See
notes 17-31 and accompanying text infra. The similar locality rule demands that the
physician observe the standard of care set by medical men of ordinary skill and care
practicing in his locality or in a similar community. See notes 32-35 and
accompanying text infra. The medical locality rule expands the geographical
boundaries of the community in which the defendant practices medicine to include
areas in which doctors have ready access to appropriate medical facilities, and it
requires that the defendant follow the standard of care observed by doctors who work
in that expanded area. See, e.g., Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003
(1955); Josselyn v. Dearborn, 143 Me. 328, 62 A.2d 174 (1948); Viita v. Dolan, 132
Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916); Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940).
The rules that do not consider locality as an important factor - the national
standard for specialists and the national standard for all physicians - hold the
defendant-physician to the course of behavior that is ordinarily practiced by doctors
in the profession generally. See notes 3 6 - 4 2 and 52-55 and accompanying text infra.
18. "Such a test [i.e., a locality rule] has never been suggested in any English case
and it is thought that the Courts would reject a contention that the requisite standard
may differ from one part of the country to another." H. NATHAN, MEDICAL
NEGLIGENCE 21 (1957).
19. Note, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND.
L. REV. 729, 730 (1970).
20. 6 Kan. 46 (1870).
21. 276 Md. at 193, 349 A.2d at 248 (quoting Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46, 63-4
(1870)). Other early cases also applied the rule. See, e.g., Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa
286 (1872); Gates v. Fleischer, 67 Wis. 504, 30 N.W. 674 (1886).
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Although most courts justified the rule by reference to such factors as the
disparate opportunities for continuing medical education2 2 and lack of
access to modern medical facilities,2 3 one court went so far as to imply that
rural physicians, as a group, were inferior to urban physicians.
24
Many jurisdictions soon encountered problems in applying the strict
locality rule. One concern was that the rule had the effect of virtually
immunizing the sole, small-town physician from malpractice actions. Since
he was the only doctor in town, his standards became the legal standard of
care. Carried to its farthest extent, the strict locality rule granted such
physicians an absolute immunity from suit.25 Although no case appears in
which a town's lone doctor was sued in a jurisdiction applying the strict
locality rule, several courts noted the potential danger from rigid application
of the rule.
26
Another problem with the strict locality rule, similar to the sole
practitioner problem, was that it might enable two or more physicians of
inferior caliber, practicing in the same community, to establish a low
standard for themselves. 27 Thus, the strict locality rule, which was designed
to protect the rural physician from an impossibly high standard, might
hinder the provision of even minimally acceptable medical services in areas
where only a few inferior doctors worked. As with the sole practitioner
problem, this danger was also more feared than real. 28
22. Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286 (1872).
23. Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497, 501 (1877).
24. Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880).
25. See, e.g., Pelky v. Palmer, 109 Mich. 561, 67 N.W. 561 (1896), in which the
Supreme Court of Michigan emphasized this fear in its departure from the strict
locality rule:
[A] surgeon's skill depends somewhat upon his experience and opportunity for
witnessing operations, and it is to be expected that the degrees of surgical
skill met with in different localities will be affected by these things. While a
man with no skill, or inconsiderable skill, should not shelter himself behind
the claim that he was the only practitioner in his neighborhood, and therefore
that he was possessed of the ordinary skill required . . . it is true that the
character of the locality has an important bearing upon the degree requisite.
Id. at 563, 67 N.W. at 561.
26. See, e.g., Pelky v. Palmer, 109 Mich. 561, 67 N.W. .561 (1896); McBride v.
Huckins, 76 N.H. 206, 81 A. 528 (1911); McCracken v. Smathers, 122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E.
354 (1898).
27. See, e.g., Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497 (1877):
It will not do, as we think, to say, that if a surgeon or physician has exercised
such a degree of skill as is ordinarily exercised in the particular locality in
which he practices, it will be sufficient.
There might be but few practising in the given locality, all of whom might
be quacks, ignorant pretenders to knowledge not possessed by them, and it
would not do to say, that, because one possessed and exercised as much skill
as the others, he could not be chargeable with the want of reasonable skill.
Id. at 501.
28. Courts have recognized, albeit in dicta, the potential danger in allowing
several inferior physicians to set local professional standards. See, e.g., Gramm v.
Boener, 56 Ind. 497 (1877); Whitesell v. Hill, 101 Iowa 629, 70 N.W. 750 (1897); Burk v.
Foster, 114 Ky. 20, 69 S.W. 1096 (1902); Mutschman v. Petry, 46 Ohio App. 525, 189
N.E. 658 (1933).
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Finally, an evidentiary problem was created by the strict locality rule:
securing physicians from the defendant's locality who were competent and
willing to testify about the community standards became difficult.
Physicians are generally loath to testify against fellow practitioners, but are
even more reluctant where the defendant is a doctor with whom they
commonly work. In small communities where all doctors know each other,
the problem of securing expert medical witnesses is extremely acute. This
reluctance to testify reflects several realities: the desire not to testify against
a friend; the possibility of ostracism from the community of doctors with
whom the potential witness generally associates; and the loss of referrals
from fellow doctors.2 9 The problem for the malpractice plaintiff engendered
by this "conspiracy of silence" has been acknowledged by courts in several
states30 Attempting to alleviate this difficulty, courts in some jurisdictions,
while purportedly adhering to the strict locality rule, have allowed experts
from outside the locality to testify. 31
Recognizing these hardships in applying the strict locality rule, several
jurisdictions have abandoned it altogether in favor of the similar locality
rule. This slightly more liberal approach holds the physician to the standard
of care exercised by doctors in communities similar to his own. By
broadening the number of doctors whose skills and abilities comprised the
standard of care, and by consequently increasing the availability of expert
witnesses, courts eliminated the problems inherent in the strict locality rule.
This modification, however, has not been without its attendant problems:
the most prominent problem has been establishing criteria that could be
applied in determining which localities are to be considered similar
localities. Originally, these criteria were derived from a consideration of
various socio-economic factors of communities - population, nature of
economy, and income of inhabitants. 32 Recently, courts employing the
similar locality standard have examined the similarity of medical facilities
available to physicians in the communities to be compared. 33
29. See Comment, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 HARV. L. REV. 333,
336-38 (1963).
30. See, e.g., Agnew v. Parks, 72 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959); Sampson v.
Veenboer, 252 Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931); Johnson v. Winston, 68 Neb. 425, 94
N.W. 607 (1903); Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); Coleman v.
McCarthy, 53 R.I. 266, 165 A. 900 (1933).
31. See, e.g., Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 102 A.2d 352 (1954); Raitt v.
Johns Hopkins Hosp., 274 Md. 489, 336 A.2d 90 (1975).
In Raitt, the Maryland Court of Appeals, while "assuming arguendo that the
'strict locality' rule is to be followed," held that "[t]here is no absolute requirement
that [the expert witness] practice or reside in the defendant-physician's community."
Id. at 500, 336 A.2d at 96. This assumption has proven to be a source of great
confusion in Maryland malpractice law. See notes 43-51 and accompanying text
infra.
32. See, e.g., Warnock v. Kraft, 30 Cal. App. 2d 1, 85 P.2d 505 (1938); Horton v.
Vickers, 142 Conn. 105, 111 A.2d 675 (1955).
33. See, e.g., 'Michael v. Roberts, 91 N.H. 499, 23 A.2d 361 (1941); Morrill v.
Komasinski, 256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W.2d 620 (1950).
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Today, the similar locality rule appears to be the plurality rule,34 with
most of the courts which use this standard focusing on the similarity of
factors directly related to the practice of medicine. Under this approach, the
court considers whether the knowledge of the proffered expert witness
derives from practicing in an area where the medical facilities are
comparable to those available in the physician's community. While this rule
enables the plaintiff to obtain expert witnesses from other communities,
34. The following jurisdictions use the similar locality rule:. Alaska, Poulin v.
Zartman, 542 P.2d 251 (Alas. 1975) (by statute); Arizona, Kronke v. Danielson, 108
Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 (1972); Delaware, Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del.
1974); District of Columbia, Smith v. Reitman, 389 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (applying
District of Columbia law); Florida, Miriam Marscheck, Inc., v. Mausner, 264 So. 2d
859 (Fla. 1972); Idaho, Flock v. J.C. Palumbo Fruit Co., 63 Idaho 220, 118 P.2d 707
(1941); Iowa, Sinkey v. Surgical Associates, 186 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1971); Kansas,
Karrigan v. Nazareth Convent & Academy, Inc., 212 Kan. 44, 510 P.2d 190 (1973);
Michigan, Callahan v. William Beaumont Hosp., 67 Mich. App. 306, 240 N.W.2d 781
(1976); Minnesota, Swanson v. Chatterton, 281 Minn. 129, 160 N.W.2d 662 (1968);
Montana, Tallbull v. Whitney, - Mont. -, 564 P.2d 162 (1977); Nebraska, Kortus
v. Jensen, 195 Neb. 261, 237 N.W.2d 845 (1976); New Hampshire, Carrigan v. Roman
Catholic Bishop, 104 N.H. 73, 178 A.2d 502 (1962); North Carolina, Wiggins v. Piver,
276 N.C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970); North Dakota, Benzmiller v. Swanson, 117 N.W.2d
281 (N.D. 1962); Ohio, Rush v. Akron Gen. Hosp., 171 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio 1957);
Oklahoma, Runyon v. Reid, 510 P.2d 943 (Okla. 1973); Pennsylvania, Incollingo v.
Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971); Rhode Island, Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84 R.I. 67,
121 A.2d 669 (1956); South Carolina, Bessinger v. DeLoach, 230 S.C. 1, 94 S.E.2d 3
(1956); Tennessee, Methodist Hosp. v. Ball, 362 S.W.2d 475 (Tenn. 1961); West
Virginia, Schroeder v. Adkins, 14 W.V. 400, 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965).
The following jurisdictions use the strict locality rule: Alabama, Parrish v.
Spink, 284 Ala. 263, 224 So. 2d 621 (1969); Arkansas, Gray v. McDermott, 188 Ark. 1,
64 S.W.2d 94 (1933), but see Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970) (construing
Arkansas law to require the application of a similar locality standard); Colorado,
Foose v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 310 P.2d 722 (1957); Illinois, Holden v. Stein, 312 Ill.
App. 260, 38 N.E.2d 378 (1941); Indiana, Adkins v. Ropp, 105 Ind. App. 331, 14 N.E.2d
727 (1938); Louisiana, Bertrand v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 306 So. 2d 343 (La. 1975);
Massachusetts, Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d 562 (1962);
Mississippi, DeLaughter v. Womack, 250 Miss. 190, 164 So. 2d 762 (1964) (by
implication); Nevada, Lockart v. Maclean, 77 Nev. 210, 361 P.2d 670 (1961); New
Mexico, Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 509 P.2d 1356 (1973); New York, Acosta v.
City of New York, 67 Misc. 2d 756, 324 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1971), but see Hirschberg v. State
of New York, Claim No. 58390 (N.Y. Ct. Cl., opinion filed Aug. 24, 1977) (rejecting any
locality rule in favor of a national standard of care); Oregon, Getchell v. Mansfield,
260 Ore. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971); South Dakota, Hansen v. Isaak, 70 S.D. 529, 19
N.W.2d 521 (1945), but see Carlsen v. Javurek, 526 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1975) (construing
South Dakota law to require the application of a similar locality standard); Texas,
Levermann v. Cartall, 393 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1965); Utah, Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah
262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943); Vermont, Pepin v. Averill, 113 Vt. 212, 32 A.2d 665 (1943);
Virginia, Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. 214, 156 S.E.2d 787 (1967), but see Whitfield v.
Whittaker Memorial Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 169 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1969) (citing Easterling
in support of a similar locality formulation); Wyoming, Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421
(Wyo. 1962).
The following jurisdictions use the national standard for specialists but retain
the strict or similar locality rules for general practitioners: Arizona, Kronke v.
Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 (1972); District of Columbia, Robbins v. Footer,
553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (applying District of Columbia law); Massachusetts,
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thus alleviating the "conspiracy of silence" problem, 35 it is not the perfect
solution. The standard of care exercised by doctors in similar communities
could be the same as in the defendant's community, thus perpetuating the
possibility that generally lower standards may be practiced in smaller
communities.
The rising number of medical specialists, most of whom have learned
the most modern scientific and technical advances and have been certified
by national medical associations, 36 has caused several jurisdictions to
recognize that specialists ought to be held to a standard of care
commensurate with their particular training and experience. 37 This means
that doctors who hold themselves out as specialists in their field of expertise
will be judged by the standards practiced by other doctors in that specialty
generally, without regard to the locality where the doctor works. This
standard embodies the notion that a professional who represents himself as
possessing a degree of knowledge and skill which is higher than that
possessed by the average member of his profession should use that ability in
his practice. 38 Courts which have accepted this principle have therefore
Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968); Michigan, Naccarato v.
Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970); Minnesota, Christy v. Saliterman, 288
Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970); North Carolina, Belk v. Schweizer, 268 N.C. 50, 149
S.E.2d 565 (1966).
The following jurisdictions use the national standard for all physicians:
California, Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976);
Georgia, Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965) (by statute);
Hawaii, Burrows v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 49 Haw. 351, 417 P.2d 816 (1966), but see
McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972) (construing Hawaiian law to
require the application of a similar locality standard); Kentucky, Blair v. Eblen, 461
S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970); Maine, Merrill v. Odiorne, 113 Me. 424, 94 A. 753 (1915);
Maryland, Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245
(1975); Missouri, Fisher v. Wilkinson, 382 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1964); New Jersey,
Schueler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330, 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Washington, Pederson v.
Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967); Wisconsin, Shier v. Freedman, 58
Wis. 2d 269, 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973).
One state, Connecticut, defines the standard of care in terms of the standard
practiced in the "general neighborhood," which has been held to mean the entire
state. See Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Conn. 609, 356 A.2d 887 (1975).
35. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
36. See Note, Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884
(1962).
37. See notes 17 & 34 and accompanying. text supra.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965):
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who
undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is
required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members
of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.
Comment d states:
An actor undertaking to render services may represent that he has superior
skill or knowledge, beyond that common to his profession or trade .... Thus
a physician who holds himself out as a specialist in certain types of practice is
required to have the skill and knowledge common to other specialists.
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developed a national standard for specialists.3 9 In Naccarato v. Grob,40 the
Supreme Court of Michigan, applying a national standard of care to
pediatricians, addressed itself to the rationale underlying the elimination of
a locality factor in defining a standard of care for specialists. The court
spoke of the "fundamental expectations" of the patients and the "purposes"
of a specialty, focusing on the measure of fairness which the national
standard provides specialists' patients.41 Moreover, from the specialists'
perspective, imposition of a national standard of care is not unfair because
"the practice of medicine by certified specialists within most medical
specialties is similar throughout the country. '42 Thus, since the patient's
expectations and the national mode of behavior coincide, neither side is
treated unfairly.
While the trend among the various jurisdictions which have been
confronted with the standard of care issue has been and continues to be a
gradual broadening of the standard away from the strict to the similar
locality rule, Maryland has been peculiarly out of step with this advance.
The earliest cases in the state dealing with medical malpractice did not
discuss locality as a factor to be considered in defining the standard of care.
In State ex rel. Janney v. Housekeeper,43 the Court of Appeals determined
that two physicians who performed a radical mastectomy on plaintiffs
decedent were to be held to "that reasonable degree of care and skill which
physicians and surgeons ordinarily exercise in the treatment of their
patients." 44 Similarly, in Dashiell v. Griffith,45 the standard was defined as
39. One such court is the Supreme Court of Michigan. In Naccarato v. Grob, 384
Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970), plaintiff brought suit against two Detroit area
pediatricians for their alleged malpractice in failing to timely diagnose phenylketonu-
ria, a rare childhood disease. Without examining the standard of care for general
practitioners, the court determined:
The reliance of the public upon the skills of a specialist and the wealth and
sources of his knowledge are not limited to the geographic area in which he
practices. Rather his knowledge is a specialty. He specializes so that he may
keep abreast. Any other standard for a specialist would negate the
fundamental expectations and purpose of a specialty. The standard of care for
a specialist should be that of a reasonable specialist practicing medicine in
the light of present day scientific knowledge. Therefore, geographical
conditions or circumstances control neither the standard of a specialist's care
nor the competence of an expert's testimony.
Id. at 253-54, 180 N.W.2d at 791.
40. 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970).
41. Id. at 253-54, 180 N.W.2d at 791; see note 39 supra.
42. Note, Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884, 889
(1962).
43. 70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382 (1889).
44. Id. at 172, 16 A. at 384.
45. 84 Md. 363, 35 A. 1094 (1896).
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"the amount of care, skill and diligence . . . as is ordinarily exercised by
others in the profession generally." 46 This rule, setting out the standard of
the reasonably prudent medical professional and making no reference to the
physician's community, appeared to be the accepted standard in Maryland
until 1962.
4 7
In that year, for the first time, a Maryland court added a locality
factor in fashioning a standard of care for doctors. In State ex rel. Solomon
v. Fishel,48 the Court of Appeals stated, in dictum, the applicable standard of
care to be "whether or not [the defendant] did fail to exercise the amount of
care, skill and diligence as a physician and surgeon which is exercised
generally in the community . .. in which he was practising by doctors
engaged in the same field." 49 This dictum was quoted by several later
decisions which, while also citing various pre-Fishel cases, followed the
strict locality language of Fishel.50 Curiously, a number of decisions after
46. Id. at 380-81, 35 A. at 1096.
47. See Lane v. Calvert, 215 Md. 457, 462, 138 A.2d 902, 905 (1958) (standard of
care "such as is ordinarily exercised by others in the profession generally," 84 Md.
363, 35 A. 1094 (1896)); Angulo v. Hallar, 137 Md. 227, 232-33, 112 A. 179, 181 (1920)
(quoting Dashiell, 84 Md. 363, 35 A. 1094 (1896)); Miller v. Leib, 109 Md. 414, 426, 72 A.
466, 470 (1909) (quoting Dashiell, 84 Md. 363, 35 A. 1094 (1896)).
48. 228 Md. 189, 179 A.2d 349 (1962).
49. Id. at 195, 179 A.2d at 353.
Fishel cited Lane v. Calvert, 215 Md. 457, 138 A-2d 902 (1958), as the source of
its rule. See note 47 and accompanying text supra. The Fishel court apparently
misread Lane because Lane did not place any locality restriction on the standard of
care.
The language in Fishel concerning the standard of care issue was dicta; the
issues in that case were whether certain hypothetical questions addressed to medical
experts were proper and whether a particular jury instruction was correct. The Fishel
court mentioned the standard of care required of physicians only as a prelude to its
consideration of the medical expert issue.
50. See Kruszewski v. Holz, 265 Md. 434, 438, 290 A.2d 534, 537 (1972) ("[the
defendant] was required to adhere to the same standard of care in treating his
patients as was practiced by other physicians engaged in this specialty in the
community"); Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md. 156, 159, 277 A.2d 67, 69 (1971) (quoting
Fishel, 228 Md. at 195, 179 A.2d at 353); Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 363-65,
306 A.2d 568, 570-71 (1973) (quoting Fishel, 228 Md. at 195, 179 A.2d at 353).
In the three cases just mentioned, the Court of Appeals, while espousing the
Fishel strict locality dictum, also cited with apparent approval decisions that did not
mention any locality factor. The Kruszewski court cited Johns Hopkins Hosp. v.
Genda, 255 Md. 616, 258 A.2d 595 (1969), see note 51 and accompanying text infra;
Tempchin cited Genda and Lane, see note 47 supra; and the Dunham court cited
Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36 (1971), see note 51 and accompanying text
infra. Apparently, the courts following the strict locality language of Fishel did not
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1962 ignored Fishel completely. 51
Shilkret finally resolved this confusion, determining that the standard
applicable to physicians is not tied to any locality rule:
[A] physician is under a duty to use that degree of care and skill which
is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to
which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances. Under
this standard, advances in the profession, availability of facilities,
specialization or general practice, proximity of specialists and special
facilities, together with all other relevant considerations, are to be taken
into account. 52
Shilkret rejected the necessity of using two standards, one for general
practitioners, governed by the locality rule, the other for specialists,
disregarding the locality rule. "[W]hile a specialist may be held to greater
skill and knowledge in his particular field than would be required of a
general practitioner under the same or similar circumstances, one standard
fully appreciate the extreme confusion that their misreadings of Maryland law would
cause. The only court accepting Fishel that actually considered the merits of the strict
locality rule was Dunham. There the Court of Special Appeals, considering itself
bound by Fishel, said:
Maryland's adherence to the strict locality rule is ... a distinct minority
view. In recent years, "as the dissemination of medical information has
become quicker and methods of treatment have become more uniform, the
trend in an ever-growing number of jurisdictions has been to allow witnesses
from localities other than that in which the defendant practices to testify, in a
malpractice case, to the standard of care that the defendant should have
observed," without being tied solely to the standard prevailing either in the
defendant's own community or in similar localities. 37 A.L.R.3d at 424. Thus,
if the issue were one of first impression in Maryland . . .we might be
persuaded to hold that the requisite standard of medical care and skill to
which a physician should be held is the standard which applies either in the
general neighborhood . . .or in similar localities ....
18 Md. App. at 364-65, 306 A.2d at 571.
51. See Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 534, 276 A.2d 36, 46 (1971) (quoting Lane v.
Calvert, 215 Md. 457, 138 A.2d 902 (1958) ("the amount of care, skill and diligence...
as is ordinarily exercised by others in the profession generally")); Johns Hopkins
Hosp. v. Genda, 255 Md. 616, 620, 258 A.2d 595, 598 (1969) ("the standard of skill and
care ordinarily exercised by surgeons in cases of this kind"); Anderson v. Johns
Hopkins Hosp., 260 Md. 348, 350, 272 A.2d 372, 373 (1971) (quoting Genda, 255 Md. at
620, 258 A.2d at 598).
52. 276 Md. at 200-01, 349 A.2d at 253.
The court adopted a like standard of care for hospitals:
[Al hospital is required to use that degree of care and skill which is expected of
a reasonably competent hospital in the same or similar circumstances. As in
cases brought against physicians, advances in the profession, availability of
special facilities and specialists, together with all other relevant considera-
tions, are to be taken into account.
Id. at 202, 349 A.2d at 254.
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can be fashioned for all physicians . . . . 3 In adopting this national
standard for all physicians, the Court of Appeals followed the lead of a
distinct minority of states5 4 which have rejected the importance'of all
geographical considerations in ascertaining the competence of a physician.
As the Shilkret court properly concluded, rational justifications no
longer exist for legally isolating rural practitioners from the higher
standards formerly associated only with their urban counterparts. Rural
physicians are no longer physically removed from the latest scientific and
technological medical advances. Their educational programs are vastly
superior to those of their predecessors, with increased opportunities for
continuing training in the very latest medical techniques. "[T]he dynamic
impact of modern communications and transportation, the proliferation of
medical literature, frequent seminars and conferences on a variety of
professional subjects, and the growing availability of modern clinical
facilities"55 have produced a higher professional standard which is national
in scope.
The formulation adopted by the court, while rejecting any mention of
geographical considerations, seems in application not very different from
the similar locality rule as it is generally applied today. Most jurisdictions
employing the similar locality standard take into consideration such
medical factors as equality of opportunity for further medical education and
availability of similar medical facilities and resources.5 6 In recognizing the
importance of the elements, which comprise a physician's professional
abilities, these courts have realized the absurdity of adhering strictly to any
locality rule.57 While the Maryland courts have now also expressly
recognized the dangers inherent in the rigid application of a locality rule,58
the.solution devised by the Shilkret court is hardly a radical departure from
previous practice in the majority of jurisdictions using the similar locality
rule. It merely recognizes that geography, per se, should not be a controlling
53. Id. at 199, 349 A.2d at 252.
54. See note 34 supra.
55. 276 Md. at 199, 349 A.2d at 252.
56. See Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1962); McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241
Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950). See generally McCoid, The Care Required of Medical
Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 575 (1959); Note, Medical Specialties and the
Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884, 890 (1962).
57. Such an absurd result in Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793
(1968), led the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to reject the similar locality
rule as it applied to specialists. Brune involved an alleged malpractice in New
Bedford, a community slightly more than fifty miles from Boston. The trial judge had
instructed the jury:
If, in a given case, it were determined by a jury that the ability and skill of the
physician in New Bedford were fifty percent inferior to that which existed in
Boston, a defendant in New Bedford would be required to measure up to the
standard of skill and competence and ability that is ordinarily found by
physicians in New Bedford.
Id. at 104, 235 N.E.2d at 795.
58. 276 Md. at 192-93, 196, 349 A.2d at 248-50. Accord, Raitt v. Johns Hopkins
Hosp., 274 Md. 489, 336 A.2d 90 (1975).
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factor in determining the standard of behavior to which the physician will
be held. Rather, the national standard allows a court to take into account all
the "circumstances" under which the physician practices in its determina-
tion of how the reasonable physician would have conducted himself under
the same or similar circumstances.
The rule adopted by the court thus comports more fully with the realities
of the modern medical malpractice case. It demands of doctors that they be
held accountable to their patients for a quality of care which falls below that
afforded by other physicians who practice under the same or similar
conditions. It ignores the factor of geographic locality, which today has no
bearing upon a physician's skills, in favor of important medical considera-
tions. The rule therefore affords a higher degree of security for all patients
and an easier route to recovery for the innocent victim of the negligent
physician's mistreatment, while placing realistic demands on the entire
medical community.
